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INFORMATION AND DISPLAY  REQUIREMENTS 
FOR INDEPENDENT LANDING MONITORS 
By J.S. Karmarkar  and J . A .  Sorensen  
Sys tems  Cont ro l ,   Inc .  
I .  INTRODUCTION 
There  a r e  m a j o r  e c o n o m i c  r e a s o n s  f o r  p r o v i d i n g  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  
o f   a l l - w e a t h e r   o p e r a t i o n s   t o   m o s t   N a t i o n a l   A i r s p a c e   u s e r s .  The 
f a c t  t h a t  a i r p o r t s  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  c l o s e d  o r  o p e r a t i n g  a t  reduced  
c a p a c i t y  b e c a u s e  o f  low v i s i b i l i t y  i s  a p r i m a r y  s o u r c e  o f  l o s t  
r e v e n u e   a n d   i n c r e a s e d   o p e r a t i n g   c o s t .   P r o l o n g e d   h o l d i n g   p a t t e r n s  
and d i v e r s i o n s  t o  a l t e r n a t e  a i r p o r t s  i n c r e a s e  f u e l  u s a g e ,  l a b o r  
c o s t s ,   a n d   a i r c r a f t   i n e f f i c i e n c y .   T h e s e   d e l a y s   a l s o   d i m i n i s h   u s e r  
good w i l l ,  a n d  i n  some c a s e s ,  c a u s e  t h e  c u s t o m e r  t o  s e e k  a l t e r n a t e  
means   o f   t ranspor ta t ion .   These   economic   cons idera t ions   have   mot i -  
v a t e d  a c o n c e n t r a t e d  e f f o r t  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  g o v e r n -  
men t  agenc ie s - -Na t iona l  Aeronau t i c s  and  Space  Admin i s t r a t ion ,  t he  
Federa l  Avia t ion  Adminis t ra t ion ,  and  the  Depar tment  of  Defense- -  
t o   s p o n s o r   t h e   d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a l l - w e a t h e r  l a n d i n g  c a p a b i l i t y  [ l - 4 1 .  
I n c r e a s i n g  t h e  number o f  I F R  ope ra t ions  and  improvemen t s  i n  
I F R  e f f i c i e n c y  a r e  be ing  accompl ished  through the  deve lopment  of  
advanced   onboard   av ionics   (au tomat ic   l anding   sys tem,   Category  I11 
ILS) .   Bu t   u s ing   t hese   advanced   sys t ems   du r ing   l ow  v i s ib i l i t y  i m -  
p l i e s  t h a t  more p r e c a u t i o n s  m u s t  b e  t a k e n  t o  e n s u r e  f l i g h t  s a f e t y .  
I n  o r d e r  f o r  t h e  p i l o t  t o  a c c e p t  f u l l y  t h e  new e q u i p m e n t  c a p a b i l i t y  
w h i c h  a l l o w s  h i m  t o  l a n d  i n  l o w  v i s i b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s ,  h e  m u s t  b e  
r e a s o n a b l y  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  h i s  c h a n c e s  o f  s a f e  l a n d i n g  a re  a t  l ea s t  
a s  g r e a t  a s  u n d e r  VFR c o n d i t i o n s .  
The a b i l i t y  o f  d i f f e r e n t  u s e r s  t o  p a y  d i f f e r e n t  amounts f o r  
a l l - w e a t h e r  a v i o n i c s  e q u i p m e n t  h a s  r e s u l t e d  i n  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s  o f  
IFR l a n d i n g   c a p a b i l i t y   i n   t h e   r e s p e c t i v e  a i r c r a f t  f l e e t s .  These 
range  f rom  Category I (where  there   must   be a t  l ea s t  a 61 m (200  
f e e t )  a l t i t u d e  v i s i b i l i t y  c e i l i n g )  t o  C a t e g o r y  I I I c  (where   the  
l a n d i n g  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y   b l i n d ) .  Aircraft  av ion ic s   mus t   be  c e r t i -  
f i e d  t o  b e  a l l o w e d  t o  l a n d  u n d e r  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  a n d  t h e  
c e r t i f i c a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  measures o f  
s y s t e m  s a f e t y  ( p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  c a t a s t r o p h i c  a c c i d e n t )  a r e  a d e q u a t e -  
l y  met. For   Category I c o n d i t i o n s ,   t h e   a v i o n i c s   m u s t   a l l o w   t h e  
p i l o t  t o  g e t  below 200  f e e t  a n d  b e  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  l i n e d  up w i t h  
the   runway   fo r  a manual   anding.   For   Category I I I a  o p e r a t i o n ,  
p r e s e n t  l a n d i n g  s y s t e m s  h a v e  u t i l i z e d  a u t o m a t i c  l a n d i n g  t o  p a s s  
c e r t i f i c a t i o n   r e q u i r e m e n t s .  To m e e t   t h e s e   r e q u i r e m e n t s   c u r r e n t l y  
n e c e s s i t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  a u t o m a t i c  l a n d i n g  ( a u t o l a n d )  s y s t e m  h a v e  
m u l t i p l e  component  redundancy t o  g u a r d  a g a i n s t  f a i l u r e .  
Avionics  sys tem improvements  which  have  been  sugges ted  to  
improve  a l l -wea the r  l and ing  capab i l i t y  inc lude  deve lopmen t  o f  
p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  ( 1 )  a l l o w  l a n d i n g  w i t h  l o w e r  v i s i -  
b i l i t y  limits, and ( 2 )  u s e  t h e  p i l o t ' s  m o n i t o r i n g  a b i l i t y  t o  
r e d u c e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c o m p l e x i t y  o f  t h e  a u t o m a t i c  l a n d i n g  s y s t e m s .  
These  des i r ed  improvemen t s  have  p roduced  the  need  fo r  r e -examina -  
t i o n  o f  t he  po ten t i a l  ro l e  o f  t he  Independen t  Land ing  Moni to r  
(ILM).  Such a dev ice   wou ld   ob ta in   i ndependen t   i n fo rma t ion   abou t  
t h e  s t a t e  of  t h e  a i r c r a f t  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  runway t o  a l l o w  t h e  
p i l o t  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  l a n d i n g  o p e r a t i o n .  
1. A l l o w   l o w e r i n g   t h e   v i s i b i l i t y  minimums w h i l e   m a i n t a i n -  
i n g  t h e  p r e s e n t - d a y  l e v e l s  o f  s a f e t y .  
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2 .  A l l o w   t h e   p i l o t   t o   d e t e r m i n e   w h e t h e r   a n   a n o m a l y   h a s   o c c u r -  
r e d  i n  t h e  o n b o a r d  g u i d a n c e  s y s t e m  o r  t h e  g r o u n d - b a s e d  
ILS o r  MLS s i , g n a l   d u r i n g   t h e   l a n d i n g   p h a s e .   T h i s   i n f o r -  
ma t ion  inc ludes  the  dec i s ion  o f  whe the r  manua l  l and ing  
o r  manual  go-around should be at tempted.  
3.  Guide t h e  a i r c r a f t  fo r   manua l   and ing   o r   go -a round   i n  
c a s e  o f  t a k e o v e r  d u r i n g  f l i g h t .  
4 .  Guide t h e   a i r c r a f t   i n  case of f a u l t   d u r i n g   g r o u n d   r o l l  
o r  t a k e o f f .  
5. Detect f a u l t s   o r   p i l o t   b l u n d e r s   d u r i n g   t h e   a p p r o a c h   p h a s e .  
Thus ,  t he  ILM c a n  p o t e n t i a l l y  i m p r o v e  a i r c r a f t  o p e r a t i o n a l  economy 
by a l lowing  more o p e r a t i o n s  i n  l o w  v i s i b l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  by 
r e d u c i n g  t h e  r e q u i r e d  a u t o l a n d  e q u i p m e n t  r e d u n d a n c y  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  
i n i t i a l  i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  t h e  r e c u r r i n g  m a i n t e n a n c e  c o s t s  would  be 
reduced.  However, i f  t h e  ILM i s  t o  b e   u s e d   t o   r e a l i z e   t h e s e   c o s t  
s a v i n g s ,  i t  must  be shown t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  l e v e l  o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  
s a f e t y  i s  a t  l e a s t  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h a t  of  t o d a y ' s  s y s t e m s .  
Previous 'Developments 
The p r e v i o u s  work on t h e  ILM has  main ly  focused  on t h e  d e v e l -  
opment o f  s e n s o r s  t o  p r o v i d e  a p e r s p e c t i v e  v i e w  o f  t h e  t e r r a i n  
ahead of  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  The i d e a  was t h a t  i f  a n   a d e q u a t e   d i s p l a y  
c o u l d  b e  d e v e l o p e d ,  t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o u l d  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h e  
n o r m a l  v i s u a l  c u e s  s u c h  t h a t  a low v i s i b i l i t y  a p p r o a c h  c o u l d  be 
execu ted .  
An e a r l y  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  a l a n d i n g  m o n i t o r  ( f o r  ILS ap-  
p roaches )  was the  Bendix  Microvis ion  Sys tem [SI t e s t e d  o n  a C-131 
a t  W r i g h t - P a t t e r s o n  A i r  Force  Base,   Ohio  in   1961.  One o f   t h e  
m a i n  t e c h n i c a l  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  t h e  e a r l y  M i c r o v i s i o n  S y s t e m  was t h a t  
t h e  s y s t e m  r e q u i r e d  t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  a c t i v e  t r a n s p o n d e r s  on 
t h e  runway s u r f a c e ,  w h i c h  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g r e e m e n t  
3 
a n d   i n s t a l l a t i o n   a n d   m a i n t e n a n c e   c o s t s .   S e c o n d l y ,   t o   p r o d u c e  a 
co inc ident  image  of  the  runway,  us ing  a r a d a r  r e t u r n  s t a b i l i z e d  
by means o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  c o m m e r c i a l  q u a l i t y  a t t i t u d e  g y r o s c o p e s ,  
was t e c h n i c a l l y   i m p o s s i b l e  a t  t h a t  time. The d i s t r a c t i o n  t o  t h e  
p i l o t  o f  a runway  image  (formed  by  the  transponders)  moving  around 
o v e r  t h e  r e a l  w o r l d  runway  was  more than  enough,  by i t s e l f ,  t o  
d i s c o u r a g e   f u r t h e r   d e v e l o p m e n t .   L a s t l y ,   t h e r e  was a growing 
a w a r e n e s s  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  p r o v i d i n g  p i l o t  p e r f o r m a n c e  c o n -  
s i s t e n c y  t o  a n  a d e q u a t e l y  h i g h  c o n f i d e n c e  l e v e l .  
The  Lockheed I L M  d e v e l o p m e n t  u t i l i z i n g  a Texas  Ins t rumen t s  
r a d a r  [6]  was b a s e d  p r i m a r i l y  u p o n  t h e  p r e m i s e  t h a t  p i l o t  c o n f i -  
dence i n  a c o m p l e t e l y  a u t o m a t i c  l a n d i n g  s y s t e m  f o r  u s e  i n  l o w e r  
than  Ca tegory  I1  v i s i b i l i t y  m i g h t  wel l  need  "boos t ing"  by v i s i b i l -  
i t y  enhancement   of   the   runway.  The purpose  o f  t h e  I L M  was t o  p r o -  
v ide  h igh  r e so lu t ion  r ada r  mapp ing  o f  t he  runway  dur ing  Ca tegor i e s  
I ,  11, o r  I11 au tomat i c   app roach   and   l and ings .  The r e a s o n   f o r  
landing  moni tor  independence  was t o  s i m p l i f y  t h e  f a i l u r e  a n a l y s i s  
by  avoid ing  any  in te rconnec t ion  be tween the  ILM and  the  au tomat i c  
a p p r o a c h   a n d   l a n d i n g   s y s t e m .   M o r e o v e r ,   t h e   h i s t o r i c a l l y   l o n g  time 
l a p s e  b e t w e e n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  a new u n i v e r s a l  g r o u n d  
a i d ,  i t s  adopt ion  by I C A O ,  and i t s  u n i v e r s a l   i m p l e m e n t a t i o n   a l s o  
encouraged  independence.  The Lockheed ILM concept  was a go/no-go 
m o n i t o r  f o r  t h e  a u t o l a n d  s y s t e m  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  f l i g h t  
d i r e c t o r .  I t s  i n t e n t  was t o   a l l o w   t h e   p i l o t   t o   j u d g e   w h e t h e r   o r  
n o t   t h e   l a n d i n g  was p r o c e e d i n g   s a t i s f a c t o r i l y .  The  Lockheed ILM 
development was n o t  c o m p l e t e d  p a r t i a l l y  b e c a u s e  o f  i n d e c i s i o n  o n  
i t s  f i n a l  r o l e  a n d  b e n e f i t s .  
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In contrast to the forward looking radar ILM developed for Lock- 
heed, the concept [performance  and failure assessment monitor 
(PAFAM)] proposed and  implemented  by McDonnell-Douglas was strictly 
a hardware monitor receiving inputs from the primary autoland sys- 
tem [ 7 ] .  Based on internal models relating to the proper function- 
ing of the key subsystems of the autoland system, the  monitor made 
an assessment of  the  total performance and failure state of the air- 
craft system in  terms of a predicted touchdown point. The underly- 
ing objective of this concept was  to  assist the pilot in  .making 
go/no-go decisions under pressure  and fn face of landing  uncertainty. 
The goal of the system was to design the performance monitor to re- 
duce  the  landing risk without imposing an unacceptable economic pen- 
alty in the number o f  aborted  approaches. The PAFAM system, though 
conceptually attractive, has not met with wide acceptance by  the 
airline  industry. The principal  difficulty  lies in the  fact  that 
in the current implementation, it is very difficult to assure  the 
integrity of the primary autoland system in the presence of exist- 
ing interconnections with the PAFAM system. 
During the course of  other studies of the  potential  role  and 
benefits of a perspective display  as  an ILM, simulator  based experi- 
ments were conducted  for  each  phase of flight in the  terminal 
area [ 8 ] .  These  studies  concluded  that although a number of flight 
parameters are useful in  assessing  system performance, the usage 
of a perspective runway  display  is not essential. 
Objectives and Scope of  Study 
To determine if the  ILM potential can be realized, it  is even- 
tually necessary to develop demonstration models for testing  either 
in flight or in a cokkpit simulator. To develop these models, it 
was first necessary to: (1) determine current and potential sensor 
capabilities, from 
ILM mechanization, 
a technological point-of-view, applicable  to 
and ( 2 )  determine how sensor measurements should 
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be  processed in an ILM and displayed to tha crew for flight evalu- 
ation.  The first item (which was the subject of a separate study) 
will be  combined with the second item (documented in this study 
report)  to formulate ground  based  cockpit simulator experiments 
leading to ILM flight test. 
specific objectives of this  study were as follows [ 2 ] :  
First, the various potential applications of an ILM were 
to be reviewed and reduced to a set  that  was  most appro- 
priate in  terms  of future development. The complete 
objective here was to define  the ILM functions, and to 
determine the information (type and reliability)  that  is 
required  by  the  pilot  and crew for the realization of 
each of these  functions. 
Next, various ways the ILM could be mechanized (in terms 
of sensor measurement processing  and  display) were to  be 
considered.  This required assessing different concepts 
of  how faults  could be detected, how the information 
could be displayed  to pilot/crew, and what different 
crew procedures would  be required to execute each  of  the 
flight  options  that  the ILM could indicate. 
The final objective was to recommend which ILM concepts 
should be studied in further detail. 
The first objective, defining  the ILM applications, was done 
in terms of operational implications and hardware (sensors, pro- 
cessor, display)  requirements. These definitions then allowed  the 
ILM applications, which could be evaluated by analytical techniques 
(as opposed  to cockpit simulator), to be selected for further 
study.  These  included providing: (1) backup fault monitoring  of 
the  primary  autoland system, and (2) manual backup  guidance  in  the 
event o f  a fault. The  types of information possibly  required  in the 
ILM to mechanize  these  applications include: 
(1) status o f  the  aircraft states, 
( 2 )  whether a fault  or  anomaly  has occurred, 
( 3 )  the type of anomaly, 
6 
(4) what action the pilot and crew should take, and 
(5)  guidance information for conducting that action. 
The reliability reqdrements of this information were determined 
by conducting a safety analysis. 
The second objective, determining how to mechanize these ILM 
applications, required conducting  the following investigations: 
(1) Determining how  a fault could be detected  and possibly 
discriminated from independent  aircraft state measure- 
ment s. 
( 2 )  Determining how long it takes  to recovery manually  from 
a perturbed condition after a' fault  has been detected. 
( 3 )  Determining  the  appropriate fault recovery strategy as 
a function of aircraft  altitude. 
(4) Specifying alternate ways  this strategy and  the associ- 
ated guidance requirements could  be  displayed to  the 
crew. 
These investigative requirements thus  formulated a systematic pro- 
cedure for determining information and  display requirements of the 
ILM  and  analyzing  landing  systems. 
The approach used  to conduct this  study  then  consisted  of  five 
steps that were quite interrelated. These steps  are shown as an 
iterative process  by  the flow chart shown in  Figure 1. Before us- 
ing this procedure, it was necessary to define (in terms of analy- 
tical  models) elements of the aircraft/autoland/MLS/operating 
environment that need to  be considered when  developing  the  ILM. 
In addition, the possible uses of the ILM were defined  in  detail. 
However, the flight system and  the  terminal area flight profile are 
complex, and  because of the  limited  effort possible, the  study con- 
centrated primarily on use of the ILM  during the final landing por- 
tion of flight [300 m (1000  feet)  altitude down to  touchdown]. 
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Environment F l i g h t   P r o f i l e  
m A i r c r a f t  Autoland/MLS/ 
(Chapter 11) 
Safety 
(Chapter 111 and Appendix A) 
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Catastrophe 
ILM R e l i a b i l i t y   P r o b a b i l i t y   o f Landing 
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(Chapter IV and 
Appendix C) 
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Va l ida t ion  of Assumptions 
(Chapter VI) 
Def in i t i on  
System Spec i f i ca t ion  
Display Requirements 
Crew Procedures 
Computer/Sensor Spec i f i ca t ion  
FIGURE 1. - OVERVIEW OF APPROACH USED TO ESTABLISH INFORMATION AND 
DISPLAY  REQUIREMENTS OF AN INDEPENDENT LANDING MONITOR 
. 
With t h e  o p e r a t i n g  s c e n a r i o  a n d  f l i g h t  s y s t e m  d e f i n e d ,  s p e c i -  
f y i n g  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  u n d e r  w h i c h  a n  ILM mus t  ope ra t e  was t h e  f i r s t  
s t e p   o f   t h e   a n a l y s i s .  The b a s i c   c o n s t r a i n t  i s  t h a t   l a n d i n g   s a f e t y  
mus t  be  p re se rved ;  t he  sys t em us ing  the  ILM must  improve  landing 
c a p a b i l i t y   w i t h   e q u i v a l e n t   f l i g h t   s a f e t y .  The a s s o c i a t e d   s a f e t y  
c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  ILM were  de te rmined  us ing  a p r o b a b i l i t y  t r e e  
w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  e v e n t s  ( s u c h  a s  a u t o l a n d  f a u l t ,  
s e v e r e   w i n d   g u s t s ,  ILM f a i l u r e )   i n c l u d e d .  The r e s u l t  was  a s p e c i -  
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f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  a c c u r a c y  a n d  r e l i a b i l i t y  l e v e l s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  
ILM. 
The i n i t i a l  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  ILM i s  t o  d e t e c t  s y s t e m  f a u l t s  
( a u t o l a n d ,  MLS, o r  severe w i n d s )  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  crew can  be  warned. 
T h u s ,  t h e  s e c o n d  s t e p  was t o  d e t e r m i n e  how t h e  f a u l t s  c o u l d  be 
d e t e c t e d  by ILM s o f t w a r e  a n d  w h a t  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  t i m i n g  r e q u i r e -  
m e n t s   ( t i m e - t o - d e t e c t   f a u l t )  were. Th i s   phase   o f   t he   s tudy   u sed  
t h e  s a f e t y  b u d g e t  v ' a l u e s  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s t e p .  
Af te r  a f a u l t  h a s  b e e n  d e t e c t e d ,  it i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  know  how 
long  i t  t a k e s  f o r  manua l  r ecove ry  to  a l low a safe  g o - a r o u n d  o r  t h e  
c o n t i n u a t i o n   o f   t h e   l a n d i n g   s e q u e n c e .  The t h i r d   s t e p   o f   t h e   s t u d y  
was t o  d e t e r m i n e  f a u l t  r e c o v e r y  time ( t i m e - t o - c o r r e c t )  f r o m  v a r i -  
o u s   e r r o r   s t a t e s .   T h i s   r e c o v e r y   t i m e  i s  f u n d a m e n t a l   t o   t h e   d e t e r -  
mina t ion  of  what  crew s t r a t e g y  ( g o - a r o u n d  o r  c o n t i n u e  t h e  l a n d i n g )  
shou ld  be u s e d ,   g i v e n   t h a t  a f a u l t   h a s   b e e n   d e t e c t e d .  The s t r a t e . g y  
i s  s e l e c t e d  t h a t  y i e l d s  t h e  maximum s a f e t y  o n  a p r o b a b i l i s t i c  
b a s i s .  
The f o u r t h  s t e p  was t o  combine  t ime- to -de tec t  and  t ime- to -  
c o r r e c t  r e s u l t s  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  e n v e l o p e  a r o u n d  t h e  l a n d i n g  f l i g h t  
p a t h  w i t h i n  w h i c h  f a u l t  r e c o v e r y  i s  poss ib l e  f rom a s a f e t y  p o i n t -  
o f -v i ew.   Th i s   enve lope  i s  u s e d   t o   d e t e r m i n e   f r o m   w h a t   a l t i t u d e s  
f a u l t  r e c o v e r y  c a n  b e  made s a f e l y  a n d  w h a t  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  r e c o v e r y  
s t r a t e g y   s h o u l d   b e   a s  a f u n c t i o n   o f   a l t i t u d e .  The t h i r d ,   f o u r t h ,  
and f i f t h  s t e p s  j u s t  d e s c r i b e d  derSine f u n c t i o n a l l y  t h e  d a t a  p r o -  
c e s s i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  ILM, what  measurements (ILM i n p u t s )  
a re  n e c e s s a r y ,  how a c c u r a t e  t h e  m e a s u r e m e n t s  s h o u l d  b e ,  and  what 
u ses  can  be  made o f  t h e  ILM d u r i n g  t h e  l a n d i n g  p h a s e  as a backup 
t o  a u t o m a t i c  l a n d i n g .  
The f i f t h  s t e p  o f  t h e  s t u d y  was t o  e x a m i n e  d i f f e r e n t  ways 
t h e   i n f o r m a t i o n   f r o m   t h e  ILM c o u l d   b e   p r e s e n t e d   t o   t h e  crew. Both 
a lphanumer ic   (pe r fo rmance   mon i to r ing   and   f au l t   r ecove ry  command) 
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a n d  p i c t o r i a l  ( a i r c r a f t  s t a t e  a n d   g u i d a n c e   i n f o r m a t i o n )   d i s p l a y s  
were   cons ide red .   Assoc ia t ed  crew procedures   t ha t   wou ld  make use  
o f  t h e s e  d i s p l a y s  was a l s o  s p e c i f i e d .  
A f t e r  t h e s e  f i v e  s t e p s  were completed,  a s e r i e s  o f  recommen- 
d a t i o n s  was made c o n c e r n i n g  w h a t  t h e  n e x t  s t e p s  s h o u l d  b e  i n  
i n v e s t i g a t i n g   t h e   p o t e n t i a l   o f   t h e  ILM. Recommendations  include 
the   deve lopment   o f   exper imenta l  ILM d e s i g n s  w h i c h  a r e  s u i t a b l e  
f o r   s i m u l a t o r   a n d   f l i g h t   t e s t i n g .  T h e   s y s t e m   d e s c r i p t i o n ,   t h e  
m a t e r i a l  d e v e l o p e d  i n  t h e  f i v e  s t e p s ,  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  recommen- 
d a t i o n s  a r e  t h e  s u b j e c t s  o f  t h e  n e x t  s e v e n  c h a p t e r s  o f  t h i s  
r e p o r t .  
I n  summary, t h i s  r e p o r t  i s  o rgan ized  as f o l l o w s :  
1. The s e c o n d   c h a p t e r   p r e s e n t s   t h e   t e r m i n a l   a r e a   o p e r a t i n g  
s c e n a r i o   i n   t e r m s   o f   e c o n o m i c   f a c t o r s ,   a p p r o a c h   t r a j e c -  
t o r i e s ,   n a v i g a t i o n   a i d s ,   a i r c r a f t   t y p e s ,   a v i o n i c s ,   a n d  
c rew  p rocedures .  ILM a p p l i c a t i o n   d e t a i l s   a n d   t h e   m a i n  
p remises  on  wh ich  th i s  s tudy  i s  based  a r e  a l s o  p r e s e n t e d .  
2 .  The t h i r d   c h a p t e r   p r e s e n t s   t h e   s y s t e m   s a f e t y   b u d g e t  
a n a l y s i s  as a b a s i s   f o r :   ( a )   j u s t i f y i n g   t h e   i n c o r p o r a -  
t i o n  o f  a n  ILM i n t o  t h e  p r i m a r y  a u t o l a n d  s y s t e m ,  ( b )  
d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  e q u i p m e n t  p e r f o r m a n c e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s ,   a n d   ( c )   f o r m u l a t i n g   t h e  optimum p o s t  f a u l t  
crew r e c o v e r y   p r o c e d u r e   s e q u e n c e   ( i . e . ,  ILM s t r a t e g y ) .  
3 .  The f o u r t h  c h a p t e r  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  f a u l t  
d e t e c t i o n  a n d  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  a l g o r i t h m s  ( c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t h e  m a i n  p r e m i s e s  o f  t h e  s t u d y )  t o  m e e t  t h e  s y s t e m  s a f e t y  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s   p r e v i o u s l y   g e n e r a t e d .  The s p e c i f i c   a l g o -  
r i t h m  s t u d i e d  i n  d e t a i l  c o n s i s t s  o f  a combina t ion  o f  t he  
s t a t i s t i c a l  c h i - s q u a r e  ( ~ 2 )  t e s t  a n d   t h e   S t u d e n t ' s   ( t )  
t e s t .  C o m p u t e r   s i m u l a t i o n   r e s u l t s  a r e  p r e s e n t e d   t o  
v a l i d a t e  t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  c o m p u t a t i o n s  p e r f o r m e d .  
4 .  The f i f t h   c h a p t e r   d e a l s   w i t h   t h e   f a u l t   r e c o v e r y   p e r -  
formance o f  t h e  s y s t e m  u s i n g  a v a i l a b l e  p i l o t  m o d e l s  a n d  
t h e   c o v a r i a n c e   p r o p a g a t i o n   t e c h n i q u e .   S t a r t i n g   w i t h  
t h e  s y s t e m  s t a t e  m a n i f o l d  a t  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n ,  t h i s  p h a s e  
o f  t h e  s t u d y  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  r e c o v e r y  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  t o  
b r i n g  t h e  s y s t e m  s t a t e  m a n i f o l d  w i t h i n  a c c e p t a b l e  limits, 
from a s a f e t y  p o i n t - o f - v i e w .  
1 0  
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5. The sixth chapter brings together the safety budget, 
fault detection and discrimination, and  fault recovery 
analyses to assess total time  to recovery from a fault. 
The results are used to generate the  ILM  strategy (in 
terms of crew procedures) for the  landing  phase of flight. 
Then, two display configura.tions are presented which can 
be used to provide necessary information to  the  crew. 
6 .  The seventh chapter summarizes the study results from 
' the viewpoint of system safety, fault detection/discrim- 
ination, fault recovery, system implementation and  ILM 
usage  strategy. The main areas requiring  further 
research are described, and a simulator/flight test 
validation plan is recommended. 
7 .  Appendices A ,  B, and C present  technical details used  in 
the second through fifth chapters. 
The reader who wishes to skip the  study  details  can directly 
peruse  the summary and conclusions presented in the seventh 
chapter. 
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11. BACKGROUND 
T.his chapter provides necessary background  concerning the flight 
system and terminal area environment  in which the I L M  must  operate. 
Also, different applications of the I L M  are summarized, and  specific 
applications studied  in  this  effort  are  explained. The material  in 
this chapter affects the methodology used throughout the  study. Nec- 
essary subsystem details are  discussed  and definition of hardware 
and software constraints used to specify system requirements are 
given . 
An overview is  first given of the relationship of the  elements 
in the flight  system. Then, details  are  presented of the  terminal 
area environment, associated crew procedures, autoland  system con- 
siderations, and microwave landing  system ..considerations. The 
I L M  applications are presented  in  terms of what the corresponding 
general information and  display requirements are.  The operational 
implications of each application are listed, and justification is 
given  for  the  specific applications evaluated  in  this  study. 
Overview 
The terminal area environment can be described  in flow chart 
form  as in Figure 2 .  The total  system  includes  the aircraft, auto- 
land system, aircraft state sensors, airborne displays, ground land- 
ing aids, air traffic control, the runway and  surrounding terrain, 
wind, pilot, and  the ILM.  The I L M  consists of airborne sensors, a 
data processor, associated  displays  and  monitoring instrumentation, 
and  possibly  ground  based  aids. 
Based on the command and  advisory information presented  to  the 
pilot through cockpit displays, instruments, and monitors, either 
manual or automatic control of the aircraft is  used. The pilot and 
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crew's decision making process is  aided  by vestibular motion cues 
and out-of-window visual cues. Under ceiling and visibility unlim- 
ited '(CAVU)  weat'her conditions, the pilot can execute a "successful" 
manual landing with these cues alone. On the other hand, -under 
low visibility conditions, these cues are misleading and partially 
or totally  lacking the required information content. The pilot  and 
crew currently do not have display capabilities required for exe- 
cuting a "safe" manual landing under these conditions. 
A "safe" manual landing  is a process in which the probability 
of a catastrophic accident occurring is  very  small (e.g. , 
Technical details pertaining to this probabilistic analysis are de- 
veloped in Appendix A .  Because such a level of safety cannot be 
met when the aircraft is under manual control  in low visibility, 
this has led  to  the  development of the  automatic  landing  system. 
Different types of autoland systems with different  levels of redun- 
dancy  and reliability have been developed, which are  discussed 
shortly. Because different levels of reliability are present, each 
of these systems is  certified to operate in  different weather condi- 
tions. For example, an autoland  system  certified for Category 11, 
will allow the  aircraft to  be automatically f lown down to 30m 
(100 feet) altitude. At  that point, the pilot must  establish vis- 
ual  contact with the  runway  for  monitoring  purposes to allow  the 
autoland to proceed with the landing or to execute a go-around. A 
Category I11 autoland system is certified to  be operational down 
to touchdown. 
Associated with each  type of autoland system, there  exists 
different applications of the  Independent  Landing  Monitor. The 
benefits that these applications can produce are as follows: 
1. Increased landing performance-- The ILi4 can compliment the 
autoland system such that  landing can take  place  in  lower 
visibility conditions than what the autoland system opera- 
ting alone  is certified for. This can be  accomplished 
because the  ILM provides additional monitoring capability 
of the  flight  system  to the pilot. This increases the 
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level of safety and allows the aircraft to be flown auto- 
matically to a lower altitude before visual contact with 
the runway must be  made. 
2 .  Increased safety - -  The ILM can be used  to detect out-of- 
tolerance wind gusts or other aircraft on the runway that 
the autoland sensors cannot do. Thus, additional safety 
is provided to  the  system. In addition, these features 
serve the pilot as confidence builders in the autoland 
system. 
3 .  Reduced redundancy - -  Several autoland systems discussed 
later  have  a  high degree of subsystem redundancy to  ensure 
that the probability of failure in flight is  acceptably 
low. To maintain this redundant equipment is  expensive. 
The ILM can potentially reduce the required redundancy by 
taking  advantage of the sensing and monitoring capabilities 
of the pilot and  crew.  By providing sufficient information 
to  the crew, the ILM enables using a less redundant primary 
autoland; this reduces both  the initial investment  and  the 
subsequent equipment maintenance costs. 
Thus, there are three factors which must be considered when analyz- 
ing  the ILM and  its applications - landing performance, safety, 
and  equipment redundancy. In the subsequent sections, the elements 
of Figure 2 are considered  in terms of these three measures. These 
measures also dictate the constraints placed upon the  information 
and display requirements for the Independent Landing Monitor. 
Terminal Area Environment And Crew Procedures 
The terminal area environment can be described in  a  graphical 
fashion as in Figure 2 .  The total terminal area environment consists 
of the  aircraft/autoland system with the associated airborne sensors 
for navigation and control, the  ground based navigation aids (e.g., 
MLS, ILS), and the air traffic control system (ATC). The purpose 
of the ATC system is to schedule the aircraft in the, landing queue, 
report  pertinent  data  such as weather, runway  visual range (RVR), 
wind  and other traffic.. 
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The number of terminal area parameters that in some way affect 
the  ILM  system concept is  rather  large. Table 1 summarizes the 
principal aspects of the  terminal  area flight path, atmospheric con- 
ditions, pilot/crew  procedural considerations, landing characteris- 
tics and  airport characteristics. These and  other considerations 
must  be  investigated prior to the actual deployment of any ILM sys- 
tem. 
Terminal area flight path.- A typical terminal area flight 
path consists essentially of an initial, intermediate and final 
approach segment as shown in Figures 3 and 4, A procedure turn  is 
used to transition from  the  initial to the intermediate segment, 
as  shown  in Figure 3 [ 9 1 .  The vertical  profile  for  the fin,al 
approach segment  is  depicted  in Figure 4. This figure also shows 
the  obstacle clearance line (OCL) and missed approach line (MAL), 
in the vertical plane, above which the aircraft must remain during 
the final approach and missed approach, respectively. The corres- 
ponding obstacle clearance slopes in  the lateral plane are 12:l with 
respect to the  runway  centerline for both  approaches. These clear- 
ance requirements are  related  to  the total system  safety as discus- 
sed  in the next chapter. 
Under low visibility conditions, the  roll  out portion o f  the 
aircraft path must be considered with respect to  roll out guidance 
and control. This phase of flight essentially involves a changeover 
from aerodynamic control  to nose wheel control with the objective 
being  to follow the runway  centerline. 
To conduct a detailed ILM requirements study, each portion of 
this flight path must be considered. For the purposes of the 
present study, it was considered adequate to model only the landing 
segment, shown in Figure 4 .  This is justified later. The methodol- 
ogy for conducting a detailed analysis of the entire terminal  area 
flight profile is  included  in Appendix B. 
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TABLE 1.- TERMINAL AREA .PARAMETERS 
I ELEMENTS 
Terminal  Area 
Flight Path 
Atmospheric 
Conditions 
Landing 
Characteristics 
(MLS, ILS, Lights) 
Airport 
Characteristics 
PRINCIPAL ASPECTS 
0 Landing Pattern (3D, 4D, CI 
0 Special Flight Procedures 
0 Ground  Roll Procedures 
0 Steady Winds 
0 Wind Shear 
0 Wind Turbulence 
0 Altitude, Temperature, Pre: 
0 Snow, Fog, Visibility 
0 Aircraft Control Tasks 
0 Monitoring/Decision-Making 
0 Available Cues - Visual, 
0 Other  Work Items 
0 Crew Physical Status 
0 Gain Variation and  Offsets 
0 Transient Due to  Overflighl 
0 Ground Station Failures 
0 Light PattedIntensity 
0 Runway  Gradients  and  Rough] 
0 Approach Terrain 
0 Runway Width, Length  and 
Threshold Distance 
0 Tire-Runway Friction 
Decelerating) 
(Procedure Turns, Merge Po: 
~. 
Vestibular , Aural 
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I 
MAP 
r-"-""" ""-" 
FIGURE  3 . -TYPICAL  TERMINAL  AREA 
TRAJECTORY [ 9 1  
Nomenclature 
DH Decision  Height 
FAF Final Approach Fix  
GPI Ground Point of 
Intercept 
IF  Intermediate  Fix 
MAL Missed Approach Line 
HAP Missed Approach Point 
MDA Minimum Descent 
Alt i tude 
OCL Obstacle  Clearance  Line 
OM Outer Marker 
TCH Threahold  Clearance 
Height 
1 PAC Final Approach Course 
J Threshold 
b- Distance As Appropr ia te - 
FIGURE 4 .  -TYPICAL  FINAL  APPROACH  SEGMENT [ 9 ]  
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Atmospher ic  Condi t ions  
The c e r t i f i c a t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  c o m m e r c i a l  t r a n s p o r t  a i r -  
c r a f t  (FAR 25 and FAR 121)   t o   ope ra t e   unde r   Ca tegory  11 and  Category 
I I Ia  c o n d i t i o n s   h a v e   b e e n   d e f i n e d   b y   t h e  FAA [ lo-121.   Termina l   a rea  
o p e r a t i o n s  i n  t e r m s  o f  runway a v a i l a b i l i t y  a n d  a i r c r a f t  s p a c i n g  a r e  
l a r g e l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  w e a t h e r  c a t e g o r y ,  a s  d e f i n e d  i n  T a b l e  2 
[ 9 ] .  The a i r p o r t   w e a t h e r   c a t e g o r y  i s  de te rmined   ma in ly  by t h e   r u n -  
way v i s u a l  r a n g e  (RVR) ,  which i s  measured  by  ground  based  sensors  
a n d  r e l a y e d  t o  a i r c r a f t  i n  t h e  t e r m i n a l  a r e a  by t h e  ATC system. 
C a t e g o r y   I I I a   a l s o   d e f i n e s   w i n d   c o n d i t i o n   [ 1 2 ]  limits a n d   t h e   c o r -  
responding  touchdown parameter  mani fo ld  denot ing  a " s a f e "  l a n d i n g  
[ l l ,   1 2 1 ;   t h e s e   a r e   g i v e n   i n   T a b l e s  3 and 4 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I n  t h e  
i n t e r e s t  o f  compar ison ,  the  Category  I1 window d e f i n e d  a t  d e c i s i o n  
h e i g h t  30m ( 1 0 0  f e e t )  i s  a l s o   n o t e d   i n   T a b l e  4 .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  a g i v e n  a i r c r a f t - a u t o l a n d  c o n f i g u r a -  
t i o n  m e e t s  t h e  C a t e g o r y  I11 r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  l a n d i n g  s a f e t y ,  
s i m u l a t i o n  s t u d i e s  a r e  t y p i c a l l y  c o n d u c t e d  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  t h e  
touchdown  manifold  in   Table  3 i s  n o t  v i o l a t e d  i n  a s t a t i s t i c a l  s e n s e  
[ 1 5 ] .   D e t a i l s   p e r t a i n i n g   t o   t h e   r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e s e   s t u d i e s   a r e  
p r e s e n t e d  i n  the  next  chapter  and  Appendix  A .  
To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  C a t e g o r y  I 1  and  Category I11 
w e a t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  c e r t a i n  a i r p o r t  l o c a t i o n s ,  a t y p i c a l  summary 
o f  r e p o r t e d  w e a t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s  by l a n d i n g  c a t e g o r y  i s  g i v e n  i n  
Table  5 [ 1 4 ] .   B a s e d   o n   h i s   r o u t e   s t r u c t u r e ,   t h e   a i r l i n e   o p e r a t o r  
c a n  t r a n s l a t e  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  i m p r o v e m e n t  d u e  t o  t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  
of   an ILM t o   r e d u c e   l a n d i n g   m i n i m a   i n t o   i n c r e a s e d   r e v e n u e s .   T h i s  
a s s u m e s  t h a t  t h e  ILM is  h i g h l y  r e l i a b l e  a n d  t h a t  i t s  u s e  r e q u i r e s  
a minimum of  main tenance  and  ground personnel  t ra in ing .  
20 
TABLE  2.-ICAO  ILS  WEATHER  CATEGORIES 
CATEGORY 
I 
I1 
1113. 
I J I b  
I I I C  
-,- 
"- 
TABLE  3.-CATEGORY I11 WIND  CONDITION  CONSTRAINTS 
Qil.\\'r I T \  
.~ "" . , . ~ .. . . . - -. 
Henduind 
T a i i u i n d  
Croswind 
T u r b u l e n c e   ( s h e a r )  
'lACVIT[IrJI: 
< 2 5  Lts 
< 1 0  k t s  
< 1 5  k t s  
B kts/30.Sm from 61m ( 2 0 0  f e e t )  down 
t o  touchdown (TD) 
600/V 600/V  3
TABLE  4.-CATEGORY I11 AND  CATEGORY I1 PARAMETER  MANIFOLD (10) 
I 
QiJ.\STITY 
" 
L o n g i t u d i n a l / V e r t i c a l  
L a t e r a l  
Sink R a t e  
Late ' ra l   Speed/Forward   Speed  
Crab Angle 
Y o r s t   C a s e   L o n g i t u d i n a l  
. Y o r s t  C a s e  L a t e r a l  
'rOUCill)ol\'S ?I:\SI ITJLnS 
c;\'rl:lx)l:Y I I I 
+ 76.3m ( 2 5 0  f e e t ) /  - - - - 
- + 3.05m ( 1 0  f e e t )  
O.Glm/s ( 2  f e c t / s )  
- + l.ZZm/s ( 4  f e e t / s ) /  + 2 k t s  
+ 2" - 
6 1  . o m  ( 2 0 0  f e e t )   f r o m  
t h r c s h o l d  
c TD < 761m ( 2 5 0 0  f c e t )  
from t h r e s h o l d  
More t h a n  1 . 5 r m  (5 f e e t )  
from edge r o r  46m 
(150  fee t )   wide   runh 'ay  
CATIIGORY I I I\'I snob 
" -  /+ 3.66m 0 2  i e e t )  
- + 22m ( 7 2  f e e t )  
" -  
" -  / 5 S k t s  
_ "  
" -  
TABLE 5. - SUMMARY OF REPORTED WEATHER BY LANDING 
CATEGORY I N  HOURS PER MONTH [14] 
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Crew Procedures 
As the  aircraft proceeds automatically along the flight path 
depicted  in Figures 3 and 4 ,  the crew must monitor the operation of 
the autoland  system. The set of discrete autoland actions that  the 
crew must monitor is shown in Figure 5. The typical time sequence 
of flap, throttle, landing gear, decrab, flare  and  brake/spoiler 
deployment  is  presented in this  figure. Simultaneously, the crew 
must also monitor whether the current state of the aircraft is 
acceptable. Typically, the crew is interested in flight path angle, 
vertical velocity, pitch.attitude, slant range and range rate, velo- 
city  vector  and cross track error and  error  rate. These have been 
graphically depicted  in Figures 6a and 6b, respectively. 
The onboard monitor and  display subsystem of the typical auto- 
land [16] normally provides the crew with status  (autoland  mode)  and 
command (flight  director  mode)  information. Additionally, the 
pilot  and crew receive vestibular motion cues, possible out-of-window 
visual cues, and  oral cues from  the  ATC  system  (Figure 2). Thus, 
based on information derived from many  different sources, the pilot 
is  required  to  make a judgement regarding the proper functioning 
of the  elements of the  primary  autoland  system. Clearly, this is 
a complex  task which taxes  the  pilot's decision making capability 
even under clear visibility  conditions.  Under  low  visibility 
conditions (when  the out-of-window visual cues are deficient, mis- 
leading, or totally  lacking) when an upset occurs, the pilot simply 
cannot  cope with the  decision making and  monitoring tasks. Here, he 
must be looking  at  all  the  cockpit instrumentation and  deciding 
whether (a) the  autoland was malfunctioning, (b) the  external environ- 
ment (e.g., wind gust) was unacceptable, or (c) the MLS signal was 
not within the specified category tolerances. 
One potentially attractive  approach  to alleviating this informa- 
tion  deficiency is  to incorporate a system, operating independently 
from  the  primary  guidance system, which  would allow the pilot and 
crew to  assess the performance o f  the autoland system, MLS, and 
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N 
P 
-1.5 
I 
b- C r i t i c a l  Zone - 
Automatic/Manual 
Taxi  **1 
Brakes/Spoilers 
Touchdown 
Wheel H e i g h t ‘ t o  Touchdown (m AGL) 
1 15 60 600 
1 :  I 1 v ” 1 I 
D i s t a n c e  t o  Touchdown (km) 
1.5 3.0 6.0 Typical  
I 
I 
I 
I 
A i r c r a f t  
Coordinates 
f o r  F i n a l  
Amroach 
Time To Touchdown (Seconds) TT I . .  
i F l a r e  I 
A l e r t  H e i g h t  
1 
Decrab 
Landing  Flaps 
Landinq Gear 
T h r o t t l e  1 
/I I 
Approach  Flaps 
Normal Crew 
Monitor ing 
A c t i o n s  f o r  
Landing 
Decision 
FIGURE  5.-AUTOMATIC  LANDING  SEQUENCE 
I 
P i t c h  
- 
Rate-of-Closure 
( a )  Vert ica l  Plane 
Aimpoint 
Runway 
7000' 
(Typical) 
Cross Track Rate 
(b) Lateral  Plane 
FIGURE 6.- ILLUSTRATION  OF  AIRCRAFT  STATES  MONITORED  DURING 
THE  LANDING  APPROACH 
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external  environment  in terms of -the aircraft's situation relative 
to the runway, under low visibility conditions. Such an independent 
landing monitor (ILM) system has been schematically presented by 
the shaded blocks  in Figure 2 .  In addition to monitoring the current 
status of  the aircraft, the ILM can have the capability o f  provid- 
ing guidance commands to allow the pilot to execute a go-around, or 
to  continue  the landing sequence provided that the  required  levels 
of safety  are  maintained. 
Autoland System Considerations 
The modern commercial aircraft under automatic control is an 
extremely  complex  system. To gain an appreciation of the complexity 
of such a system depicted  at  the center of Figure 2, the  blocks rep- 
resenting  the  autoland  system  are redrawn in greater detail in Fig- 
ure 7. The autoland-system is a network of sensorsltransducers, 
real time computational algorithms, control systems and actuators 
driving  the aerodynamic surfaces. A partial list of the associated 
autoland sensors and transducers is given in Table 6. 
The failure of one or more of these elements of the total avi- 
onics/autoland system, during the approach and  landing phase of  flight 
can result in a hazardous condition leading to a catastrophic out- 
come. Thus, to enhance  the reliability of such a system, the entire 
system is generally duplicated and interconnected. A representative 
configuration, namely, triple modular redundancy (TMR), is  depicted 
in Figure 8. This increased reliability is obtained at  the  expense 
of increased  initial capital expenditure and recurring maintenance 
cost. Depending on the  level o f  redundancy (e.g., dual, quadruple) 
and  the redundancy management technique [17]  (e.g., voting, hardware- 
aided software, etc'.) the  resulting avionics systems can continue 
to operate in spite of the  total failure of one or more computers. 
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I Aerodynamic -~ I I Control  System I 
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Trim  Tab  Servo/Clutch/ 
Actuator 
Throttle  LandingGear Actu tor 
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Navigation 
Flight  Control/Stabilizer 
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A1 terna  tor 
Regulators 
Battery  (Standby) 
Hydraul i c POWE 
Motor 
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Real Time  Computer I 
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Air Data 
Navigation 
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Figure 7.-AUTOLAND AIRBORNE HARDWARE BLOCK DIAGRAM (INCLUDING ILM) 
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TABLE 6 . -  AUTOLAND SENSORS/TRANSDUCERS (PARTIAL LIST) 
G B N E U J ,  CATEGORY 
P i l o t  C o n t r o l s   ( A u t o m a t - . i c )  
P i l o t   C o n t r o l   ( M a n u a l )  
A j . r  D a t a   T r a n s d u c e r s  
N a v i g a t i o n   S e n s o r s  
F l i g h t  C o n t r o l  S t a b i l i z a t i o n  
S e n s o r s  
A e r o d y n a m i c   S u r f a c e   P o s i t i o n  
T r a n s d u c e r s  
Engj  ne T r a n s d u c e r s  
TYPES - - 
Mode s e l e c t  p a n e l ,   k e y b o a r d  
g o - a r o u n d  switch, c u t - o u t  
s w i t c h   ( c o m p u t e r )  
Con t ro l  w h e e l   f o r c e   ( p i t c h /  
r o l l )  , trim s w i t c h  
D y n a m i c   p r e s s u r e ,   s t a t i c  
p r e s s u r e ,  a i r  t e m p e r a t u r e ,  
b a r 0   a l t i m e t e r  
VHF N a v .   r e c e i v e r / c o n t r o l l e r /  
a n t e n n a ,   T a c a n   r e c c i v e r / c o n -  
t r o l l e r / a n t e n n a ,  r a d a r  a l t i -  
m e t e r ,  MLS r e c e i v e r / c o n t r o l -  
l e r / a n t e n n a ,  INS, ILS 
V e r t i c a l   g y r o s ,   d i r c c t i . o n n 1  
g y r o ,   r a t e   g y r o s ,   a c c e l e r o -  
m e t e r s ,   s i d e s l i p ,   a n g l e - o f -  
a t t a c k  
E l e v a t o r ,  a i l  e r o n ,  r u d d e r ,  
f l a p ,  trim t a b   ( e l e v a t o r ,  
a i l e r o n ,   r u d d e r ) ,   s p o i l e r s  
T h r o t t l c   p o s i t i o n ,   r p m ,   p r o -  
p e l l e r  p i t c h ,  o i l  p r e s s u r e /  
t e m p e r a t u r e ,   e x h a u s t   g a s  
t e m y e r a t u r e / p r e s s u r e  - 
A "fail-operative" autoland system  is a multiply redundant 
system  that can detect a fault in any one of the redundant channels, 
automatically disconnect that channel, and continue to function 
properly. A "fail-passive" autoland system is a system with ade- 
quate redundancy to detect a fault in  any  one of the redundant 
channels  and automatically disconnect  the  total system, leaving  the 
aircraft  in a safe condition for  manual  takeover. Typically, the 
autoland  system  must  be  fail operative to  be  certified  for Category 
I11 operation. A fail-passive system is  generally required for 
Category I1 certification. The type of system used governs the 
applications which are appropriate for consideration in conjunction 
with the autoland system.. 
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From Sensors  
- 
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Avionics 
Computer 2 
b 
b F1 i g h t  b Voter 
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b 
c 
FIGURE 8.-TRIPLE MODULAR REDUNDANCY CONFIGIJRATION 
In  designing autoland systems, built  in monitors are  added  to 
detect  the occurrence o f  component  failures. Enough monitoring 
capability is added so that  fixed  levels of reliability (associa- 
ted with the  desired certification level)  are  achieved. 
The methodology for deciding which failures are operationally 
significant, and the design o f  appropriate hardware monitors to 
detect these failures and take appropriate action  is a complex, 
time-consuming, iterative design process referred to  as Failure 
Mode and  Effects Analysis (FMEA) [18]. This analysis consists of 
analyzing  the  signal characteristics at different points in each 
autoland subsystem to determine if the possible faults occurring in 
that subsystem can be  detected  fast  enough to ensure  that  the air- 
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craft cannot be upset to an unsafe  attitude. The monitors are 
placed  at  the highest subsystem levels consistent with the relia- 
bility  and  fault detection speed desired. Hardware monitors pro- 
vide signals indicating that failures have occurred, and  they dis- 
connect the failed subsystem. 
The potential benefit of introducing an ILM system is  to re- 
duce  the level of  redundancy.required and the degree of hardware 
monitoring.  Normal  system monitoring can be supplemented with ILM 
derived  information to assess the functioning of the autoland 
system. 
Midrowave Landing System Considerations 
The  United States and other countries are developing a new 
scanning beam Microwave Landing System (MLS), under the auspices 
of ICAO, to provide increased flexibility in precision landing [19]. 
The MLS will permit, through volumetric position information, ad- 
vanced terminal approach paths such as two-segmented  noise-abate- 
ment approaches, and  curved: decelerating flight paths. However, 
because o f  the complexity of these  landing  techniques,  the  pilot 
and  crew's  ability  to monitor the approach progress and projected 
touchdown state will be more difficult than for the straight, flat, 
constant configuration and  speed operations used with present-day 
Instrument Landing Systems (ILS). 
The degree of trust which can be placed in  the correctness of  
the  information supplied by the MLS facility [21]  is referred to 
as  its integrity. The integrity requirement for MLS is  as follows: 
When the  system  (ground/airborne)  is operating in a "full  up" Cat- 
egory I11 status, with no "abnormal" operating indications, the 
probability of both  lateral  and/or vertical guidance elements 
failing  during  the next 10 seconds (which can result in  the radia- 
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tion of a potentially hazardous guidance .signal, or the loss of 
signal)  will  be less than 
Degradation of MLS data produces primarily "false  course" or, 
more properly, "false position fixing"  phenomena. Table 7 lists 
some of the major sources of MLS integrity degradation and correl- 
ates them to the  type of integrity loss produced. The major envi- 
ronmental source of MLS integrity degradation is multipath effects. 
The major single approach to integrity  assurance  is again the use 
of hardware  monitors. To mechanize a category I11 fail-operative 
ground system; a triplicate voting monitor system with fully redun- 
dant  ground  transmitters has been proposed. If the standby trans- 
mitter has been degraded  beyond an acceptable course alignment 
tolerance, after it is on the air, an immediate shutdown will take 
place. During the  time  the  standby  transmitter  is  on  the air, the 
facility category status will be  downgraded  and  displayed  to pilots 
and  ATC. This will signal a suspension of Category I11  operations. 
. 
A foremost requirement for an all-weather landing  system (such 
as the MLS) is the availability of complete fail-safe airborne 
integrity monitoring of the  ground  signal  during  the  approach. In 
addition  to  alerting  the pilot, it has  been  proposed  that  the  flight 
control  system  be  disconnected  automatically  in  the case of the 
detected MLS equipment malfunctions. To achieve these requirements, 
dual  processor  integrity monitoring on each of the  dual  active 
airborne channels, along with an integral  manual self test feature, 
has been recommended. 
The-level  of redundancy built  into the airborne  and  ground 
based portions of the Category I11 MLS,  ensures low probability o f  
failure, as  stated  earlier. Moreover, the  hardware monitors built 
into  the  system'informs  the  crew of malfunction within one second of 
occurrence. In the case of Category I1 MLS, the number of monitors 
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TABLE 7 .  - SOURCES  OF MLS FAILURES AND THEIR SOLUTIONS [ S I  
RESULTING  PROBLEbl 
SOLUTION 
Bad 
Angle 
D e g r a d a t i o n  i n  MLS Ground Elements 
Ang le   e cod ing   e r ro r  - 
Other  cod ing  ma l func t ion  
S i d e l o b e  t r a n s m i s s i o n s  
Degradat ion  lByEnvironmental /  
E x t e r n a l   I n f l u e n c e s  
Var ious  mul t ipa th  p rob lems  
( t e r r a i n ,   o b s t a c l e s ,  a i r -  
c r a f t  y e t c .  ) 
Degrada t ion  by S p u r i o u s  S i g n a l s  
I n t e r s t a t i o n  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
Othe r  RF s o u r c e s  
D e g r a d a t i o n  i n  MLS Ai rborne  Elements 
Receiver m a l f u n c t i o n  
FM, IM RD 
SLS 
- 
BC ,AP 
AP 
AP , BF 
PM,RD,BT 
Bad 
A u x i l i a r y  
Angle 
I M , R D  
BF 
AP 
AP , B F  
PM,RD,BT 
So lu t ion  Keys :  
BF - Baseband  format AP = A i r b o r n e  p r o c e s s i n g  
RD = Redundancy BC = Beam c o n t r o l  ( f o r  
FM = F i e l d  m o n i t o r i n g  m u l t i p a t h  m i n i m i z a t i o n )  
IM = I n t e g r a l  m o n i t o r i n g  SLS = S i d e l o b e   s u p p r e s s i o n  
BT = B u i l t - i n  t e s t  SF = Scan  format  
P1\1 = Airborne  per formance  
mon i to r ing  
3 2  
and the redundancy level is reduced, so that the failure probability 
increases. The incorporation of an ILM into  an  airborne  system can 
potentially allow Category I11 operation with a Category I1  MLS. 
ILM Application Areas 
' An ILM serving  as a monitoring/warning  aid  must be able  to de- 
tect  and discriminate between (a) navigation degradation/failure, 
(b) autoland degradation/failure, (c) pilot blunder  (e.g.,  miss  set 
I L S  or runway heading),  (d) "out-of  -design envelope"  wind condi- 
tions, and (e) system  failure of the I L M  itself. As a guidance 
aid, the ILM must provide post-failure information  to allow execu- 
ting a manual  takeover  for go-around or landing, under low visibil- 
ity  conditions. From an economic standpoint, it must be ensured 
that  adding  an ILM to  an already complex aircraft does not  increase 
maintenance costs without a significant increase  in  overall sys- 
tem  safety  and all-weather performance. These requirements must 
be interpreted  in  terms of the application areas shown in Table 8 .  
On  existing  aircraft with single-channel autopilots, the ILM 
could  reduce  decision  height  and generate go-around commands on 
detecting an anomolous condition. On aircraft equipped with dual- 
channel  autoland systems, an ILM of adequate  integrity  could be 
used to,initiate a manual  takeover  to execute a landing or go- 
around  depending on the nature of the  fault  and height of fault 
occurrence. It  is noted that a perspective runway  display  is un- 
necessary as part of the ILM if its principal function  is a fault 
monitor and/or go-around prompter. 
On the other hand, if the objective is  visibility enhance- 
ment or guidance to touchdown, then runway display  becomes essen- 
tial. Table 9 presents the ILM system functions, operational im- 
TABLE 8.- APPLICATIONS OF INDEPENDENT  LANDING  MONITOR 
I 
FUNCTION  FLIGHT  PHASE I OPERATIONAL  PERFORMANCE 
I I 
Gross  Fzu l t  Moni to r  Approach 
Landing 
Detect RNAV/bILS f a u l t  or p i l o t  
Around o r  l a n d i n g .  
B lunde r .  Command blanual Go- 
Detect FILS/Autcland f a c l t .  Co:n- 
mand manual  go-around o r  l a n d i n g  
from l o v e r  d e c i s i o n  h e i g h t .  
V i s i b i l i t y  Enhancement D e t e c t  h i g h  gi-ound o r  runway o b s -  Landing 
t r u c t i o n .  Command go-around.  
Faul t  Moni tor /Manual  
Guidarice 
Landing I Provide   manual   gu idance   for   go-  around o r  l a n d i n g  as b a c k u p  t o  
au to l and   sys t em.  I " 
Late ra l   Gu idance  I Rol lou t /Takeof f  Keep a i r c r a f t  c e n t e r e d .  Detect t u r n o f f .  I I 
Longi tudina l   Guidance  R o l l o u t / T a k e o f f   M o n i t o r   a i r c r a f t   p e r f o r m a n c e .  
C0m:nar.d r o l l o u t / t a k e o f f  a b o r t  
ar,d i n i t i a t e  c a e r g e n c y  p r o c e d -  I I u r e s  
plications  and associated information and  display requirements, 
assuming a runway  display  is present. Proceeding from  the  top 
entry o f  the table to the bottom, the system requirements become 
increasingly  sophisticated. 
In any case, the key requirement for using an ILM is  as fol- 
lows: The system with the ILM must be demonstrated (and hence 
certifiable] to  be as safe or safer than  the  system  without an  
ILM under low visibility conditions. The methodology for estab- 
lishing  this requirement is  the  subject of the next chapter. 
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TABLE  9.-ILM  SYSTEM  FUNCTIONSAND  IMPLICATIONS  (ASSUMING RU WAY DISPLAY 
CAPABILITY 
I 1 I INFORLIATION AND DISPLAY HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS 
1 FUNCTIONAL REOUIREMENTS I OPEKATIONAL IUPLICATIONS 1 SENSOR 
Gross Fault Monitor * N i n i ! n n l  Resolution wIncrenscd Cxtcgory  
I I I a  Se rv ice  
Confidence Builder *Reduced Orientation 
Time I n  IFR Situations 
I 
Visibility Enhancement *Reduce Decision Height *Increase  Field. 
I AndUnnecessary Go-Around of View (FOV) 
I I I High Ground and Runway *Avoid Ground Col- Obstruction Detector lisions *Increased Resolu- tion. POV,  and Scan Rate 
I off Culdance Lateral RolloutITake- I *Safety lncrease I tion, and Scan *Increase Resolu- 
I I I Rate 
Longitudinal Rollout/ 
Takeoff Guidance 
*Safety Increase 
(Category IlIb 
~~ 
Manual Backup Guid- *Upgrade Fail Pas- 
ance for Fail Passive 
Autoland egory  II/IIIa 
sive Autoland Cat 
Fault Monitor Backup *Reduce Decision 
~~~~ ~~~~ ~ 
Height and Unnec- 
' essary Go-Around5 
wHigi1 Resolution, 
Scan Rate, and 1 FOV 
*Additional Sen- 
sors Required 
Gyros, Altimeter) 
(e.g., Attitudc 
PROCESSOR I DISPLAY 
~llccluttering *Perspective Distance CRT 
*Down/Up 
.Same As Above *Head up 
*Faster Proces- *Same As Above 
sor 
*Same As Above *Same As Above I 
I 
*Distance Compu- I *Distance Display (Analog1 
tation 
*Distance .Synthetic Display 
wAlignmcnt #Symbol Generator 
*Crab Angle 
*Flight Path Angle 
*Attitude Stability 
*Ground RolllTake- 
off Dista-nce . 
ILM A p p l i c a t i o n  S t u d i e d  U n d e r  T h i s  E f f o r t  
A s  has   been   shown,   there  are  many i n t e r r e l a t e d  s u b s y s t e m s  
which a f f e c t  t h e   o p e r a t i o n   o f   t h e  ILM. B e c a u s e   o f   t h e   l i m i t e d  
e f f o r t  p o s s i b l e  i n  t h i s  s t u d y ,  it was d e c i d e d  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  o n  
t h e   a u t o m a t i c   p o r t i o n   o f   t h e  ILM s y s t e m ' s   p o t e n t i a l .   R e f e r r i n g  
t o  T a b l e  9 ,  i t  can   be   deduced   t ha t   t he  ILM a p p l i c a t i o n s  a s s o c i a t e d  
wi th   hav ing  runway d i s p l a y  c a p a b i l i t y  ( c o n f i d e n c e  b u i l d e r ,  v i s i -  
b i l i t y  e n h a n c e m e n t ,  h i g h  g r o u n d  a n d  r u n w a y  o b s t r u c t i o n  d e t e c t o r )  
c a n  o n l y  b e  a n a l y z e d  by c o c k p i t  s i m u l a t o r  o r  f l i g h t  t e s t  c a p a b i l i t y .  
F o r  s u c h  s t u d i e s ,  a n  ILM mockup o r  p r o t o t y p e  w o u l d  b e  n e c e s s a r y .  
T h u s ,  t h e s e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  w e r e  o n l y  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  te rms   of   what   gen-  
e r a l  d i s p l a y  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w o u l d  b e  n e c e s s a r y .  
R e f e r r i n g  t o  T a b l e  8 ,  it was f e l t  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  e c o n o m i c  
p o t e n t i a l   f r o m   t h e  ILM c a n   b e   r e a l i z e d   d u r i n g   t h e   l a n d i n g   p h a s e .  I t  
i s  a l s o  i n  t h i s  p h a s e  t h a t  t h e  ILM has   t he   mos t  c r i t i c a l  e f f e c t  o n  
sys t ems   s a fe ty .   Fu r the rmore ,  i f  a methodology  could  be  developed 
f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  d i s p l a y  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  t h e  l a n d -  
i n g  p h a s e ,  i t  would  be s t r a i g h t  f o r w a r d  t o  e x t e n d  t h i s  m e t h o d o l o g y  
t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  a p p r o a c h  a n d  g r o u n d  p h a s e s  o f  f l i g h t .  
T h u s ,  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  d e t a i l  were t h e  a u t o -  
matic f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  ILM d u r i n g  t h e  l a n d i n g  p h a s e  o f  f l i g h t .  
These  inc luded  f au l t  mon i to r ing /de tec t ion  and  manua l  gu idance  in  
t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a f a u l t .  
The ILM a p p l i c a t i o n s  h a d  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  a u t o -  
land   equipment   on   board .   Because  a f a i l - o p e r a t i v e   s y s t e m   ( r e q u i r e d  
f o r   C a t e g o r y  I11 o p e r a t i o n s )  i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  e s s e n t i a l l y  f a i l -  
s a f e ,  t h e  ILM f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  a n d  g u i d a n c e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  a r e  more 
s u i t e d  t o  a i r c r a f t  w i t h  f a i l - p a s s i v e  o r  l ess  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  s y s t e m s .  
A key   ques t ion   t hen  was as f o l l o w s :  How much lower   can   t he  v i s i -  
b i l i t y  c e i l i n g  b e  s e t  when an  I L M  i s  b e i n g  u s e d ,  i f  t h e  same l e v e l  
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of safety  is  to  be maintained as  is present with the  higher  ceiling 
and no ILM? The approach presented in the  following  chapters 
directly  addresses  this  question. 
To answer this question required assessing the time-to-detect 
and correct a fault by use of  an ILM and  manual  control. Total 
fault recovery time was used to define an altitude, namely, "criti- 
cal altitude" below which no fault was recoverable within the de- 
sired levels of safety, for a go-around decision. Similarly, an 
altitude was determined below which no fault was safely recoverable 
for a landing decision; this  altitude was labeled "decision alti- 
tude." Thus, decision altitude  and  critical altitude define 
switchover points  in the decision strategy associated with monitor- 
ing  and  detecting a fault.  The  exact  values o f  these  altitudes 
thus  play key roles  in  assessing  the  economic  value of using an 
ILM for  lowering  landing  minimum  for  less ophisticated autoland 
capability. 
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III. SYSTEM SAGETY ANALYSIS 
This chapter addresses a number of basic issues concerning 
use of the ILM that  are  affected  by  safety  requirements. These 
are: (1) On what basis can existence and use of an ILM be justi- 
fied? ( 2 )  How is .the strategy associated with use of the ILM sys- 
tem affected? ( 3 )  On what basis will possible conflicting sys- 
tem  fallure indications of the autoland fault monitors be  recon- 
ciled with those of the ILM? (4) What  are the technical require- 
ment's  (false alarm rate, missed fault  rate) of the ILM fault 
detection equipment? and (5) What  are the fault detection timing 
requirements? 
The underlying means of addressing  these  pertinent  questions 
is  to analyze  the contribution of subsystem reliability to overall 
system  safety. In the process o f  answering  these questions, an 
ILM system design methodology evolved, and it is  presented  in 
further detail  in  this  chapter. 
This chapter begins with an overview o f  safety  and  performance 
analysis which also  includes  aspects pertinent to certification. 
Then, ILM decision strategies and pilot  takeover criteria are dis- 
cussed. Numerical results are  used to illustrate  the interrelation- 
ship  between  safety  and  reliability. Then answers to the above 
questions are numerically illustrated. The mathematical details 
of the safety analysis  are  presented  in Appendix B .  
Safety Analysis Overview 
The overall desjgn of advanced avionics/autoland systems 
(including an ILM for use in  low visibility conditions [ 7 ,  9, 10 
151) requires consideration of two criteria--system performance 
and system safety. System performance  is measured in terms of 
the statistical dispersion of the aircraft around the nominal 
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state at touchdown (touchdown manifold). This is  evaluated  by con- 
sidering  the effects of variations within the normal equipment 
design tolerances (i.e., the effects of equipment faults are not 
considered)  and normal external environment factors (i.e., tur- 
bulence,  steady  winds) on the touchdown dispersion manifold. 
System safety assessment entails a more global consideration 
of the  entire terminal area  flight  envelope. The effect of all 
faults  and  fault sequences within the system must be  examined on 
a probabilistic basis to determine the total probability of exceed- 
ing specified flight path safety limits. 
For  the ILM, both  ,system performance (touchdown  manifold) 
and system safety  (entire flight path envelope) must be assessed 
in terms of individual causes' (e.g., design tolerances, turbulence, 
MLS beam bends, avionics faults and fault sequences, etc.) con- 
tributing to the overall probability of a catastrophic accident. 
This performance and safety analysis  process  is  depicted in flow 
chart form in Figure 9. In this figure, fault-free performance 
is a measure of how  often  there is a catastrophic accident  during 
landing even though the autoland system  and associated equipment 
operate within normal tolerances. This probability is designated 
by Pnual. (The nomenclature is  explained  later.) 
The "nuisance  disconnect" (or false alarm") i s  a situation 
where, even though  the  primary autoland system is performing per- 
fectly, the automatic system  is disconnected because of some signal 
combination  anomaly or hardware monitor failure. Then, manual 
takeover is  required. Nuisance disconnect performance refers to 
the rate at which ensuing catastrophic accidents  occur  because  of 
these false alarms. Here, the probabilities are  designated by 
'ndp 1 ndp g 
go-around was attempted when the accident occurs. 
and P which indicate that either a manual  landing or a 
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VARIABLES ~- EVALUATIONS 
> t 
Terminal  .4rea 
Environment - 0 Faul t  Free (e .g . ,  Wind Performance 
Turbulence) (’mal 
0 Nuisance 
Disconnect 
Performance 
(‘ndpl’  ‘ndpg) 
0 A i r c r a f t  System  Failure
0 Avionics (e.g. ,  
Autoland) 
Performance 
0 Pi lo t  Disp lays  
- (‘fual’  ‘fdpl’ 
0 MLS  ’f dpg 
Accep t a  bl  e 
Performance 
and Safe ty  
RESULTS “ I  
1 
Total  System 
Performance 
System 
Modification Total  System 
Sa fe ty  
( i  .e . ,  Displays, 
Sensors,  Com- 
pu te r s )  
‘Pi l o t  Response 
Models 
FIGURE 9.-FLOW CHART OF PROCESS REQUIRED FOR EVALUATION OF 
ILM SYSTEM SAFETY AND PERFOKL‘.NCE 
A “system failure” may  or  may  not  be detected by the  ILM  or 
the primary  system  monitors. The rate of undetected failures  that 
causes accidents  is designated Pfual. The rates of detected fail- 
ures followed by manual takeover that result in catastrophic acci- 
dents  in  landing  or go-around are designated by Pfdpl and P 
respectively. 
f dP g ’ 
To determine the ILM system’s reliability requirements, each 
of these measures of performance must be known  for the autoland 
system operating without the ILM. These probabilities are then 
combined and evaluated by using the overall safety  requirement. 
The result is the determination of  reliability requirements of the 
ILM system. Details of evaluating the fault free, nuisance discon- 
nect, and system failure performance (together with the  associated 
probability definitions) are discussed later in this chapter. 
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System Performance Evaluation 
As noted above, system performance is evaluated in  terms o f  the 
touchdown dispersion envelope. The process of  evaluating  this 
performance typically consists of setting up  a detailed computer 
simulation of the aircraft, avionics/autoland, landing aids, and 
the  external  environment [ 9 1 .  Then, by performing an extensive Monte 
Carlo analysis, the  fault free performance o f  the entire  autoland 
system is evaluated in terms of the  probability of catastrophic 
accident  (aircraft state exceeds  safety  constraints). 
Some of the terminal  area  parameters which must be incorpor- 
ated  into such a simulation are presented  in the previous chapter. 
The external  environment simulation model would include the wind 
conditions, such as those  defined  in Table 3 .  An example of the 
acceptable touchdown parameter manifold that would be  used in 
testing  is  presented  in Table 4 .  
If the overall system  safety requirement is specified as an 
acceptably  small rate of catastrophic accidents per number of land- 
ing attempts, then the fault-free performance measure must be a 
smaller subset  of  this overall rate.  For example, the current 
overall  safety criterion for certification of  a Category I11 auto- 
land system is that  the catastrophic accident probability rate be 
less than The contribution of the fault free autoland system 
to this number is specified to  be  no greater than loy8. For a five 
dimensional  terminal state manifold, this corresponds to the  rate 
at which the seven sigma values computed from Table 4 are  exceeded. 
(See Appendix B) . 
Performance failure during go-around (i.e., probability of 
a catastrophic  accident while executing a go-around) must  be evalu- 
ated by computer simulation in a manner similar to  the  landing 
evaluation.  Clearly  defined  criteria similar t o  Table 4 are not 
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available; this can be attributed to the fact that performance 
failures in  go-around are highly aircraft dependent. In general, 
performance failures result from exceeding certain aerodynamic 
constraints (e.g., angle-of-attack, sideslip) or violation of 
obstacle clearance boundaries. 
System Safety Evaluation 
The overall system safety assessment can be performed.by 
defining an event outcome tree. Then, the probability of occur- 
rence of each outcome leading to a catastrophy is  determined by 
analysis  and  simulation. Some of the results may  be validated by 
flight test. Finally, total system probability of catastrophic 
failure is determined by summing these probabilities, as  defined 
by  the outcome tree. 
The failure rates are dependent upon the strategies that a 
pilot  may take in case of a detected  fault. In the following, two 
possible pilot strategies are first defined; then an event outcome 
tree  is  presented for one of these  strategies. Subsequently, the 
incorporation of the  ILM's reliability measures into  this probabil- 
ity  tree  is  discussed.  The associated problem of resolving a pos- 
sible conflict between the autoland and,ILM monitor signals is 
then treated. 
Pilot decision strategies.- Two distinct pilot decision 
strategies are feasible following the detection of  an autoland 
system fault  during the landing  sequence. These are  depicted in 
Figures 10 and 11. Consider an airborne system equipped with auto- 
land capability but no ILM.  Suppose  that the autoland is  engaged at 
height ho; then, the-first decision strategy, designated A, consists 
of executing a go-around  if the autoland monitors detect a fault 
between altitude ho and h*. An emergency landing is executed if 
the  fault  is detected between h* and touchdown (TD). The value of 
4 3  
Total Exposure  Time I 
Pilot 
Deci s i  on Emergency Land Go-Around 
FIGURE 10. - POST  FAULT  DETECTION 
STRATEGY (A) 
PILOT  DECISION 
Pilot 
Decision Emergency Land Manua 1 Land  Go-Around 
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FIGURE 11. - POST  FAULT  DETECTION  PILOT  DECISION 
STRATEGY (B) 
h*  is  determined statistically as the height above which it  is safer 
to attempt a go-around in case of a fault. Below this altitude it 
is safer to attempt a manual landing. As shown in Figure 10, the 
nominal flight duration between  these altitudes is t2 and tl,  re- 
spectively. 
The other possible strategy, shown in Figure 11, is to  execute: 
.(a) an emergency landing if the fault is detected between hl* and 
TD, (b) go-around if the altitude of fault detection lies between 
hl* and h2*, and (c) execute a manual landing if the fault  is 
detected between ho  and h2*. In this second strategy, hl* is 
chosen in the same manner as h*  in Strategy A. The higher altitude 
h2* is chosen based on the assumption that above  this altitude, 
there  is adequate time to recover manually s o  that the landing 
sequence can safely be  continued.  Recovery consists of nulling 
out the state error caused by  the  fault  and  manually  tracking  the 
nominal  approach flight path.  It  is noted that  manual recovery 
for landing  in Strategy B may  be realistic only if visual contact 
can be established with the runway prior  to h2* .  In other words, 
the visibility ceiling would not be below a minimum of h2*. Al- 
ternatively, the ILM equipment must have the capability of provid- 
ing  manual  guidance to touchdown. 
" Event outcome tree.- To illustrate the  methodology  of evalu- 
ating the total system probability of catastrophic accident, PA, 
the outcome tree  is now considered for an autoland with Strategy 
A depicted in Figure 12. The probability  terms  used  in  this figure 
are  defined in Table 10. A detailed exposition of these probabili- 
ties  is  presented in Appendix B. These probability terms  are 
essentially integrals of the associated probability density func- 
tions which must be determined in general  by simulation methods. 
The hypothesized forms of the go-around and autoland catastrophe 
probability density functions are illustrated in Figures 13 and 
14, respectively. 
The branches of the tree in Figure 12 terminate with either 
landing or go-around failure probabilities. A landing failure can 
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! 
Equipment F a i l u r e  
(Exclude Monitor) 
No Equipment F a i l u r e  
(Exclude Monitor) 
(Fau l t  F ree )  
 I t t '  
Fai   1   ure  
Detected 
Fai   1   ure  
T '  
aGl Go-Around Go-Around b A f t e r  ,fi-x, P r i o r  pqpJ [-]E] Go-Around Go-Around Landing  Landing 
FIGURE 12. -EVENT  OUTCOME  TREE  FOR  MONITOR  OPERATION  DURING 
AUTOMATIC  LANDING  USING  STRATEGY A. 
t 
h* A1 ti tude ( h )  
FIGURE 13. - PILOT  RECOVERY  CATASTROPHE  PROBABILITY 
DENSITY  FUNCTION 
t 
1 
a 6  
'nus 
a A1 ti tude (h) 
. .  
FIGURE 14. - AUTOLAND  CATASTROPHE  PROBABILITY., DENSITY 
FUNCTION 
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TABLE10. - OUTCOME TREE CATASTROPHE PROBABILITIES 
QUANTITY 
P~~ 
PMAE 
pD 
FAE 
nual 
fual 
fdpg 
'fdpl 
pndPg 
'ndpl 
* 
EQUIPMENT 
FA1  LURE 
" 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
NO 
MONITOR 
DETECTION 
" 
" 
NO 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
RESULTING 
PILOT 
OBJECTIVE 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
Land 
Land 
Go -Around 
Land 
Go-Around 
Land 
+ 
COMMENTS 
Total  System  Probability o f  
Catastrophe  Accident 
Probability of Equipment Failure 
Probability of Missed Alarm Fol- 
lowing  Equipment  Failure 
Probability of Detected  Fault 
Probability o f  False  Alarm 
Caused By Primary  Equipment 
Monitors 
Fault Free Performance  Measure 
Missed  Alarm (PMAE) 
Prior to  h* detection 
After h* 1 PD = (l-pmE) 
disconnect 
false alarm 
After h* 
P(fln)  (d/u)  (p/a) cg/l) : probability of catastrophe 
Notation: 
f - fault p - pilot 
n - no fault a - automatic 
u - undetected 1 - land d - detected g - go-around 
h* - minimum  descent 
altitude 
occur due to  a number of conditions which can be partitioned into 
the  lateral  and longitudinal failure  effects.  Lateral  effects in- 
clude such events as  running off the side of the runway, excessive 
crab, and wing tip/pod/tail  scrape. Longitudinal effects include 
overrunning the  runway  and  hard/soft  landing. Similarly, lateral 
go-around, failure effects include violation of obstacle clearance 
and  excessive roll angles and rates. Longitudinal go-around  fail- 
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ures include such events as stall and unacceptable obstacle clear- 
ance. 
On the basis of Figures 10 and 12, the  total system probabil- 
ity  of catastrophic accident, PA,.can be expressed  as 
Here, the exposure factors al and a2  are given by, 
- T1 
"1 - (T1 + T2) 
Basically, the exposure factor represents the portion of the  total 
flight period  during which the system is  "exposed"  to  the conse- 
quences of a particular pilot decision. 
Effect of an ILM on pilot takeover.- The incorporation of an 
ILM with its own monitors.into an autoland system, brings  up  a 
significant operational problem. The source of the problem is  the 
potential disagreement between the ILM and  primary  system  monitor 
alarms. Table 11 lists the four takeover initiation options  that 
could be used to resolve this situation.  Clearly in an operation- 
al environment, one of these must be selected as  being  more 
appropriate. The logical way to resolve this conflict is  to deter- 
mine which of these four options leads to the highest level of 
system safety or lowest level of catastrophic accident probability, 
PA. For a given autoland system, after having selected one of . 
49 
OPTIOX TAKEOVER INITIP.Tl@l< CRITERION 
" 
2 Use E i t . h e r  ILM E P r i m a r y  M o n i t o r s  
3 
Monitors)-  
Use ILPl O n l y   ( i . e . ,   I g n o r e   P r i m a r y  
4 Use ILM and  P r i m z r y  M o n i t o r s  ( i .  e . ,  
Act Only-17 B o t h  Detect F a u l t )  
* 
t h e s e  o p t i o n s  as t h e  b e s t ,  t h e  p i l o t / c r e w  wou ld  be  t r a ined  to  
f o l l o w  a l w a y s  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  t a k e o v e r  c r i t e r i o n .  
The  combina t ion  of  the  two d e c i s i o n  s t r a t e g i e s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  
F i g u r e s  1 0  and  11 a n d  t h e  f o u r  t a k e o v e r  o p t i o n s  l i s t e d  i n  T a b l e  11 
r e s u l t  i n  e i g h t  d e s i g n  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a n d  e i g h t  a s s o c i a t e d  a c c i d e n t  
p r o b a b i l i t y   e q u a t i o n s   f o r  PA. The g e n e r i c   f o r m   o f   t h e   s y s t e m  
s a f e t y  e q u a t i o n  i s :  
{l-PEF1{Pnual + W ' X )  +PEF{Pfual y + X ' Z )  
The pa rame te r s  w ,  x ,  y and z f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e  e i g h t  c o m b i n a t i o n s  a r e  
expanded  in  terms o f   p r o b a b i l i t y   m e a s u r e s   i n   T a b l e  1 2 .  D e t a i l e d  
d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  measures a re  p r e s e n t e d  i n  T a b l e  
1 3 .  The e q u a t i o n   p e r t a i n i n g   t o  a s p e c i f i c   s t r a t e g y   d e c i s i o n   a n d  
i n i t i a t i o n  c r i t e r i o n  i s  c o n s t r u c t e d  b y  i n s e r t i n g  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
t a b u l a t e d  terms r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  f a l s e  alarm r a t e ,  missed  alarm r a t e ,  
s t r a t e g y ,   a n d   i n i t i a t i o n   c r i t e r i o n .   T h e s e   e q u a t i o n s   f o r m   t h e   b a -  
s i s  f o r  a d d r e s s i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  r a i s e d  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  
c h a p t e r .  The b a s i c   o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  s e l e c t  t h e   a l t e r n a t i v e   t h a t  
l e a d s  t o  t h e  l o w e s t  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  c a t a s t r o p h i c  a c c i d e n t  PA. 
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TABLE 12. -ACCIDENT  PROBABILITY  PA  AS  A  FUNCTION  OF  DECISION  STRATEGY  AND  INITIATION  OPTION 
OPTION 
X 
(STRATEGY) 
Y 
(MISSED ALARM) (CRITERION) 
z W 
(FALSE ALARM: 
F~~~ 
COMMENTS 
'SAE = 
" l P E L E  ' a2PGAE 
P~~~ 
I 
A l 2  'FAE +. P~~~ 
A Necessary Condit ion To 
J u s t i f y  An ILM Is 
'ELI << P~~~ 
'GAI << 'GAE 
P~~~ Ir p~~ 
I '  
I 
b A 4 P~~~ PSAI 'MAS = I P~~~ ' 'FAE 'SAI 
P~~~ 
V i s i b i l i t y  P~~~ 
CAVU 10-6  
CAT I l o - ;  
CAT' I1 1 0 -  
CAT I 1 (unacceptab le)  
PSBE = a P 
+ a 2 P G A E  
' "3'MLE 
PSBI = a P 
' a2PGAI 
' a3PblLI 
1 ELE 
1 E L I  'FAE ' 'FAI 
e A Necessary Condit ion To 
J u s t i f y  T h i s  S t r a t e g y  Is 
p~~~~ '< 'MLE 
'MLI ' P~~~ 
and 
I 
'FA1 'SBI 
'FAI * 'FAE 'SBI 
TABLE13.-DEFINITION OF TERMS APPEARING IN TABLE 12 
' QUANTITY 
"FAE 
P~~~ 
SAE 
P~~~ 
P~~~ 
P~~~ 
p~~ I 
P~~~ 
'SBE 
'SBI 
'MLE 
'ML I 
'MAE 
pMAI 
'ILM 
pMAs 
DEFINITION 
Probability Of False Alarm - Autoland/MLS/Other 
Equipment (Primary) Monitors 
Probability Of False Alarm - ILM 
Probability Of Catastrophe Using Strategy A With 
No  ILM  (Primary Monitors Only) 
Probability Of Catastrophe Using Strategy A With 
I LM 
Probability Of Emergency Landing Catastrophe With 
No ILM 
Probability Of Go-Around Catastrophe With No ILM 
Probability Of Emergency  Landing Catastrophy 
With  ILM 
Probability Of Go-Around Catastrophe With ILM 
Probability Of Catastrophe Using Strategy B With 
NO .ILM 
Probability Of Catastrophe Using Strategy B With 
I LM 
Probability Of Manual  Landing Catastrophe With 
No ILM 
Probability Of Manual Landing Catastrophe With 
I LM 
Probability Of Missed Alarm - Primary Monitors 
Probability Of Missed Alarm - ILM (Inherent  Rate) 
Probability Of Missed Alarm Due to  ILM Failure 
Probability of  Missed Alarm Of ILM; - 
- pMAI + 'ILM 
Evaluation Of System Requirements 
With the formulation of the  eight possible strategy combina- 
tions presented in Table 12, it  is now possible to address  the ques- 
tions posed at the beginning of this  chapter. This is  done by con- 
sidering  the  typical ranges of numerical values for the parameter 
which make up the equations of Table 12. Specific example  values 
are selected for these parameters, and they are used  to compute the 
result.ing probability of catastrophic accident PA. Then, the stra- 
tegy which gives best results can be selected. Also, necessary 
equipment peTformance requirements can be ascertained. 
Consider the first question: On what basis can an ILM be justi- 
fied?  The answer to this question has two  parts - (a) the  strate-. 
gies which use the ILM information (Options 2 ,  3 ,  and 4 in  T.able 
11) must provide better safety results than without the ILM (Option 
1) and (b) the improvement  in  safety or landing performance must be 
economically  justified.  Only  the former condition is  considered 
here. 
The answer to  the  second question - How is the strategy asso- 
ciated with use of the ILM affected? - can be  partially  answered  by 
determining which strategy (A or B) discussed previously provides 
the better results. The answer to the  third question - On what 
basis will possible conflicting system failure indications of the 
existing autoland monitors be reconciled-with those of  the ILM? - 
is based on which option of Table 11 using the ILM provides the 
better  answer. The answer to  the fourth question - What are  the 
technical requirements of the ILM fault detection equipment? - 
is  based on what are  the upper limits to the ILM false  alarm rate 
and missed alarm rate which will still provide an  acceptable cata- 
strophic accident rate. 
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The  answer t o  t h e  f i f t h  q u e s t i o n - - W h a t  are t h e  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  
t i m i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s ? - - i s  n o t  d j r e c t l y  a n s w e r e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r .  
The s t r a t e g i e s  A and B use t h e  a l t i t u d e  p a r a m e t e r s  h * ,  h l * '  a n d  
h 2 * .   T h e s e   a l t i t u d e   v a l u e s   a r e   g i v e n   a s s u m e d   v a l u e s   i n   t h i s  sec- 
t i o n  s o  t h a t  t h e  e i g h t  c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  T a b l e  1 2  can  be  numer ica l ly  
e v a l u a t e d .   L a t e r ,   t h e   t o t a l   r e c o v e r y   t i m i n g   r e q u i r e m e n t s   a r e  
e v a l u a t e d  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  u s e d  t o  r e s e t  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  h* o r  
hl*  and  hZ*.  The s y s t e m   d e s i g n e r   c a n   u s e   t h e s e  new v a l u e s  t o  r e -  
compute t h e  ILM equipment  per formance  requi rements  based  on  the  
o p t i o n s   p r e s e n t e d   i n   t h i s   c h a p t e r .   I n   t h i s  way, t h e  ILM system 
d e s i g n  i s  a n  i t e r a t i v e  p r o c e s s . .  
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ,  t h e  n o m i n a l  v a l u e s  o f  e x p o s u r e  f a c t o r s  r e -  
s u l t i n g  f r o m   t h e   s t r a t e g i e s  A and B a r e  f i r s t  determined.  Then, 
n o m i n a l  v a l u e s  f o r  a u t o l a n d  a n d  o t h e r  e q u i p m e n t  f a i l u r e  p r o b a b i l i -  
t i e s  and 1LM f a i l u r e   p r o b a b i l i t i e s   a r e   s e l e c t e d .   T h e s e   v a l u e s   a r e  
u s e d   t o   e v a l u a t e   t h e   p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  c a t a s t r o p h i c   a c c i d e n t ,  PA. The 
basic  d e s i g n  r u l e  i s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  n u m e r i c a l  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  u n s p e c i -  
f i e d  p a r a m e t e r s  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  a s p e c i f i e d  l e v e l  o f  s a f e t y  PA i s  
achieved .  F o r  numer ica l   example ,   the  FAA c e r t i f i c a t i o n   r e q u i r e -  
ment o f  P A 5  c a t a s t r o p h i c   a c c i d e n t s   p e r   l a n d i n g  i s  used .  
A l l  c a l c u l a t i o n s  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  e x p o s u r e  p e r i o d  i s  
250 s e c o n d s .   D u r i n g   t h e   s t a r t  o f  t h i s   p e r i o d ,   t h e   a i r c r a f t  i s  
assumed t o  e n t e r  t h e  l a n d i n g  a r e a  w i t h  t h e  o n b o a r d  a u t o l a n d  s y s t e m  
and t h e  ILM sys t em  in   an   a rmed   s t a t e .  The assumed  nominal  values 
f o r   t h e   e x p o s u r e   f a c t o r s   a r e   s u m m a r i z e d   i n   T a b l e  1 4 .  I n   g e n e r a l ,  
t h e s e  v a l u e s  a r e  v e r y  much a i r c r a f t  d e p e n d e n t ;  f o r  example,   the  
Boeing 737 can  execute  a go-around from 2 0  f ee t  whee l  he igh t  where -  
a s  a Boeing 7 4 7  cannot .  
Table  1 5  shows t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  c o m p u t i n g  t y p i c a l  v a l u e s  o f  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  a ca tas t rophe   due   to   manual   t akeover   (PsAE,  PSAIy 
'SBE' and  PsBI )  w i th  S t r a t eg ie s  A and B and  wi th  and  wi thout  an  
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TABLE: 14.-EXPOSURE FACTORS USED FOR NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
a2 
a3 
" " .~ 
COMMENTS - 
E x p o s u r e  P e r i o d  F o r  E m e r g e n c y   L a n d i n g   D e c i s i o n  
E x p o s u r e  P e r i o d  F o r  G o - A r o u n d  D e c i s i . o n  , 
E x p o s u r e  P e r i o d  For  M a n u a l   L a n d i n g   D e c i s i o n  
E x p o s u r e   F a c t o r  - Emergency   Land ing  
E x p o s u r e   F a c t o r  - Go-Around 
E x p o s u r e   F a c t o r  - M a n u a l   L a n d i n g  
ILM. These results are for assumed  values of the  terms PGAE, PELE, 
14. To j~stify Strategy B using an ILM, it  is required that  the 
probability of catastrophe during  manual  landing  using ILM guidance 
'MLE' 'ELI 9 P~~~ 9 and p~~~ and the exposure factors given in Table 
is  less  than  that  using autoland monitors alone; that is 
p~~~ - MLE < P  (5 1 
Moreover, the probability o f  catastrophe while executing a manual 
landing using an  ILM  should be less than or  equal to that for execu- 
ting a  go-around using an ILM; this is 
Table 15 indicates  that Strategy B is unacceptable under Category 
I11 conditions, without an ILM, due to the excessively large contri- 
bution to accident catastrophe in attempting a blind  landing with- 
out guidance aids; this  is an intuitively obvious result. 
5 5  
TABLE is.-EFFECTIVE CATASTROPHIC PROBABILITIES FOR STRATEGY 
A  AND B, WITH  AND  WITHOUT  ILM  FOLLOWING  MANUAL 
TAKEOVER 
PROBABILITY VALUE 
P~~~ 
P~~~ 
10-2 
p~~ I 
P~~~ 2 x 
'SAI 3 x 
1.2 x 
P~~~ 1.7 x IO-' 
0.9 
'SBI 3 x 
SITUATION OF CATASTROPHE 
Go-Around Using Primary Monitors 
~ ~~ ~~~ ~ 
Emergency  Landing Using Primary  Monitors 
Category  I 
Category I1 
Category  I11 
Manual Landing U.sing 
Primary Monitors 
Emergency  Landing  Using  ILM  Monitors/ 
Guidance 
Go-Around Using  ILM  Monitors/Guidance 
Manual  Landing  Using  ILM  Monitors/ 
Guidance 
Strategy A,  Using Primary Monitors 
Strategy A,  Using ILM Monitors/Guidance 
Category  I 
Category I1 
Category I11 
Strategy B,  Using 
Unacceptable f o r  
Primary Monitors; 
Category  111  Visibility 
Strategy B, Using  ILM  Monitors/Guidance 
A necessary condition for justifying the incorporation of an 
ILM is  that using the ILM decreases the probability of catastrophe 
for one of the strategies; that  is either 
'SAX 5 'SAE ( 7 )  
or 
P~~~ 'SBE 
56 
F i n a l l y ,  f o r  t h e  s y s t e m s  w i t h  I L M ' s ,  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  
c h o o s i n g  S t r a t e g y  B o v e r  S t r a t e g y  A i s  t h a t  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c a t a -  
s t r o p h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  f o r m e r  be l e s s  t h a n  t h e  l a t t e r ;  t h a t  i s  
P~~~ 5 P~~~ 
The e v a l u a t i o n  a n d  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  (4) - (8) i s  done  by 
per forming   a   covar iance   p ropagat ion   ana lys i s .   The   method i s  p r e -  
s e n t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  V and Appendix B. 
Now c o n s i d e r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  c a t a s t r o p h i c  a c c i d e n t  a s  a func- 
t i on   o f   t he   equ ipmen t   u sed .   Tab le  1 6  conta ins   assumed  nominal   va lues  
o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t e r m s  r e q u i r e d  t o  compute t h e  t o t a l  c a t a s t r o p h i c  
a c c i d e n t  p r o b a b i l i t y  PA. A l l  f a u l t  r a t e s  a r e  b a s e d  on  a 250  second 
exposure   pe r iod .   Fo r   S t r a t egy  A a n d  i n i t i a t i o n  O p t i o n  1, Table  1 7  
i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  i m p r o v i n g  t h e  p r i m a r y  e q u i p m e n t  f a i l u r e  
r a t e  PEF u s i n g   t h e   v a l u e s   g i v e n   i n   T a b l e s  1 4  and 1 6 .  The s a f e t y  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  lCY" c a n n o t  b e  m e t ;  t h e  l i m i t i n g  f a c t o r  i s  t h e  
m i s s e d   a l a r m   p r o b a b i l i t y  PwE. Table   18   shows  the   e f fec t   o f   improv-  
ing  the  p r imary  equ ipmen t  mon i to r  mis sed  a l a rm ra t e  PmE; h e r e  a g a i n  
t h e   s a f e t y   r e q u i r e m e n t   o f   c a n n o t   b e  met w i th   an   equ ipmen t   f a i l -  
u r e  r a t e  o f  
When u s i n g  t h e  b a s e l i n e  d a t a  f r o m  T a b l e  1 6 ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  v a r y i n g  t h e  p r i m a r y  e q u i p m e n t  m o n i t o r  f a l s e  a l a r m  a n d  m i s s e d  
a l a r m  r a t e s  (PFAE and PmE) with and without the ILM when S t r a t e g y  
A is  used .   In   Tab le  1 9 ,  Case 1 i l l u s t r a t e s   ( v i a   n u m e r i c a l   e x a m p l e )  
t ha t  sys t em pe r fo rmance  w i l l  indeed be enhanced by an ILM, prov ided  
t h e  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  p e r f o r m a n c e  of t h e  ILM (PFAI and PmI) can be 
implemented.  Case 2 i l l u s t r a t e s   t h a t   i n c o r p o r a t i o n   o f   a n  ILM does 
no t  improve  ove ra l l  pe r fo rmance  apprec i ab ly  i f  the  normal  missed  
a l a r m   r a t e  i s  reduced   toCase  3 shows t h a t   i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of 
an ILM us ing  takeover  Opt ion  2 is i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  m e e t  t h e  s a f e t y  
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TABLE 16. - NOMINAL VALUES OF PROBABILITY TERMS REQUIRED 
TO COMPUTE PA 
PROBABILITY VALUE 
'EF 
LM 
'fual 
nual' 
PFAE 
. .  
'MAE 
. .  
P~~~ 
pMAI . .. 
0 .9  
1 0 - 3  - 
1 0 - 1  
10-.3 
COMMENT 
MTBF% 700 Hours; Autoland/MLS 
(Primary)  Equipment  Failure 
MTBF Q., 700 Hours ; ILM  Hardware 
Failure  Rate 
Automatic  Landing  Catastrophe 
With  Failed Primary Equipment 
Automatic  Landing  Catastrophe 
Under Normal  Operations . 
Primary  Monitor  False Alar, 
(Nuisance  Disconnect) 
Primary  Monitor  Missed  Alarm 
(Undetected  Failure) 
ILM  Monitor False Alarm (Nuisance 
Disconnect) 
ILM Monitor Missed  Alarm  (Unde- 
tected  Failure) 
. I  
* I  
. .  
I .  
. ,  
requirements,  although  there  is  almost  two  orders of  magnitude im- 
,provement in PA by using the  ILM. Consequently, the  other  options 
in Table 11 were examined'by repeating Case 3 .  The ILM performance 
measureS-PFAI an'd'PmI were adjusted  to achieve.lO-' f o r  PA. 
, . I  * , . .- 
Cases 4 and 5 in Table 19 .show the result of considering  these 
options. -For.the.numerical values chosen, Option 3 is acceptable. 
Here, stringent  requirements ..are  p1ace.d on the ILM  performance. 
Option 4 is-preferred because the ILM-false alarm  and  missed  alarm 
rates required.are more eas'ily implemented in hardware  than  those 
required  for  Option 3 . .  . 
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TABLE 17. - EFFECT OF IMPROVING  PRIMARY  EQUIPMENT  FAILURE 
RATE  PEF  ON  PROBABILITY  OF  CATASTROPHE  ACCIDENT 1" - 6  PA SAFETY  LIMITING-FACTORS 1 . 2  x P~~ 3 x l o +  P ~ ~ '  P~~~ 
2 x ? 
TABLE 18. - EFFECT OF  IMPROVING  AUTOLAND  MONITOR  MISSED 
ALARM  RATE  PMAE ON PA 
SAFETY  LIMITING  FACTORS 
4.9 x 10 'MAE ' 
TABLE19 . - RESULTS  OF  CATASTROPHIC  ACCIDENT  PROBABILITY 
COMPUTATIONS 
- 
'FAE 
10- 
10- 
1 
ASSUMED  VALUES PA FOR PA FOR ILM 
P~~~~ 
2 . 2  x 10-2 . 
2 4 x 1 0 - 6  10-2 
2 1 . 2  x 1 0 - 1  
VALUE 0PT.ION oP?'loN 'MAI P~~~ . 
"JO- 3 2 . 2  x 2 x 3 x 
3 . 7  x 2 
2 . 2  x 4 
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A similar c o m p a r i t i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  cases l i s t e d  
i n  T a b l e  1 9  c a n  b e  p e r f o r m e d  f o r  S t r a t e g y  E. The  main p o i n t  t o  b e  
made  by the  above  examples  i s  t h a t  t h e  a n s w e r s  t o  q u e s t i o n s  r a i s e d  
a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  c h a p t e r  a re  v e r y  much sys tem dependent .  
Summary 
The  meth.od o f  p r o v i d i n g  o v e r a l l  s y s t e m  s a f e t y  d u r i n g  t h e  
d e s i g n  o f  a l l  a d v a n c e d  a v i o n i c  s y s t e m s  w i t h  a u t o l a n d  a n d  ILM ( p a r -  
t i c u l a r l y  u n d e r  low v i s i b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s )  is p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  
c h a p t e r .   T h i s  i s  done i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of  pr imary  monitor   and 
independen t  l and ing  mon i to r  des ign .  
The b a s i c  a c c i d e n t  p r o b a b i l i t y  e q u a t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  g e n e r a t e  
p e r f o r m a n c e   s p e c i f i c a t i o n s   f o r   f a u l t   d e t e c t i o n ,   d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,   a n d  
r e c o v e r y .  The k e y   p a r a m e t e r s   g o v e r n i n g   t h e   f a u l t   d e t e c t i o n / d i s -  
c r i m i n a t i o n  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  are  t h e  f a l s e  a l a r m  r a t e s ,  PFAE/ 
t e c t e d   f a i l u r e ) ,   a n d   e q u i p m e n t   f a i l u r e   r a t e s   ( P E F / P I L M ) .   A d d i t i o n -  
a l  f a c t o r s  i n c l u d e  t h e  ILM input  measurement  sampl ing  ra te  and  
a b s o l u t e  maximum time t o  d e t e c t  a n d   d i s c r i m i n a t e .  The  key p a r a -  
m e t e r s  g o v e r n i n g  f a u l t  r e c o v e r y  p e r f o r m a n c e  a r e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
o f  emergency   l and ing   f a i lu re   (PELE/PELI ) ,   p robab i l i t y   o f   go -a round  
f a i l u r e  (PGAE/PGAI)   and   probabi l i ty   o f   manual   l anding   fa i lure  
(PMLE/PMLI). The f u n d a m e n t a l   b a s i s   f o r   t h e   j u s t i f i c a t i o n   o f   a n  
ILM i n  a n  a u t o l a n d  s y s t e m  i s  s e e n  t o  b e  a r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  p r o b -  
a b i l i t y  o f  c a t a s t r o p h i c  a c c i d e n t  w h i l e  e x e c u t i n g  a l a n d i n g  o r  g o -  
a r o u n d .   T h i s   b a s i s   a l s o   l e d   t o  a p r o c e d u r e  t o  r e s o l v e  c o n f l i c t  
between pr imary autoland and ILM m o n i t o r s .  
'FAI ( n u i s a n c e  d i s c o n n e c t ) ,  m i s s e d  alarm r a t e s ,  PmE/PmI (unde - 
The s y s t e m  s a f e t y  e q u a t i o n  g o v e r n s  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  t r a d e o f f s  
i n  t h e  e q u i p m e n t  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  f a l s e  a l a r m  a n d  m i s s e d  a l a r m  r a t e s  
o f   t he   p r imary   mon i to r s   and   t he  ILM.  Moreover,  i t  a l s o   g o v e r n s  
t h e  r e q u i r e d  l e v e l  o f  s a f e t y  w h i l e  e x e c u t i n g  a go -a round  o r  a 
l a n d i n g  d e c i s i o n .  
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IV. FAULT DETECTION AND DISCRIMINATION 
The allocation of total accident probability to meet  safety 
requirements is  performed in Chapter  IV. The relationship between 
the system safety equation ( 4 )  and the performance specification 
for the fault detection and discrimination subsystem is  illustrated 
in Figure 1. The specification is  made in terms of the allow'able 
false alarm rates, PFAE/PFAI .(nuisance  disconnect), missed alarm 
rates, PmE/PmI (undetected failure), and  the  inherent  equipment 
failure rates (PEF/PILM). Promising ILM software  imp1  entations 
incorporating fault detection and discrimination algorithms  are 
now evaluated with reference to this specification, to  ensure  that 
the resulting avionics system meets  the  allowable  accident proba- 
bility. Thus, to select a specific scheme, the  following  points 
are address'ed: 
"Q1 
1. Is it possible to achieve  the false alarm  and  missed  and 
2 .  Does  the hardware implementation technology allow the 
3 .  How many measurement samples of a state are  required to 
alarm rate performance required by the  ILM? 
desired equipment failure rates to  be met? 
determine that a fault  has occurred? 
4. How accurate must  each  state be measured by the ILM? 
5. How can the  ILM be used  to  discriminate  between  the  types 
6. How much will  the  error state build up before  the  ILM 
of system faults? 
detects  that the fault occurred? 
This chapter begins by summarizing the  main premises, arising 
from operational factors, on which the ILM hardware implementation 
and algorithm design are  based. This is  followed by modeling of the 
representative nature and magnitude of faults to be detected  and dis- 
criminated. Then, two practical fault detection algorithms are pre- 
sented  together with the associated assumptions and  computer simula- 
tion  results. Subsequently, the  philosophy of fault discrimination, 
taking  into account operational constraints, is  discussed. The sen- 
sors required--to measure particular aircraft states, to implement 
the  fault detection and discrimination scheme--represent  a signifi- 
cant portion of the ILM information requirements. Finally, the 
areas  of required further work are summarized. 6 1  
Main Premises and Fault Models 
The premises  used  in  the ILM fault detection monitor design 
are  as follows: (1) minimize the interconne,ction to the primary 
autoland system (e.g., sensors, servos, signal levels, etc.), ( 2 )  
provi-de  various  levels o f  pilot  involvement in the  performance 
assessment, and ( 3 )  perform the assessment in  terms of the present 
rather than  the  future (or predicted)  position. Premise (1) allows 
avoiding  the  hardware problems of primary system reliability reduc- 
tion, due @I additional interconnections, and the consequent re- 
duction in  system  safety. Premise ( 2 )  provides that  the output 
o f  the  ILM not be  limited  to simply a go/no  go indication. Rather, 
it provides the option of a display format to enable the pilot to 
assess continually changes in performance and  to  develop a confidence 
for  ILM  generated commands over a period of usage. Premise ( 3 )  ac- 
knowledges the complex nature of making a prediction regarding future 
events, in the presence of nonstationary wind disturbances, on an 
aircraft  possibly flying a curved decelerating flight  path. Con- 
sequently, the  failure detection algorithms only assess whether the 
current  "state"  is  "abnormal". 
Prior to discussion of fault detection and discrimination tech- 
niques, it is  necessary to delineate  the nature and magnitude of the 
faults under consideration. 
Conventional  autoland  designers perform a laborious failure 
modes  and  effects  analysis (FMEA) E181 to design the  autoland hard- 
ware monitors. The two  basic monitoring techniques are comparison 
and on-line monitoring [ 2 0 ] .  Comparison monitoring is  performed 
by comparing  the outputs of two  identical systems, and on-line 
monitoring  is  performed by measuring key signal parameters as a func- 
tion of time (e.g., voltage  amplitude  and phase). The iterative 
design process of FMEA is  conducted  by analyzing the  effect  of 
faults (in terms of signal characteristics)  at different points in 
a subsystem  and  then  designing  the minimum cost monitor to detect 
the  fault  before  its  effects become unacceptably large. Often 
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this is a trial and error process; at each step in this  iterative 
process, the fault monitor has to be moved electrically closer to 
the point, in the subsystem where the fault is likely to occur. Ulti- 
mately, the monitor performance is improved until the  fault  detection 
specification for the overall avionics system can be met. The 
resulting design is  highly  aircraft/avionics  system dependent and 
must be reworked for each new aircraft design. 
On the positive side,.usage.of autoland system hardware 
monitors results in minimum time-to-detect any failure that is con- 
sid'ered  to  be hazardous to normal flight operation and  "not highly 
improbable." Indeed, the  Federal  Air Regulations (FAR's) require 
onboard  indication of the operational status of all  important sys- 
tems  and sensors. Specifically, the FAR's require that  the crew 
be informed  visually  and orally o f  an autopilot malfunction or dis- 
connection and the current autoland redundancy level.  As noted pre- 
viously, the MLS system, as  currently planned, also  has  hardware 
monitors to inform  the pilot and crew of malfunction and redun- 
dancy  level.  In general, the time-to-detect faults for  the  MLS 
and autoland hardware  monitors is on  the order of  one  second. 
The purpose o f  the ILM  fault  detection  subsystem is  to  (a) 
detect an "abnormal" condition, and (b) discriminate between  the 
possible "failures". Due to  the operational premise (1) , stated 
previously, the  ILM monitors must  detect a failure by observing 
only the failure's  effect on the aircraft  state. Consequently, 
one can expect  the  ILM time-to-detect to  be  longer  than  that of 
a well-designed hardware monitor. 
The possible system faults that  the  ILM can detect  can  be 
categorized into (a) autoland (e.g., guidance computers, autopilot), 
(b)  MLS, (c) "out-of-design envelope" wind, and (d) ILM  system 
malfunctions. Since minimal interconnection to the primary  system 
is proposed, the failures are detected  by measuring perturbations 
to the nominal aircraft trajectory (e.g., 8 ,  @, $J, x, y, z, a, B ,  
p, q ,  r) with independent  ILM sensors. 
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I t  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  t o  model e x p l i c i t l y  t h e  exact 
a i r c ra f t  dynamics   which   resu l t s   f rom a systems. f a u l t .  The s t a t e  
p e r t u r b a t . i o n s  b e c a u s e  o f  a f a u l t  can b e  a s s u m e d  t o  c h a n g e  e i t h e r  
as a s t e p  o r  a ramp.  For  example, a f a u l t  c a u s i n g  t h e  a i r c r a f t  t o  
r o l l  would produce a ramp ou tpu t  f rom a ve r t i ca l  gyro and a s t e p  
output   f rom a r o l l  r a t e  g y r o .  A l s o ,  c e r t a i n  MLS beam n o i s e   o r   w i n d  
c o n d i t i o n s  c o u l d  c a u s e  s t e p  o r  ramp changes  in  the  measu remen t  
s e n s o r   o u t p u t   c o v a r i a n c e .   T h e r e f o r e ,   t h e   f a u l t   d e t e c t i o n   s c h e m e s  
can  be  based  on  measu r ing  the  changes  in  the  mean and  va r i ance  of 
each  measu remen t  s enso r ' s  ou tpu t .  
The measurement data have a c e r t a i n  amount o f  n o r m a l  n o i s e .  
T h i s  n o i s e  i s  su rp res sed  by  hav ing  a t h r e s h o l d  w h i c h  t h e  s t a t e  e r -  
r o r  m u s t  e x c e e d  b e f o r e  it can be considered "abnormal" .  
The f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  s y s t e m  a n a l y s i s  c o n s i d e r e d  p o t e n t i a l  f a u l t s  
i n  terms o f   t h e i r  e f f e c t  on t h e  a i r c r a f t  s t a t e .  The t y p i c a l   r a n g e  
o f  s t a t e  e r r o r  b u i l d u p  ra tes  c h o s e n  f o r  t h i s  s t u d y  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  
Tab le  2 0 ,  f o r   r o l l ,   s i d e s l i p ,   p i t c h   a n d   h e a d i n g .   N o t e   t h a t   h a r d -  
o v e r  f a u l t s .  are e a s i e r  t o  d e t e c t  ( i . e . ,  s m a l l  t i m e - t o - d e t e c t )  a n d  
more d i f f i c u l t   t o   c o r r e c t .  On t h e   o t h e r   h a n d ,   s l o w o v e r s   a r e   d i f -  
f i c u l t  t o  d e t e c t  ( i . e . ,  l o n g  t i m e - t o - d e t e c t )  and  somewhat e a s i e r  
t o   c o r r e c t .  The p r i n c i p a l   d i f f i c u l t i e s   i n   d e t e c t i n g   s l o w o v e r s  i s  
due t o  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  s l o w o v e r s  b e i n g  masked  by  sensor  noise  and 
t h e  n o m i n a l  s t a t e  a c t i v i t y  d u e  t o  t h e  e x t e r n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  ( i . e . ,  
t u r b u l a n c e ) .   T a b l e  2 1  g i v e s   t h e   a s s u m e d   n o m i n a l   n o i s e   a c t i v i t y   o n  
a o n e  s i g m a  b a s i s ,  i n  t h e  r o l l ,  p i t c h  a n d  h e a d i n g  s t a t e s  d u e  t o  t h e  
e x t e r n a l   e n v i r o n m e n t ,   n o r m a l   a u t o l a n d   c o n t r o l   a c t i v i t y   a n d   n o r m a l  
MLS beam no i se /bends .  
Fau l t  De tec t ion  Algor i thms  
P r i o r  t o  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  s p e c i f i c  d e t e c t i o n  scheme  proposed 
a n d  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  s i m u l a t i o n  r e s u l t s ,  some comments r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
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TABLE 20.-TYPICAL  STATE PERTURBATIONS CAUSED  BY 
SYSTEM FAULTS 
~ . " -~ 
T 
. .. 
TYPE OF HEbDING RATE PITCH RATE SIQESLIP RATE POLL RATE 
FAILURE 4 (O/SEC) 
0 . 1  - 0.01  (NOSEDOWN) 0.02 0.01 SLOWOVER 
2 2 7 . 5  5 HARDOVER 
VJ (O/SEC) 6 (O/SEC) B (O/SEC) 
+ 0 . 1  (NOSEUP) 
TABLE 21.-ASSUMED NOMINAL STATE ACTIVITY DUE TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL NO I SE ( l u )  
- _" -~ ~ 
STATE HEADING  PI  TCH SIDESLIP ROLL 
NOMINAL 0.32 '  0 . 6 5 '  0.32O 0 .32O 
"- . 
methodology are  in order. Recall from the previous chapter  that 
the basic  pilot action for Strategy A,  on failure detection, is  to 
initiate a go-around. Because of time criticality of the approach, 
the precise cause of the failure is of secondary  importance. Thus, 
the fault detection process receives major emphasis  at  this  point. 
Basic  assumptions in the fault detection scheme are that (1) 
the sequence of samples obtained from  the sensors on each  state 
arise from a normal Gaussian distribution and (2) the samples are 
uncorrelated. These assumptions are  made because no'results exist 
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in the literature without these assumptions at this time. The for- 
mer assumption of "normality" does not have as significant an  impact 
as  the  latter.  From  the physics of the problem it is clear that 
sequential samples of aircraft state measurements are  in  fact cor- 
related, but  these can be made uncorrelated by a whitening filter 
[ 2 1 ]  or  an A M  (auto-regressive moving average - -  minimal  order 
discrete  differential  equations modeling the  input/output  behavior) 
model [ 2 1 ] .  Both  these approaches require  the availability of 
flight  test/simulator data, and additional computation time is re- 
quired  for  the  whitening  process.  In  any case, the  robustness of 
any statistical sample testing  algorithm  to  test  assumptions must 
be  determined by simulation methods. 
Difficulties arise in detecting  the faults from the measured 
state perturbations  because: (1) the allowable time  to  detect 
(from a recovery point-of-view) for hard  failures is limited t o  
some maximum time T and ( 2 )  the  effect of slowovers are masked 
by the  effect of the normal disturbances indicated  in Table 21.  An 
increase  in  the  wind  disturbance magnitude or a performance degrada- 
tion in the MLS or autoland system  is  reflected by an  increase in 
the  variance of the  system state statistics. On  the  other hand, 
a hardover or  slowover  failure results in a change in the mean 
values of some or all of the states. 
In summary.,  the statistical tests should detect changes in mean 
and/or  variance  from  the  "nominal", within T seconds, using a fixed 
sampling  rate. Also to meet ILM performance constraints, the de- 
tection  logic  should have a fixed false alarm  (nuisance  disconnect) 
rate PFAI and a fixed  missed alarm (undetected  failure) rate of PmI.  
Based on industry  data  and  the calculations of the previous chapter, 
a typical  set of numerical  values of these parameters is presented 
in Table 2 2 .  
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TABLE 22.- FAULT  DETECTION  ALGORITHM  PERFORMANCE 
SPECIFICATION 
. 
T (SEC) K (SAMPLES/SEC) P m I  'FAI ( Q )  
~ ~ 
2 10 
- I 
A number of statistical tests can be used, depending on the 
hypothesis being  tested [ 2 2 - 2 5 1 .  The applicable tests to detect 
mean and  variance changes, are  summari,zed  in Table 2 3 .  In the 
leftmost column, the hypotheses being  tested are tabulated; these 
fall  into  two main categories - -  mean  changes  and  variance  changes. 
For  each of these categories, ,there exists  the  univariate  sample 
case and  the multivariate sample  case. 
As noted in  the references, a number of unsolved problems re- 
main in the  area o f  statistical testing.  One  particular  case is 
the generation of fault  detection operating characteristics f o r  
the t test. Current literature  indicates  that  these characterist- 
ics  must be determined  by  extensive Monte Carlo computer simulation. 
Let{ xi) s = l  be a sample from a normal distribution with 
constant mean uo and  variance oo . To test whether a given sample 2 
C x .  I satisfies the null hypothesis (a2 = o o Z )  or the alternate 
( 0  # o o 2 )  one can perform either a likelihood ratio test [ 2 2 ]  o r  
a  chi-square (x ) test. Even under the assumptions of normality 
and  independent samples, the  likelihood ratio test is a complex 
function of  the sample variance. Analytical or empirical results 
on the distribution of the  likelihood  ratio tests, necessary to 
compute test thresholds, are not available in  literature. There- 
fore, in practice, a  chi-square (x ) test for the  null hypothesis 
(denoted  by p o :  u = o ') is 'used. This  test  is a l s o  used here, 
for detecting univariate variance changes as  documented in Table 2 3 .  
t 
2 
2 
0 
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TABLE 23.-APPLICABLE  PARAMETRIC  STATISTICAL TESTS 
MEAN -
Ho: P = Po 
H1: P f v0 
2 TEST: 
1 l + r  
1 - r  zo = 7 l o g  -
r: CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT 
(BI-VARIATE) 
u UNKXOWN 
t TEST: 
ROBUST TO  NOR- 
MALITY ASSUlrlP- 
TION 
VARIASCE MAXIMUbI LIKELIHOOD  TEST 
LARGE  SAMPLE APPROXIMATION: x2 
p KNOWN/UNKNOWN 
NOT  ROBUST  TO  NORMALITY 1 ASSUMPTION 
MULTIVARIATE (OXE-SIDED NOT APPLICABLE) 
u KKOIIN 
T2 TEST: x 2  TEST 
u UNKNOI\’N 
(VECTOR I T2 = N ( X - P ~ ) ~ ,  S .  -1 (X-po) - 
CASE) 
S = COVARIANCE  MATRIX 
X. - CONFIDENCE  LEVEL SETTING 
~ ~ _ _ _  ~~~ ~~ 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  TEST 
LARGE  SAMPLE  APPROXIMATION: T2 
1.1 KNOWS/UNKNOIJN 
To  test  the hypothesis of whether the mean p is  equal  to 
some constant p o  (denoted  by Ho: u = p o )  o r  it  is not (denoted 
by  H1: 1-1 # p o ) ,  the student's t test  is  used when the variance IS 
is unknown. Unlike the x2 test, the t tes?  (see Table 2 3 )  is robust 
(i.e., insensitive to moderate deviations from the assumption o f  
normality) when the sample is random. But unlike the x 2  test, 
analytic expressions or tabulated results are not available  to de- 
termine the test threshold setting to achieve a prespecified  false 
alarm rate ( q )  and missed alarm rate ( r ) .  
2 
For  the x 2  test, Figure 13 presents the variance  ratio  that 
can be detected  as a function of sample size (n), false alarm rate 
( q )  and missed alarm rate ( E )  [24]. These curves were obtained 
by evaluating, analytic expressions of  the x 2  test  using numeric 
values of the false alarm ( q )  and missed alarm ( E )  rates.  Based 
on requirements defined in Table 2 2 ,  it was  determined  that  to  detect 
an "abnormal" condition in a given signal, the change in  variable 
from  "normal" (oo2) t o  "abnormal" (om2) must  be 9 . 5 5 .  The cor- 
responding null and alternative hypotheses for  the x 2  test  are 
shown in Table 24 for  the roll, pitch, and heading axes. 
The proper  threshold  setting  and  the  corresponding  mean  change 
required to identify  an  abnormal  signal  in  the t test  had  to be 
determined by computer simulation. This is as yet an analytically 
unsolved  problem. 
TABLE 24.-THE NULL AND ALTERNATE HYPOTHESIS 
FOR THE x 2  TEST 
STATE ROLL PITCH HEADING COMMENTS 
NOMINAL 0 . 3 2 O  0.65 '  0. 32O Ho: NULL HYPOTHESIS 
I 
~ . ,  
,DETECTABLE 
. - ~ . . ~ ~ ~ 
l.oo 2 . 0 °  1. o o  HA: ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS 
-_ 
" ." ~ 
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F o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y ,  c o m p u t e r  s i m u l a t i o n s  were p e r f o r m e d  t o  
v a l i d a t e  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  t t e s t  and x2 t e s t ,  f o r  t h e  u n i -  
v a r i a t e  c a s e ,  u s i n g  s t e p  a n d  ramp  changes, i n  t h e  mean and  va r i ance  
o f   t h e   m e a s u r e d  s t a t e .  The performance o-f t h e  t e s t s  was e v a l u a t e d  
us ing   10 ,000   runs   o f  50 samples   each.  To o b t a i n  more s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
c o r r e c t  r e s u l t s  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  more r u n s .   T h i s  was n o t   d o n e   t o   m i n i -  
mize   computa t ion   cos t s .   I n   each  case,  s t e p   a n d  ramp c h a n g e s   t o   t h e  
measured s t a t e ,  b e c a u s e  o f  f a u l t s ,  were i n t r o d u c e d  a f t e r  20 samples .  
The form  of   these   changes  a r e  shown i n  F i g u r e s  14a and. l4b. ,   respec-  
t i v e l y .  
The c o r r e s p o n d i n g  s i m u l a t i o n  r e s u l t s  f o r  a mean change  and a 
va r i ance   change  a r e  shown i n   F i g u r e   1 5 a   a n d   1 5 b ,   r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
T h e s e   f i g u r e s   i n d i c a t e   t h a t ,  as  e x p e c t e d ,   s t e p   f a u l t s   a r e   e a s i e r  
t o   d e t e c t   t h a n  ramp f a u l t s .   S i m u l a t i o n   r e s u l t s   a r e   s u m m a r i z e d   i n  
Tab le  25. I t  c a n   b e   s e e n   t h a t  x2 t e s t  i s  n o t   r o b u s t   t o   c h a n g e s   i n  
t h e  mean. I n   o t h e r   w o r d s   t h e  x2 t e s t ,   u s e d   t o   d e t e c t   c h a n g e s ,  
has  a h i g h  f a l s e  alarm (q) r a t e  f o r   c h a n g e s   i n   t h e  mean. On t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  t t e s t ,  u s e d  t o  d e t e c t  mean changes ,   does   no t  
cause  a f a l s e  alarm when t h e r e  i s  a change   i n   va r i ance .   Thus ,   t he  
t t e s t  i s  r o b u s t   t o   v a r i a n c e   c h a n g e s .  
The r o b u s t  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  t t e s t  c a n  b e  u s e d  t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h e  
s h o r t c o m i n g  o f  t h e  x' t e s t ,  when bo th  t e s t s  a re  u s e d  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y .  
A s i m p l e  h a r d w a r e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e q u i r e d  l o g i c  i s  shown i n  
F i g u r e   1 6 .   E s s e n t i a l l y   t h e   s h o r t c o m i n g   o f   t h e  x 2  t e s t  i s  overcome 
by d e c l a r i n g  a c h a n g e  i n  v a r i a n c e  o n l y  i f  t h e  t t e s t  d o e s  n o t  f l a g  
a c h a n g e  b u t  t h e  x 2  t e s t  does .  
A s i g n i f i c a n t  amount o f  a d d i t i o n a l  work  needs t o  b e  p e r f o r m e d  
o n  d e t e c t i o n  a l g o r i t h m  m e t h o d s  t o  a n s w e r  a number o f  p e r t i n e n t  
problems : 
1. D e t e r m i n a t i o n   o f   t h r e s h o l d   s e t t i n g   f o r   t h e  t t e s t  as  a 
f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  s a m p l e s  s i z e  (n)  , f a l s e  alarm r a t e  (TI) 
and missed  alarm r a t e  (<) . 
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FIGURE 1 4 b - S T E P  AND RAMP FAULT IN MEAN 
2. Methodology for threshold setting and false alarm/missed 
alarm rate computation for state errors with ramp growth 
characteristics. 
T2 and x tests). 
3 .  Extensioy of (1) and (2) t o  the vector  test (i. e. , the 
Fault Discrimination 
In  examining the results of  the previous chapter, one notes 
a primary requirement is  to detect the presence o f  a fault. 
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FIGURE 15a.- FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FAULT DETECTION 
FOR MEAN CHANGE 
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FIGURE  1Sb.-FREQUENCY  DISTRIBUTION  OF  FAULT 
DETECTION  FOR  VARIANCE  CHANGE 
- 
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FIGURE  16.-PROPOSED  DETECTION L O G I C  TO PROVIDE 
ROBUSTNESS IN x2 TEST 
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TABLE 25. - COMPUTER  SIMULATION  RESULTS  FOR  THE x 2  AND t TEST 
INPUT  CHANGE 
CHARACTERISTIC 
TYPE -
St eP 
Ramp 
- 
ELEMENT 
Me an 
Variance 
Me an 
Variance 
FALSE  ALARM  RATE 
(rl) 
X 2  
0 .366  
(High  False 
Alarm  Rate) 
l o  
3 x l o - /  
(Small 
Alarm 
Missed: 
4ISSEI 
RAT1 
X 2  
" 
" 
ALARM 
SI 
t 
10- 
" 
COMMENTS 
Excessive rl for  Mean  Change, 
Using x 2 
Increased  Turbulence/Beam/Noise/ 
AP  Degradation 
Excessive rl for  Mean  Change, 
Using x 2  
Increased  Turbulence/Beam/Noise/ 
AP Degradation 
To discriminate among the various fault categories, one procedure 
is to check sequentially all the autoland/MLS hardware monitor 
flags and to identify  the  fault source by a process of elimination. 
One posible discrimination flow chart, to accomplish this, is 
presented in Figure 17. Basically, the priority for performing the 
sequential discrimination is t o  perform the validity checks 
first on the subsystems (e.g.,  autopilot) whose failures  lead to the 
greatest  hazard  probability. 
An alternative methodology for fault distrimination without 
the use of existing hardware monitors  is  to compare signals from 
independent sources for consistency  using simple system dynamic 
mdoels.  For example, a fault  causing a roll  angle  must eventually 
show up  as a lateral displacement.  Assuming  that  the ILM position 
and  attitude information is independent, Figure 18 shows sketches 
of the measurement traces  due  to faults causing  lateral deviations 
in  the  error  state. Shown are  typical amplitudes of ILM gyro 
measured  roll  angle (@) ,  ILM y-sensor measured lateral position 
(yi), and MLS measured  lateral  position (y,). As can be seen in 
Figure 18a, if  both ILM gyro  and y-sensor data are available, auto- 
land, MLS, and ILM faults can be distinguished.  With  only y-sensor 
(Figure  18b) or gyro  (Figure  18c) data, an autoland  failure can be 
distinguished  from an ILM or MLS fault, but  the ILM and MLS faults 
can't be differentiated directly. However, if the presence of a 
fault is the  only information required, the  two sources are 
adequate. Similarly, a single source (either y-sensor or  gyro) 
could be used to determine that a fault of some sort is present 
(ILM,  MLS, or autoland). 
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FIGURE 17.-SEOUENTIAL  DISCRIMINATION TEST FLOW  CHART 
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ILM y Sensor t Autoland Fault t ILM or  MLS Fault t ILM or MLS Fault t 
ILM Gyro Fault t MLS Faul t t Autoland Fault t Auto1 and  Faul t t 
( a )  Three Independent Signals (b )  No ILM Gyro ( c )  No ILM y Sensor 
FIGURE 18.- LATERAL  SIGNAL  TRACES  INDICATING  ILM,  MLS,  OR  AUTOLAND  FAULT  OCCURRENCE; 
( a )  ILM  ASSUMED  TO  HAVE  BOTH  POSITION (yi) AND  ATTITUDE (+) INFORMATION; 
(b) ILM  HAS  POSITION  INFORMATION  ONLY; (c) ILM  HAS  ATTITUDE  INFORMATION 
ONLY. 
V .  FAULT RECOVERY PERFORMANCE 
The f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  a l g o r i t h m s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r  
p r o v i d e  t h e  p i l o t  w i t h  an a1ar.m a d v i s i n g  h im o f  t he  ex i s t ance  o f  
a f a u l t .  The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  c a n  be  used  to  recom- 
mend a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  r e c o v e r y  d e c i s i o n  ( i - e . ,  m a n u a l  t a k e o v e r  t o  
l a n d   o r   g o - a r o u n d ) .  However, t h e   v a l i d i t y   o f   t h e   c h o i c e  i s  r e l a t e d  
t o  t h e  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e c o v e r  f r o m  t h e  e r r o r  s t a t e  i n d u c e d  by 
t h e  f a u l t .  A t  t h e   p o i n t   o f   f a u l t   d e t e c t i o n ,   d u e   t o   t h e   s t a t i s t i c a l  
n a t u r , e  o f  t h e  f a u l t  o c c u r r e n c e  a n d  d e t e c t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  s y s t e m  
s t a t e  x i s  d e s c r i b e d  by  a mean d e v i a t i o n  f rom nominal,   x,   and a 
c o v a r i a n c e ,  P ,  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g   d i s p e r s i o . n s   a b o u t   t h i s  mean i n  a 
p r o b a b i l i s t i c   s e n s e .  A s  n o t e d   i n   F i g .  1, s p e c i f i c   f a u l t .   r e c o v e r y  
c o n s t r a i n t s ,  i m p o s e d  b y  t h e  s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  a r e  d e f i n e d  i n  t e r m s  
o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  emergency  l and ing  f a i lu re  (PELE/PELI ) ,  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  g o - a r o u n d  f a i l u r e  ( P G A E / P G A I )  a n d  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
manual   anding   fa i lure   <PMLE/PMLI) .  To e n a b l e   t h e   p i l o t  t o  r e c o v e r  
f r o m  a n  u p s e t  a n d ,  s u b s e q u e n t l y  g u i d e  t h e  a i r c r a f t  t o  a l a n d i n g  o r  
g o - a r o u n d  w i t h i n  t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  n e c e s s i t a t e s  t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  
o f   a d d i t i o n a l   s e n s o r s   a n d   d i s p l a y   p a r a m e t e r s .  The s e t   o f   s e n s o r s  
a n d  d i s p l a y  p a r a m e t e r s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  meet t he  above  men t ioned  sa fe ty  
c o n s t r a i n t ,  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  ILM i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  d i s p l a y  r e q u i r e -  
men: s .  
- 
The o b j e c t i v e  of  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  t o  p r e s e n t  a n  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  
t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  p i l o t - a i r c r a f t - d i s p l a y  s y s t e m  i n  r e c o v e r y  
f rom an  upse t  cond i t ion ,  based  on t h e  a n a l y s i s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  C h a p t e r  
I V .  T h i s   p e r f o r m a n c e   o f   t i m e - t o - c o r r e c t   t h e   f a u l t ,   c a n   b e   u s e d   t o  
d e f i n e  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  t h e  a l t i t u d e s  w h i c h  g o v e r n  t h e  r e c o v e r y  
s t r a t e g y .  F i r s t ,  t h e   t e c h n i q u e   o f   e v a l u a t i n g   p o s t - f a u l t   s y s t e m  
per formance   (namely ,   covar iance   p ropagat ion)  i s  p r e s e n t e d   i n   a n  
o u t l i n e  f o r m ;  a  more d e t a i l e d  e x p o s i t i o n  i s  conta ined  in  Appendix  
B .  S u b s e q u e n t l y ,   s i m u l a t i o n   r e s u l t s   f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  o f  numer- 
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ical  values  corresponding to a linearized model of the terminally 
configured  vehicle (B-737) are presented. These preliminary results 
allow an assessment to be made of the fault recovery performance 
as a function of initial state covariance, display accuracies, and 
pilot response characteristics. 
Fault  Recovery  Performance  Assessment  By Covariance Propagation 
Two distinct  techniques  are available to evaluate post-fault 
system performance; these  are  the Monte Carlo  analysis [15 ]  and 
covariance propagation [ 2 1 ] .  The former technique has been exclu- 
sively  used by a number o f  commercial aircraft system  developers 
to generate certification requirement compliance data for Category 
I11 autoland systems [15 ] .  The latter technique has mainly been 
used  in  analytical  studies. 
The principal  advantage of Monte Carlo methods over covariance 
propagation  is  that  the results are more accurate. The Monte Carlo 
simulation  allows  the inclusion o f  all nonlinear details of the 
overall  system  being  studied. On the other hand, the computation 
time  for  the Monte Carlo  simulation can be excessive, particularly 
when the tails o f  the  outcome probability distribution are to  be 
evaluated. Moreoever, the time  required to develop the  program  is 
quite substantial. 
Because  the present study  focused on the development o f  a 
methodology for determining information and  display requirements, 
the  covariance propagation technique was selected to study recov- 
ery  performance. Although the results are less accurate  than  those 
obtained by Monte Carlo analysis, this novel application o f  the 
technique  does yield useful results pertinent to  the complex, costly, 
and time-consuming process o f  advanced aircraft ILM design. 
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The application of the covariance propagation technique to 
evaluate recovery performance requires a linear small perturbation 
system model or sequence of models. These models define the air- 
craft-autoland-display-pilot system as it proceeds along  the  terminal 
area landing trajectory. Detailed analytical characterization of 
the system model and the covariance propagation technique is pre- 
sented in Appendix B. 
Figure 19 shows a system level block diagram for the manual 
control of the aircraft during a particular flight condition along 
the trajectory. The three essential subsystems in  this  diagram 
are the aircraft model, the  display model, and  the  pilot  model. 
Wd External 
Disturbance "m - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1 Measurement Noise 
1 I 
Control I u 
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FIGURE 19.- MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM BLOCK  DIAGRAM 
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Note  that  the  system model definition is in  terms of perturbations 
about  the  nominal. The effects of sensor errors (e.g., MLS, ILM, 
altitude) are modelled by the noise variance vm introduced by 
them. Similarly, display noise is modelled by  the noise variance 
Vd. The basic assumption in modelling the pilot is  that he behaves 
as  an optimal state estimator followed  by a feedback controller 
to null  out perturbations from  the nominal [ 2 6 , 2 7 ] .  To model the 
effects of pilot muscular motor noise in implementing these man- 
ually  generated optimal control laws, a noise term wm  is introduced. 
Finally, to  model external gust-turbulence disturbances another 
noise term wd is used. 
The state of the system at the  point o f  fault detection is 
modelled by the mean state vector, x, offset from the nominal (null) 
trajectory. A covariance matrix P represents the dispersion of 
the state about this mean, in a statistical sense. The closed  loop 
aircraft-display-pilot feedback control system performance is 
obtained by numerically integrating the corresponding differential 
equation  governing  the propagation of the covariance matrix as a 
function  of  time. Typical covariance propagation results are graph- 
ically  illustrated for the  landing  and go-around tasks, in Figures 
ZOa  and 20b, respectively, for the  altitude state. 
- 
To determine whether the  landing  or go-around is  "successful", 
the  propagated covariance on a {(mean) + k (sigma)) basis  must be 
entirely within the appropriate state constraints (e.g., obstacle 
clearance, angle-of-attack limit). The probability of catastrophic 
failure  due to a landing  or go-around, as stated in the  preceding 
error  budget discussion and  Appendix A, dictates the corresponding 
numerical  value of k. The relationship between  the  parameter k 
and  the  failure probability is quantitatively  presented  in Appendix 
- 
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FIGURE  20b."ANUAL  GO-AROUND  TASK  FAULT  RECOVERY 
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At each  point  along  the  approach  trajectory, the error  state 
covariance  must  be  within  the  appropriate  state  constraints. If it 
is not, then  it can be  concluded  that  for the assumed initial. state 
covariance  and  pilot  model  parameters,  fault recovery at a sufficient- 
ly low level of catastrophe  probability  is not feasible. 
The "time-to-correct", from an initial  upset  condition  at  fault 
detection,  is  evaluated in this  fashion.  A  state  covariance  matrix 
characterizing  the  steady  state  covariance (due  to  external distur- 
bance) when no faults  are  present  is  compared  to  that  obtained  from 
covariance  propagation  from  the  initial  fault  state. When the 
latter  covariance  is  entirely within the former, the  corresponding 
time-to-correct is  obtained.  Details on this  recovery  termination 
condition  are  given in Appendix B. 
Besides  evaluating  probability of catastrophe  and time-to- 
correct, covariance  propagation  allows  convenient  analysis of the 
sensitivity  to  the  magnitude of sensor  errors (v,), display  errors 
(v,), external  disturbances (Wd)y and  the  pilot  model  parameters 
for  the  estimator  and  the  controller.  In  the  present  study,  partial 
results  relating  some of these  factors  were  obtained. A substan- 
tial  amount of further work, particuarly  with  respect  to  pilot  model 
parameter  sensitivity,  remains  to  be  performed. 
Two  particular  phases of flight, specifically  the  flare  and 
go-around maneuvers,  require  further  comments.  Both  these  maneuvers 
involve non-linear system  dynamics.  The  flare  maneuver  has a non- 
linear  control  sequence  and non-linear ground  effects on the aero- 
dynamic  coefficients. The go-around maneuver  is  nonlinear  because 
of the  limiting  controls  and  abrupt  change  in  flight  conditions in- 
volved.  consequently,  to  obtain  covariance  propagation of reason- 
able  fidelity  to  the  true  situation  in  these regimes, it  is neces- 
sary  to  model  these  phases  by a sequence  of  linear  models  rather 
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than a single model. This requirement detracts  from the principal 
features of covariance propagation, namely, ease of implementation 
and small computation time. In any case, the results of  covariance 
propagation must be treated  as a first approximation to advanced 
aircraft ILM design. These results must  be validated by Monte 
Carlo  analysis  using the nonlinear equations of motion, ground- 
based cockpit simulation, and  finally a prototype flight test. None- 
theless, covariance propagation does serve to provide approximations 
to  the sensitivity of time-to-correct to system  parameter  variations. 
It also serves to determine which system parameters should be exam- 
ined  more closely in subsequent analysis and  testing. 
Example Covariance Propagation Simulation Results 
To determine  the pilot recovery performance after  fault detec- 
tion, the longitudinal and  lateral  modes of the Terminally 
Configured Vehicle (TCV) were modeled by linearized  sets of 
perturbation equations  for the aircraft and  an  optimal control model 
for the  pilot.  Numerical  data on these models are  presented  in 
Appendix B. 
Starting with an  initial state error covariance manifold (ac) 
and  display  error statistics ( u s ) ,  the objective the the simulation 
was to determine  the sensitivity of time-to-recover to changes in 
oc and us .  This was done for both the  longitudinal  and  lateral 
axes recovery  decisions. 
The baseline  system was characterized by the set of numerical 
values  in Table 2 6 .  These baseline standard deviations were varied 
as shown in Table 2 7 .  Based  on the error budget requirements, the 
probability of catastrophic accident, during a go-around or landing 
decision, was constrained to be about (1 accident per 10,000 
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TABLE 26.-COVARIANCE PROPAGATION BASELINE DISPLAY ERROR (0 ) 
AND INITIAL STATE ERROR (us )  STANDARD DEVIATION? 
1 LONGITUDINAL ERRORS 
ILM Display us(O,u,a,h,RS) = { 1" , .52 m/s ( 1 . 7  Feet/s) , 
Error: 
I", . 3  (1 foot) , I. 5m (5 feet)) 
Initial 
State Error: uc(O,u,a,h,RS) = (2",  .52m/s  (1.7 Feet/s), 
LATERAL ERRORS 
2O, 3.05m (10 Feet) , 6.lm 
(20  Feet)) 
ILM Display os(~,$,B,L) = {I", lo, l o ,  1.5m (5 Feet)) 
Error 
Initial 
State Error: ac(~,$,B, p,r,L)= {lo, lo, l o ,  l 0 / s ,  ~ O / S ,  
where 
7.6m (25  Feet)} 
8 - Pitch angle $I - Roll  angle 
u - Normalized  velocity $ - Heading angle 
CY. - Angle-of attack B - Sideslip  angle 
h - Altitude p - Roll rate 
RS - Slant range r - Yaw rate 
L - Lateral  displacement 
decisions). This corresponds approximately to the  four sigma (40) 
covariance dispersion envelope  as  discussed in Appendix B. During 
each  time  step of the covariance propagation integration, this  four 
sigma dispersion was constrained  to  lie within the appropriate aero 
dynamic  and obstacle clearance constraints, shown in Table 28.  The 
time-to-correct was the  time  required  to satisfy the flare point 
window, given  in Table 28. 
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TABLE 2 7 .  - FAULT RECOVERY TIME-TO-RECOVER SENSITIVITY RESULTS 
VARIABLE ILM DISPLAY  ERRORS AND AIRCRAFT  STATE 
ERRORS  (DUE TO FAULTS) 
LONG1 - 
TUDINAL 
LATERAL 
- 
CASE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
- 
~. 
~ 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
~ 
I  LM 
DISPLAY 
a = as 
a = 2as 
a = as 
a = as 
a = a J 2  
a = a  
a = 20  
a = a s  
a = as 
a = o s / n  
STATE  ERROR 
INITIAL 
a = (Ic 
0 ' 0  
0 = 2ac 
a - O C / 2  
0 = 0 / 2  
a = a  
a - a  
a = 20, 
a = o c / 2  
a = a / t  
14 
1 8  
6 . 2  14 
6 . 2  
4 . 0  1 2  
4 . 0  1 2  
8 . 8  
1 8  I :::: 
24 
16 
1 4 . 8  
8 . 0  16 
8 . 0  
COMMENTS 
Baseline 
Doubling  Display  Error 
Doubling  Initial  Covariance 
Halving  Initial  Covariance 
Halving  Initial  Covariance 
and  Display  Error 
Baseline 
Doubling  Display  Error 
Doubling  Initial  Covariance 
HalvinR  Initla1  Covariance . 
Halving  Initial  Covariance 
and  Reducing  Display  Error 
* Addi t iona l  Delay  To I n c o r p o r a t e  Go-Around  Height  Loss - 3  Sec 
N u m e r i c a l  v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  " t i m e - t o - c o r r e c t "  f o r  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  
( u c )  and ( o s )  a r e   g i v e n   i n   T a b l e  2 7 .  F o r   e x a m p l e ,   i n   t h e   b a s e l i n e  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n   ( C a s e  1) i t  t a k e s  1 4  sec.  ( see   Tab le  27) t o   r e c o v e r ,  
on a 4 0  b a s i c  ( i . e . ,  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ~ a t a s t r o p h e = l O - ~ ) ,  f r o m  t h e  
i n i t i a l  s t a t e  c o v a r i a n c e  uc  ( s ee   Tab le  26) a t  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n ,  t o  
t h e  f l a r e  p o i n t  window ( see   Tab le   28 ) .  
T y p i c a l  p l o t s  o f  t h e  r e c o v e r y  e n v e l o p e s  f o r  a l t i t u d e  ( a  l o n g i -  
t u d i n a l  a x i s  s t a t e )  a n d  r o l l  r a t e  ( a  l a t e r a l  a x i s  s t a t e )  a re  shown 
i n   F i g u r e s  2 1 a   a n d   2 1 b ,   r e s p e c t i v e l y .   T h i s   f i g u r e   i l l u s t r a t e s   t y p -  
i c a l  p o s t - f a u l t  r e c o v e r y  e n v e l o p e s  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  l a n d i n g  a n d  g o -  
round   dec i s ions .   Fo r  a f a u l t   c a u s i n g   a n   u p s e t   i n   t h e   l a t e r a l   a x i s ,  
t h e  s e q u e n c e  o f  r e c o v e r y  a c t i o n s  i s  f i r s t  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  a i r c r a f t  
i n  t h e  l a t e r a l  a x i s  a n d  t h e n  t o  e x e c u t e  a l a n d i n g  o r  a go-around.  
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21.-FAULT  RECOVERY  COVARIANCE  PROPAGATION EXAMPLES 
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TABLE 28.-ASSUMED AIRCRAFT RECOVERY LIMITS AND FLARE POINT WINDOW 
r RECOVERY LIMITS 
MAX 
12 
0.15 
+22 
3 
305  (100) 
915 (3000) 
10 
5000 
15 
15 
5 
5 
5 
152 (500) 
~" . 
MIN 
12 
-0.15 
-10 
-3 
-30.5(-100) 
-610(-2000) 
- 5  
- 500 
-15 
-15 
-5 
- 5  
-5 
-152 ( -  500) 
FLARE POINT 
WINDOW 
- +O. 5 
- +o. 02 
- +O. 5 
- +O. 05 
- +l. 5 (+5) 
- +3.05(+10 
- +1 
+loo 
+1 
+1.5 
- 
- 
- 
- +l.  5 
+ 0 . 5  
+O. 5 
- 
- 
- +6.1(~20) 
AXIS 
Lateral 
This sequence of actions is reflected in the  recovery time listed 
in Table 27. Note  that go-around recovery for a failure  causing 
a lateral axis upset takes longer than that for a failure causing 
a longitudinal  axis  upset. 
For the  longitudinal  and  lateral axis, the principal conclusions 
are: 
1. The go-around recovery covariance converges more rapidly 
than  the  landing recovery covariance. 
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2 .  The time t o   e s t a b l i s h  a p o s i t i v e  r a t e  of  c l imb  i s  of  t h e  
o r d e r  o f  o n e  s e c o n d  a n d  t h a t  c o v a r i a n c e  c o n v e r g e s  t o  90 
p e r c e n t   w i t h i n   t h r e e   s e c o n d s .   N o t e   t h a t   t h e s e   r e s u l t s   m u s t  
b e  u s e d  c a u t i o u s l y  s i n c e  t h e y  a re  b a s e d  o n  l i n e a r i z e d  p e r -  
t u r b a t i o n  m o d e l s .  
3 .  The t i m e   r e q u i r e d   f o r   t h e   c o v a r i a n c e   t o   c o v e r g e   i n c r e a s e s  
w i t h  u c  and u s .  
4 .  For a l a n d i n g   d e c i s i o n ,   t h e   c o v a r i a n c e   t a k e s  as  much 
as t e n   s e c o n d s   t o   c o n v e r g e .  
5 .  B e c a u s e   l i n e a r   p e r t u r b a t i o n   e q u a t i o n s   h a v e   b e e n   u s e d ,   t h e  
go -a round  he igh t  l o s s  does  not  show  up  on t h e  p l o t s .  
6 .  The l a t e r a l   a x i s   r e c o v e r y   t a k e s   l o n g e r   t h a n   t h e   l o n g i t u d i n a l  
a x i s  r e c o v e r y  d u e  t o  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  time r e q u i r e d  t o  s t a -  
b i l i z e  t h e  a i r c r a f t  l a t e r a l l y .  
c o n s i d e r e d ,   t h e   r e c o v e r y   p e r f o r m a n c e  i s  i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  
7 .  F o r   t h e   v a l u e s   o f   d i s p l a y   e r r o r   s t a n d a r d   d e v i a t i o n s  ( o s )  
. t h e s e   e r r o r s .  
I n  summary, f o r  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  o f  n u m e r i c a l  v a l u e s  u s e d  on 
d e t e c t i n g  a f a i l u r e ,  t h e  s a fe r  d e c i s i o n  i s  t o  e x e c u t e  a go-around.  
R e c a l l i n g  t h a t  t h e  time t o  d e t e c t  i s  no  more  than  two  seconds,  
t h e  t o t a l  time f o r  l o n g i t u d i n a l  g o - a r o u n d  r e c o v e r y  f r o m  f a u l t  
i n i t i a t i o n  i s  abou t   e igh t   s econds .   Th i s   compares   f avorab ly   w i th  
c u r r e n t  FAA requ i r emen t s .  I t  i s  noted   tha t   an   emergency   landing  
d e c i s i o n  i s  w a r r a n t e d  o n l y  i f  t he  t ime  to  touchdown i s  o f  t h e  o r d e r  
o f  l e s s   t h a n   t h r e e   s e c o n d s .  To r e s o l v e   c o n c l u s i v e l y   t h e   s t r a t e g y  
d e t a i l s   b e l o w   t h e  f l a r e  h e i g h t ,   c o m p u t e r   s i m u l a t i o n s  (manned 
and  unmanned)  must  be  per formed us ing  de ta i led  nonl inear  models  
i n c o r p o r a t i n g  g r o u n d  e f f e c t s  a n d  a i r c r a f t  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  c h a n g e  e f -  
f e c t s  a t  t h e s e  h e i g h t s .  
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VI. TOTAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE, ASSOCIATED STRATEGIES, 
AND DISPLAY REQUIREMENTS 
Using the results generated by conducting the safety budget, 
fault detection and fault recovery analyses, this chapter evaluates 
total system performance and the resultant optimum pilot-crew ILM 
strategy. System performance is characterized by  the  total  time 
(detection  and  recovery) curves for go-around and  landing. This 
performance  is characterized by  the critical altitude (CA) and 
decision altitude (DA). These altitudes, in turn, define bound- 
aries to the  ILM strategies for go-around and manual landing ini- 
tiation. Appropriate display  concepts  are proposed to  implement 
the  ILM  strategy. The two  distinct versions of these  displays  are 
the go-around prompter status display  and the manual guidance dis- 
play. Associated sensor and  computational requirements are also 
considered in this  context. 
Total System Performance 
The total  time curves for go-around and  landing recovery are 
determined  by summing together  the time-to-detect and time-to- 
correct curves obtained from  the  fault detection and fault recovery 
analysis, respectively.  Figure 2 2  shows a superposition of the 
time-to-detect curve for the  variance  change (x2 test) algorithm 
(see Fig.  13)  and  the  longitudinal  axis  fault recovery (time-to- 
correct) curve (see Table 2 7 ) .  These two curves are  summed 
together  for  the  same  initial state error deviation (a) 
ratio, along the time axis. The multiple of standard deviations 
(a) to be used to assure that the probability of catastrophe dur- 
ing go around is budgeted in Chapter I11 .and Appendix B y  was 
established as four standard deviations (40). The resulting total 
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FIGURE 22.- DETERMINATION OF TOTAL  TIME  (DETECTION/RECOVERY)  FOR  GO-AROUND TASK 
(BASELINE) IN LONGITUDINAL  AXIS 
time curve shows that the tolerable deviation ratio due to faults, 
decreases until t is .less than or equal to tminl. Below tminl, 
no fault is tolerable without violating  the required level of 
safety. 
The altitude  on the nominal profile at which the  time to touch 
down is  equal to tminly is  defined  as the critical altitude (CA). 
Below this altitude the pilot/crew must prepare for an emergency 
landing, in the event  that a fault  occurs. This is because  the 
error state due to the fault would no longer  be recoverable with 
a probability of catastrophe during go around of less  than 
(e.g., 4 0  basis). 
The  "time-to-detect" and "time-to-correct" can  be scaled up 
to correspond  to five standard deviation values, for example, and 
then summed to yield a different total  time curve. Using Table 
B-1  of Appendix B y  this corresponds to a budgeted  probability  of 
go around catastrophe of 3 . 4  x 10m6--a much safer go around.  But 
the  corresponding tminl from the new total  time  curve  would be 
much larger. This illustrates the  intuitively  obvious concept 
that it is safer to execute a go around  from a higher altitude 
(i.e.y  more  time  to  touchdown). 
The  total  time curve for landing  recovery  is  obtained  in a
similar fashion, as shown in Fig. 23. For  the particular set of 
numerical values used, the minimum time for landing recovery, 
tmin2 9 
to touchdown is tmin2 is defined as decision altitude (DA). 
Below decision altitude, no fault  is sufficiently recoverable to 
execute a manual landing within the required levels of safety 
(i.e. , 
is  equal to 22  seconds. The altitude at which the  time 
The portion of the go around recovery curve, in  Fig. 22, and 
the  landing recovery curve,.in Fig. 23, corresponding to recovery 
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Aerodynamic Limit 
X Test  Detection Curve 2 
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FIGURE 23.- COMPARISON OF TOTAL  TIME  FOR  RECOVERY - GO-AROUND  AND  LANDING 
from large initial deviations (i.e., large recovery time)  is of 
dubious  validity. One can reasonably expect that  the  linearized 
small perturbation models used for the aircraft and the  pilot  are 
no longer valid under large perturbations from the nominal. The 
characteristics of this portion of the curve must be obtained by 
performing an extensive Monte  Carlo analysis on a cockpit  simulator 
with a detailed nonlinear aircraft model. 
I For  the lateral axis recovery case, the pilot stabilizes  the 
aircraft prior  to  executing a go  around or a landing.  Referring 
to Table 2 7 ,  this requires an additional amount of time  equal  to 
four seconds. Thus, the  corresponding recovery time  curves  and 
the tmints would be increased by four seconds for  recovery  from a 
lateral axis fault, maintaining  the same level  of  system  safety. 
The absissa of the total  time curves (i.e.,  Figs. 2 2  and 2 3 )  
obtained in this manner, are  translated  to  an  equivalent  height 
usjng the nominal landing sequence time-height correspondence  in 
Fig. 5 of Chapter 11. The results of Figs. 2 2  and 2 3  enable one 
to superimpose the allowable deviation envelopes  (ordinate  in  Figs. 
2 2  and 2 3 )  on the nominal approach profile  for  each  of  the six 
longitudinal and  lateral  axis  states. The allowable deviation 
envelope for one state, namely altitude, has  been shown in Fig. 2 4 .  
The critical altitude and decision altitude  are 2 3  m ( 7 0  ft)  and 
56 m (170  ft), respectively, for the numerical values used in  this 
example. These altitudes can be, compared with the  currently de- 
fined nominal  "alert  altitude" (i.e., altitude at which an auto- 
land system must be fail operative to continue on automatic  landing 
Category I11 weather) of about 2 6  m ( 8 0  ft), and the Category I1 
"decision  height" of 3 0 . 5  m (100 ft) . 
A figure similar to Fig. 2 4  can be obtained, for system per- 
formance, for lateral axis faults. Basically, the  allowable devi- 
ations for the same altitude are reduced, and the critical decision 
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\ Nomi na 1 Approach 
Envelope (A1 t i t u d e )  f o r  
F a u l t  D e v i a t i o n  
Landing  Decision 
I 
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FIGURE 2 4 . -  COMPARISON  OF ALLOWABLE LONGITUDINAL FAULT 
DEVIATION ENVELOPES 
altitudes  are  increased to 3 0 . 5  m (100 ft) and 61  m (200 ft), 
respectively. These correspond  to an additional recovery  time 
requirement of four seconds above that for the  longitudinal  axis 
faults. 
The ILM system information and  display requirements, implicit 
in these recovery time  and aircraft state deviation envelopes, are 
functions of the assumptions made in the previous chapters and  the 
appendices. By virtue of its  definition  as  the measurement equa- 
tion, for example, Fig. 39 in Appendix B leads t o  the ILM sensor 
requirements. Information requirements arise from  the need to 
detect  and discriminate among possible failures; and  display re- 
quirements arise from the need to provide the pilot with an  adequate 
means of executing a "safe"  recovery. 
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Sensor errors affect the state being  measured in an RSS (root- 
sum-square) sense. To ensure that  the contribution of sensor error 
statistics is negligible to the required false alarm (q) and missed 
alarm ( c )  rates, the sensor measurement error standard deviation 
(a) is specified to be one-third of the nominal standard deviation 
of a particular state, due to environmental disturbances  (note  that 
30 for a univariate random variable is approximately 0 . 9 9 7 ) .  Thus, 
using Tables 2 4  and 26,  a set of ILM information and  display require- 
ments can  be derived, as in Table 2 9 .  Since extensive  sensitivity 
studies were not conducted in this study, these  requirements  are 
of a preliminary nature. 
The fault recovery portion of the results presented  in  this 
section have been derived  from a linearized  aircraft  model  about a
particular nominal condition together with an  optimal control pilot 
model with a hypothetical set o f  numerical parameters.  Additional 
TABLE 2 9 :  PRELIMINARY ILM INFORMATION AND  DISPLAY  REQUIREMENTS 
FOR STRATEGY A 
ACCURACY  REQUIREMENTS ( l o )  
I 
I I INFORMATION S T A T E   ( D E T E C T I O N /  D I S P L A Y  I D I S C R I M I N A T I O N ’ I  ( R E C o V E R Y )  
0. 21° 
0 . 7  m/s 
(0.5 ft/sec) 
(Angle-of-Attack) 0. 21° 
(Altitude) 0 . 3  m (1 ft) 
0.66 rn I (2.1  ft) 
l o  
(1.7 ft/sec) 
0.52 m/s 
l o  
0.3 m (1 ft) 
1.5 m 
(5 ft) 
COMMENTS 
ti is proportional 
to 2 
h z z  
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work  remains  to be performed to study the sensitivity of recovery 
time curves to variations in aircraft  and pilot model  parameters. 
Nonetheless, the results presented are representative of the pro- 
cess of fault detection and subsequent fault recovery. 
ILM Usage Strategy 
The  basic computations of the  total  time constraints, critical 
altitude, and  decision  altitude can be translated into definitive 
strategies for operational usage of the Independent Landing Monitor 
The four  elements  that  must be considered in categorizing  the  type 
of usage  are the navigation aid error characteristics of the run- 
way, the  landing accuracy performance requirements [i-e., touch- 
down dispersion manifold), the existing weather category, and  the 
airborne  autoland  system configuration. Again, the type of usage 
ranges from a runway obstruction monitor/gross  fault  monitor to a 
system with "manual  guidance to touchdown"  capability. 
Seven  principal configuration categories are noted in  Table 
30. These  categories  address  uses o f  an  ILM in weather visibility 
ranging  from  Cat I to  Cat IIIa.  Cat 24 is  used  to  designate 
visibility  conditions  midway  between  Cat I1 and  Cat  IIIa. 
These configurations  have  been arranged in the  order of de- 
creasing  system  performance  capability and, therefore, cost. Con- 
figuration 1 represents the  highest performance available  from  the 
navaid characteristics, landing  accuracy required, and  avionics 
reliability. Here, the principal usage of the ILM  is  to  serve  as 
a ground  obstruction  monitor and confidence  builder. Thus, this 
function  must be evaluated further by cockpit simulation or flight 
test. 
In  Configuration 2, the autoland equipment quality is down- 
graded by using  less  expensive  but  poorer quality components 
:ONFIGU- 
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TABLE  30.-CANDIDATE  APPLICATIONS FOR AN ILM 
CHARACTERISTICS 
NAVAID 
Category I11 
Category  I J I  
Category  I11 
Category I11 
Category I1 
Category  I11 
Category 1/11 
ACCURACY 
LAND I NG 
PERFORMANCE 
Category  I11 
Category 111 
Category I11 
Category I1 
Category 11 
Category 11 
Category 1/11 
WORST 
WEATHER 
(ACTUAL) 
Category 
I I I a  
Rol lout )  
(See To 
Category 
I I I a  
Category 
11:a 
Category 
2 1 / 2  
I e c i s i o n  
Height % 
50 Fee t )  
Category 
2 1 / 2  
Category 
2 1 / 2  
Category 
I 1  
A I RRORNE 
SYSTEM 
CONFIGURATION 
Fa i l  Opera t ive  
Fa i l   Opera t ive  
(Downgrade 
Equipment 
Qual i ty)  
Fa i l   Pas s ive  
F a i l  P a s s i v e  
Pass ive  F a i l  
SimF ) l e  Moni- 
t o r i n g  
Simple Moni- 
t o r i n g  
ILM USAGE 
Ground Obst ruc t ion  
Monitor;  Confidence 
Bui Zder 
Detec t  Out of  "Design 
Envelope" Conditions 
and  Faul t s ;  Use Ap- 
p r o p r i a t e  S t r a t e g y  
(Table 30) 
I, 11 
II 11 
Reduce Decision Height 
to. 50 Feet (Category 
2 1 / 2 ) ;  Go-Around If 
Faul t  Detepted 
Reduce Decision Height 
Go-Around If F a u l t  
Detected.  
Go-Around I f  F a u l t  
Detec ted ;   Appl icable  
To General  Aviat ion 
W 
W 
resulting in a higher equipment failure rate. Here, the I L M  is 
used to llcatchll the resulting higher rate of system  failures.  The 
intent  would be  that a lower overall system cost would result. 
This corresponds to designing a new aircraft configuration with 
less expensive primary avionics  and an ILM effectively  to  buy 
back  the  loss o f  reliability. 
Configuration 3 applies  to fail-passive avionics configura- 
tions. Here, the objective of  using  the ILM is to upgrade safety 
to the point where the fail-passive system could be  used for Cat 
IIIa operations. 
Configurations 4 ,  5 ,  and 6 illustrate the attempt to operate 
in poorer weather conditions than Category I1  but be.tter than 
Category  IIIa.  This  is  economically  attractive  because such a 
weather condition is far more frequent than Category  IIIa type 
weather. Thus, potentially, at a small  equipment  cost increase, 
a substantial  operational gain can be made  using  an ILM. Condi- 
tion 4 addresses  lowering  the decision height  below  the  Cat I1 
requirement  by  use of the  ILM. Condition 5 addresses  the  same 
situation, except  that  the  navaid  system is certified  only for 
Cat  I1 rather  than  Cat  111.  Condition 6 is  the same.as Condition 
5 except  the autoland system is not fail-passive (i.e.,  the auto- 
matic  disconnect feature is absent). Thus, it places  the  most 
stringent  r quirements  o the ILM. . 
Configuration 7 applies t o  general aviation aircraft. Here, 
the  intent  is to lower the operational ceiling of the simple avi- 
onics  system.  Note  that for Configurations 5, 6, and 7,  the ILM is 
mainly  used  as a go around prompter. The configurations labeled 
3 ,  4 and 5 are  considered to be the  most  promising  usage categories 
based on the projected numbers of aircraft and economic-operational 
benefit. 
1 0 0  
To s p e c i f y  c l e a r l y  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  s t r a t e g y  t o  b e  e x e c u t e d  
f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s ,  o n e  n e e d s  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  t y p e  
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TABLE 31 . -  PILOT/CREW STRATEGY FOR EACH CONFIGURATION (POST FAULT 
DETECTION) b 
HE I GIiT AT 
DETECTION 
FAULT ~~\Ui,T/FAIl.Ul~l~ 4NSIISCI hIOR 
I I.FI PILOT AClION 
h > DA 
Dh 1, 16m 
(Category 
2-112) 
1. , \ l l t ~ ~ l ~ l l l J  (11. bl1.S 1:1111t  c ‘ ; I u t  i o n  
Accuracy Pcrformnnce 
1 ,c~aJ inc   tu  1,:111Jing 
Degradation (Down to 
Category 1 1 )  
3 .  Unacceptable Autoland/ Abort 
b1l.S Fault (Ilardl 
C:lsc (11, ( 2 1 ,  131 Ahort 
Case (1). ( 2 ) .  ( 3 )  Landing 
1. Wind Outside Design Abort 
Envclope 
2 .  Autoland or FI1.S Fault Caution 
Accuracy PcrFvrmancc 
L e a d i n g  to I.andin!: 
Dugtadation (Down to 
Category I )  
.~utomatic/lnstrumcnt  Land; Re Prepared 
lo Initiate Emergency Landing Procedure 
Automatic/Instrument Go-Around 
Cuntinue Autuland/lnstrument Approach 
Until D A ;  Establish Visual Contact 
t o  Land, Othcruisc Go-Around 
3 .  Unacceptable Autoland/ 
MLS Fault’ (Hard) 
Ahor; ILPI/Instrument Guidance to DA;  Estab- 
Otherr,.ise Go-Around 
lish Visual Contact and Land Manually: I 
:A < h .: DA Case (11, ( 2 ) .  ( 3 )  I Abort Automatic/Instrument Go-Around 
ca 2r 6m I I I 
: O  < h < CA  Case ( I ) ,  ( 2 ) .  ( 3 )  I Landing I Automatic/Instrument Land, Be Prepared I To Initiate Emergency Landing Procedure I 
Fault Detected 
”” 
Abort 
_”  
Instrument Go-Around 
Establish Visual Contact  at  DA  and 
Land Manually 
31 f,or strategy  modification based on  aircraft attitude 
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specifies the required ILM annunciator display message and the 
corresponding  pilot/crew strategy recommendation. The strategies 
are  partitioned  into  three subgroups based on the  system configur- 
ation, defined  in Table 3 0 .  For each of these subgroups, the 
strategy is controlled by the altitude at which the  fault occurs, 
as compared to the critical altitude (CA) and decision altitude 
(DA). Thus, three ranges of altitude h exist, namely: (1) h >  DAY 
(2 )  DA > h > CA, and (3)  CA > h > 0 .  Corresponding to each of these 
altitude zones, three  main classes of faults can occur, namely: 
(1) wind  outside design envelope, (2 )  autoland or MLS'fault  lead- 
ing to landing accuracy performance degradation (down  to  Cat II), 
and ( 3 )  unacceptable autoland or MLS fault  (hard  failure). The 
corresponding  pilot action is documented  in  the  last  column. 
When  the  wind  exceeds  the design conditions above DAY 
the control remains  automatic until DA is reached. If this wind 
condition  has  not subsided by the  time DA is reached, an automatic 
instrument go-around is  initiated. If the failure is soft, lead- 
ing  mainly  to performance degradation, then the automatic approach 
is  continued until DA with the proviso that if the nature of the 
fault  becomes more severe, a go-around must be executed. If the 
nature of the fault  remains  the same, enough monitoring  capability 
must be provided to the pilot  to assure him  that  the  automatic 
landing can be safely continued. If an unacceptable fault  is de- 
tected for h >  DAY then a manual  takeover  is  required. Whether a 
go-around or a manual  landing  is  executed  depends on the  guidance 
capabilities of the ILM  system. 
The  principal  difference between the  strategy  for Configura- 
tions 2 and 3 ,  described above, from  that for 4 ,  5 ,  and 6 is  that 
better  visibility  exists for the latter. Thus, post-fault manual 
landings  are  attempted  only  after  establishing  visual contact with 
the runway  above DA for Configurations 4, 5 ,  and 6. In  all cases, 
for altitudes  below  DA  but above the critical altitude (CA), the 
1 0 2  
automatic landing  is  aborted  and a manual go-around is  initiated 
in-case of detected  fault. 
For altitudes below the C A Y  further strategy modifications 
based on aircraft altitude are  possible. Essentially, these 
amount to recommending that in the event of a pitch up situation 
due to a fault, it  is  better  to  execute a go-around rather than a 
landing, for the longitudinal  axis.  And if the roll attitude or 
roll rate due to a fault increases. the  lateral deviation , then 
the proper pilot action is go-around rather than  land.  This  type 
of strategy refinement for low altitudes is documented  in Table 3 2 .  
The  Boeing 7 3 7  attitude limits at touchdown, for a 3 m/s (10  f/s) 
sink rate are  presented in Fig. 2 5 .  These  attitude  constraints 
can be  extrapolated  to slightly higher  altitudes to define recom- 
mended pilot/crew actions based on aircraft  attitude at fault 
detection.  In  this manner, the  pilot/crew  strategy  at  the  higher 
altitude can be blended with those at  lower  altitudes. 
Proposed  Display Configurations 
The candidate ILM display configurations fall  into  two cate- 
gories--automatic fault  monitoring/warning  and  manual  guidance. 
When the primary ILM mode  is automatic warning and  the  secondary 
mode is pilot display, the monitor warns the pilot when the air- 
craft  exceeds predetermined flight envelope  limits. The secondary 
mode pilot display provides guidance  under  two conditions: (1) from 
failure warning point down to DAY and (2) from any warning point 
to a safe go-around flight path. 
On the other hand, if the primary ILM mode  is  to serve as a 
pilot display for manual guidance, then it provides the  pilot with 
a visual picture of where the aircraft is within the safe flight 
envelope.  It also provides a "continue  to DA" or go-around flight 
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TABLE  32.-STRATEGY  REFINEMENT  FOR  ALTITUDES  BELOW 
THE  CRITICAL  ALTITUDE 
AX1 S PILOT  ACTION  CONDITION 
Longitudinal 
Go - M o u n d  
Go -Around L@ > (L )max Lateral 
Go - A r o m d  1 6 > 6 > (')max 
B < *(i) 0 ; e < (elmax Land 
$4 < (@hmax Go -Around 
' Lmax 
Notation: - Pitch  angle 
8 - Pitch  rate 
4 - Roll  angle 
4 - Roll  rate 
L - Lateral  displacement of centerline 
3m/sec (10 ft/sec)  Descent 
Tail S k i d  Touching 
FIGURE 25. -TOUCHDOWN  ATTITUDE  LIMITS  FOR  THE  BOEING 737-100 
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path guidance on command. The secondary automatic  warning  mode 
of the ILM, in this case, provides a backup warning if the  pilot 
ignores the primary display  mode. 
The ILM system output in its simplest format would be a status 
panel-type display depicted in  Fig. 2 6 .  Each of the status panel 
symbols correspond to those noted in Table 31, discussed in  the 
previous section. The caution signal would typically  be a flashing 
amber light cancelable by the pilot. The controlling  logic would 
reinitiate the alarm if the hazard still existed  after, say, three 
seconds. The other symbols in the panel would be flashing or 
steady  red lights, cancelable only on executing  the appropriate 
pilot/crew strategy described  in Table 31. These basic visual 
signals could be augmented by the proper auditory (e.g., buzzer, 
synthetic voice)  alarms. 
An appropriate guidance mode display  is illustrated in Figure 
2 7 .  This display format is similar in configuration to current 
guidance/flight  director displays except  that an elliptic boundary 
representing  the  ILM safe manifold is  added. This display  would 
function as a continuous monitoring aid  to  the  pilot  during auto- 
matic  landing. Go-around prompting  and  guidance  are  provided when 
a fault  is  detected. A fault  is  visually  detected when the air- 
craft symbol falls outside the  safe manifold ellipse. 
CAUTION AUTOP I LOT I LM  MLS WIND ABORT 
FIGURE 26.-STATUS-MONITOR PANEL IN ILM DISPLAY OPTION 
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ILM Flag 
FIGURE  27a.-PILOT  DISPLAY MODE - CRT  DISPLAY  (MONITOR/ 
GO-AROUND  PROMPTER) - -  AT  INSTANT OF GO- 
AROUND  INITIATION 
ILM Flag 
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I Go-Around , 
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FIGURE 27b.- PILOT  DISPLAY  MODE - CRT  DISPLAY  (MONITOR/ 
GO-AROUND  PROMPTER)--AT  INSTANT OF GO- 
AROUND  RECOVERY  COMPLETION 
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Figure 27a shows the displayed situation at the  time instant 
when the go-around is initiated due to the aircraft  symbol  falling 
outside the ILM "safe"  manifold. A go-around flag  is  displayed  at 
the  top center of the display, and a flight path vector  leading  to 
safe recovery is  indicated. The changes in symbology that occur 
at the time instant the go-around recovery is  completed are shown 
in Figure 27b.  Note  that  the  ILM  "safe" manifold is  centered  and a 
positive climb rate has been established. 
For autoland equipped aircraft with landing  guidance  provided 
by the ILM, the display  would incorporate a runway  symbol to  aid 
the pilot in assessing his relative position prior to decision 
height; a display of this  type  is  presented in Figure 28 .  At the 
lower  edge o f  the display, the ILM derived  smoothed runway refer- 
ence  heading  is  displayed. On the  left edge, the  smoothed flight 
FIGURE 2 8 . -  CANDIDATE. LANDING  DISPLAY FORMAT FOR ILM 
SYSTEM (AUTOLAND NORMAL) 
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path angle is displayed. The heading and flight path angle infor- 
mation are supplemented by a flight path vector and  aim point dis- 
play superimposed on the  runway symbol, during the last 300 m 
(1000  ft) of altitude.  At 300 m altitude, the ILM messages at the 
upper-middle portion of the display  are activated. 
The central portion of the display in Figure 28 contains a 
specific  message such as "go-around" or  "land." The objective of 
this  message  field  is to integrate  the status type  information 
regarding faults detected and  the corresponding pilot decision into 
a single CRT  type display. On the  left of the message field, the 
time to critical altitude (TCA) and  time  to decision altitude (TDA) 
are  displayed.  On  the right side of the field, the difference be- 
tween current altitude  and critical altitude (ACA), and current 
altitude and  decision  altitude (ADA) are  displayed. These four 
numbers provide  the  pilot with continuous information on the emer- 
gency  alternatives  available to him  (if a fault  were to  occur)  and 
the  criticality of a fault. For example, an autoland failure  above 
decision  altitude would allow him  to  take  over  and  land safely, 
whereas such a failure  below decision altitude would require the 
pilot to execute a  go-around. An additional quantity displayed 
to the  pilot  is  the  time  to touchdown (TTD); this becomes the key 
parameter of interest  below  critical  altitude. 
Additional  parameters  to  be  displayed  would include: (1) com- 
mand pitch, roll, and  speed bars, and (2) estimated  wind  and tur- 
bulence  level. The final  design  format for displays to execute 
manual  landings  to touchdown under  low  visibility conditions must 
await a substantial cockpit simulation effort backed by computer 
analysis. 
For  the  aircraft not equipped with automatic landing capabil- 
ity, the ILM serves  as an autopilot  monitor. The display  symbology 
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is similar to that for autoland  aircraft. The differences  are a 
direct-result  of differing  usage  strategies. The main objective 
of  an ILM in this case is to: (1) provide visual guidance down to 
DA, and (2) command a go-around  in case of equipment failure or 
severe winds. The display format in Fig.  29a  depicts  the sitbation 
when the aircraft is at the caution limits and manual takeover pro- 
cedures must be initiated. Figure 29b presents the situation where 
the "caution"  flag has been changed to "proceed  to  DA"  requiring a
manual takeover  and ILM guidance to decision altitude; visual con- 
tact with the runway is  to be established at  that  point  before 
proceeding  any further. The third situation shown in  Fig.  29c 
indicates where the aircraft has  deviated off the  nominal by a 
significant amount and, consequently, the ILM message recommends 
a "go-around" rather than a "proceed to DA."  Note  that the "TDA" 
and It~DAtt numeric message are no longer  valid  and  are lectronical- 
ly removed from the electronic CRT display. 
ILM Flag  
Message  Radio 
Speed A1 ti tude 
r -d--  1 
I Caution I 
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FIGURE  29a.- GUIDANCE MODES FOR NONAUTOLAND AIRCRAFT-- 
AT CA'JTION LIMITS 
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FIGURE 29b . -  GUIDANCE  MODES  FOR NONAUTOLAND AIRCRAFT"PR0CEED 
TO  D.A. MANUALLY 
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FIGURE 29c.-  GUIDANCE  MODES  FOR  NONAUTOLAND  AIRCRAFT--EXCEEDING 
L A N D I N G   L I M I T S ,  MANUAL GO-AROUND MODE 
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System Hardware Implementation 
Based on the material presented  in  the  preceding sections o f  
this report, an ILM hardware implementation is  proposed. It consists 
of sensors for attitude and position with respect to  the runway, a 
computer for implementing  fault detection-discrimination algorithms 
and  generating  display information, and  the  displays  for  presenting 
the recommended pilot-crew action  and  fault  category. 
at ed 
the 
tude 
.A schematic block diagram of the  ILM computer with  the associ- 
input and output is shown in Figure 3 0 .  This figure  indicates 
ILM sensor inputs; these  include  independent position and atti- 
sensors. 
Potential independent position sensors include: (1) precision 
approach radar, ( 2 )  trilateration transponders, and (3) redundant 
MLS. Attitude sensors recommended include redundant gyros to ob- 
tain roll ($) , pitch (e) and  heading ($) angles. Additional  vane 
type or multiorifice head sensors are  recommended  for  measuring 
angle-of-attack (a) and  angle of sideslip ( 6 ) .  The state manifold 
L """""""""""""" -J 
FIGURE 30.-SCHEMATIC BLOCK DIAGRAM OF AN ILM  COMPUTER CONFIGURATION 
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generator computes the nominal roll ($I~), pitch (8,) and heading 
(Qn) angle  values for comparison with the measured attitudes. 
The figure also shows the interconnections with the primary 
autoland and MLS systems and  their  sensors. In a practical imple- 
mentation, a special  effort  must be made to minimize this inter- 
face. On the  right side of the figure, the output to the  display 
and mode selector panel is shown. The mode selection feature is 
included to allow the crew the  ability  to select the phase of 
flight  and  the guidance or monitoring mode described  in  the pre- 
vious section on  displays. 
A considerable amount of further work remains to be  performed 
(via analysis  and cockpit simulation)  before  the ILM hardware con- 
figuration can be  detailed. Specific items include finalization 
of intended  uses  for the I L M ,  establishment of fault detection 
algorithm details, establishment of I L M  sensor configuration and 
accuracy requirements, refinement of display formats, development 
of ILM computer algorithms and  logic requirements, and selection 
o f  computer, display, and  interface requirements. 
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This effort has developed a systematic procedure which can be 
used to obtain specific information and  display requirements for an 
Independent Landing Monitor. Numerical values and  linearized sys- 
tem models were used throughout the study to  test  this  procedure 
and  to yield approximations to the  ILM requirements for the  Boeing 
7 3 7  TCV aircraft. 
The 
1. 
2 .  
3 .  
4. 
5.  
6 .  
study  had multiple objectives; briefly, these were: 
Define the possible uses for the  ILM  and  determine how 
the’se uses could be justified. 
Establish the information processing requirements forthe 
ILM  that will support these uses. This included detec- 
tion of faults in the MLS and  autoland systems and out-of- 
tolerance wind conditions. 
Determine typical  time  elapsed  between  fault occurence, 
fault detection, and  fault  recovery. The associated per- 
turbation to  the nominal flight path due to the  fault  was 
to be computed. Crew action  included  the  manual  takeover 
for  both go-around and landing. 
Based on the  timing requirements, devise ILM strategies 
to govern what crew action is appropriate as a function 
of altitude and aircraft attitude. 
Devise display formats that provide the crew with neces- 
sary information to monitor the automatic landing, deter- 
mine  that a fault has occurred, and  guide  the  subsequent 
manual control of the  aircraft. 
Describe further analysis and  testing required to realize 
the  implement-ation of the  ILM. 
Because there are multiple, complex facets of the  analysis of the 
ILM, this  limited  study  concentrated on the  final  landing portion 
of the flight sequence. I.LM uses for approach, rollout, and take- 
off monitoring and guidance were briefly discussed but not analyzed. 
113 
Summary and Conclusions 
The use of the ILM studied in this investigation was to serve 
as a backup fault monitor and  to  provide guidance for manual fault 
recovery. The types  of information that are derived by the  ILM for 
such applications  include: (a) the status of aircraft states, (b) the 
presence of  a fault, (c) the  type of fault, (d) what recovery strat- 
egy should  be followed, and (e) pilot/crew guidance information to 
realize the recovery strategy. The manner in which this  information 
is  presented to the pilot and crew constitutes the display require- 
ments. 
The development of the information and display requirements 
involved a  five-step iterative  process. The steps were: 
1. Determination of the ILM  system performance requirements 
to  meet fixed safety constraints. ILM performance is 
measured in  terms of ILM hardware reliability, false alarm 
rate, and undetected failure rate. 
2 .  Determination of time-to-detect specific  fault situations 
with the I L M  system performance  (determined  in  the  first 
step) fixed. This necessitated the postulation of fault 
detection algorithms and  their subsequent simulation. 
3 .  Determination of the time-to-correct the state error fol- 
lowing  the detection of the  fault. The state error mag- 
nitude at  the  time of fault detection was dependent upon 
the required time  for detection and the error growth rate 
due  to  the fault. 
4 .  Specification of crew procedures following  fault  detection. 
These procedures were dependent upon the  time  availability 
for  recovery  ir,terms of remaining altitude and the prevail- 
ing conditions of the avionics, navigation aids, and envi- 
ronment (wind,  visibility). 
5.  Recommendation of display formats that would provide neces- 
sary information to  the crew to implement  the previously 
specified  procedures. 
These steps are now summarized in more detail. 
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The ILM potentially has three general  benefits - -  improving the 
level of safety of  an  existing flight system, providing  the means of 
lowering the landing minimums while maintaining a given level of 
safety, and  providing the means of lowering the redundancy require- 
ments (and thereby  initial investment and maintenance costs) of the 
autoland system while still maintaining a given overall safety 
level. Thus, safety is an important criterion in  the ILM design, 
and  it  is  used  in  the study to specify hardware and software re- 
quirements for  the  ILM. 
The system safety  analysis  required  the  determination of 
contribution of each  flight subsystem to the  total  system probabil- 
ity of catastrophic failure. The introduction of an ILM  to compli- 
ment a given autoland system  must provide an improved  level  of 
safety  based on the present standards for automatic landing  systems. 
The analysis  showed that for typical failure rates of existing 
equipment, the ILM could  improve performance if a voting  strategy 
was used where the  ILM  monitor  had to agree with  existing  autoland 
or MLS monitors  before corrective action was taken. 
The safety  budget analysis led  to the specification of typical 
performance requirements for the ILM system. A landing phase (total 
exposure  period) of 2 5 0  seconds was assumed, and  the  autoland/MLS 
equipment failure rate (PEF) was assumed to be (MTBF of 700 
hours). The autoland/MLS hardware monitor false alarm rates (nui- 
sance  disconnects) and missed alarm rates (undetected  failures) 
were assumed to be The resultant ILM system performance re- 
quirements are as given in Table 3 3 .  These numbers produce an 
overall catastrophic accident rate of Typical values are 
given  for the ILM hardware failure rate (PILM), false alarm rate 
(PFAI), missed alarm rate (PMAI), go-around accident rate (PGAI), 
and manual landing accident rate (PMLI). These values are highly 
dependent on the  assumed performance of the system without the ILM. 
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TABLE 33"SAFETY BUDGET ANALYSIS .REQUIREMENTS 
ON ILM SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
t 
PROBABILITY QUANTITY 
Autoland/MLS Equipment Failure Rate 
(MTBF 700 Hours) ; (PEF) 
ILM Hardware Failure Rate (PILM) 
ILM False  Alarm Rate (PFAI) 
ILM  Missed Alarm Rate (PhlAI) 
Go-Around Accident Rate with ILM (PGAI) 
Manual Landing Accident Rate With 
I 
ILM (PMLI) 
NUMERICAL VALUE 
The ILM false alarm  and missed alarm requirements serve as con- 
straints  in  designing  the fault detection software. Specifically, 
these  two numbers determine what threshold settings should  be plat- 
ed on .the  input measurements monitored  and how many  sequential sam- 
ples o f  measurement  data are necessary to determine that a fault 
has  occurred. Conversely, for a fault to be detected in, say, two 
seconds, the false alarm and  missed alarm constraints determine 
how much  larger the state  error  due to the  fault  must  be  than  the 
normal noise threshold of the measurement quantity. This governs 
the  requirement  placed on the ILM input measurement accuracy. 
Two fault detection schemes, the t test  and the x test, were 
formulated  for  detecting  abnormal  changes in a measurement  input's 
mean and variance, respectively. These schemes were  tested by simu- 
lation to confirm that  the false and missed alarm requirements were 
being  met  and  that  the time-to-detect matched  analytical  predictions. 
Additional  schemes  were  suggested  but not tested for discriminating 
the  type of failure that did occur (e.g:, autoland, MLS, wind gust). 
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The type of  fault, the resultant rate o f  state error buildup, 
and  the time-to-detect this fault determine how large the state error 
is  at the  time of fault  recovery. Thus, the time-to-recover from 
a fault  is  dependent upon the time-to-detect. The time-to-recover is 
also dependent upon what action the pilot takes for the  recovery. 
For the go-around, the action is  Eirst to stabilize the aircraft and 
then to execute the climb-out procedure. For manual landing, the 
aircraft is first stabilized, the desired glide slope is next captured, 
and finally this  glide, slope must be tracked. 
To determine time-to-recover, a linear  model was developed 
o f  the  aircraft/display/pilot  system.  The  different phases of the 
recovery required  developing correspondingly different models of 
the  pilot's action for each of these phases. The effect of ILM 
display errors were also  included  in  the model. The pilot models 
were developed  using the optimal control model procedure and limited 
available pilot performance data. 
The linear system model was used  to  develop a covariance propa- 
gation procedure for  assessing time-to-recover.  Time-to-recover 
was defined  as  the length o f  time  required to  bring  the  aircraft 
error covariance inside of that which would normally exist due to 
normal gust conditions and navigation errors. This response  time 
is highly dependent on the pilot performance model and what consti- 
tues  "safe"  recovery. Thus, the quantitative results of this  study 
are  only  examples  and must be  substantiated by further cockpit 
simulator test;. 
The accuracy requirements on specific states which are first 
used  as  inputs to the ILM and then are displayed to the crew for ILM 
Strategy A were obtained and  are  tabulated  in Table 3 4 .  Essentially 
the ILM state input accuracy requirements are those  dictated by  the 
fault detection and discrimination system. The display  parameter 
requirements are dictated by the recovery guidance needs during go- 
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TABLE 34.- PRELIMINARY  ILM  STATE  INPUT AND DISPLAY  REQUIREMENTS  FOR 
STRATEGY  A 
STATE 
L a t e r a l  
L (Displacement) 
4 (Heading) 
$ (Roll) 
(Angle of 
Sideslip) 
L o n g i t u d i n a l  
3 (Pitch) 
u (Airspeed) 
X(Ang1e-of-Attack 
h (Altitude) 
I ACCURACY REQUIREMENTS ( l a )  
STATE  INPUT 
DISCRIMINATION) 
(DETECTION/ 
0.82 m (2.5ft) 
0.l0 
0.l0 
0. lo 
0.21" 
0 . 7  m/s 
( 0 . 5  f t / s e c )  
0.21O 
0.3 m ( 1  f t )  
Rs (Slant  Range) 0.66 m I ( 2 . 1  f t )  
DISPLAY 
(RECOVERY) 
1.5 m (5 f t )  
l o  
lo 
lo 
l o  
0.52 m/s 
1" 
0.3 m (1 f t )  
1 . 5  m 
( 1 . 7   f t / s e c )  
(5 f t )  
r 
COMMENTS 
L E Y  
u i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  
t o  j ,  
h E z  
around  and  manual landing. Because extensive  sensitivity studies 
were  not  conducted to study  the  effect of key parameters, these 
accuracy  requirements  must be treated  as  preliminary. 
The time-to-detect and time-to-correct results were summed to 
yield total  time f o r  detection  and correction as a function Of 
state  error  magnitude.  This  was done for  both  lateral  and longi- 
tudinal  modes  and  both go-around and landing. These timing require- 
ments  were  then  converted to envelopes  about  the  nominal approach 
trajectory. Constraints such as obstacle clearance, stall angle, 
and r o l l  angle  limits  were  imposed on these results. Thus, these 
envelopes  defined  altitudes  above  which it was  safe to attempt a 
manual  landing  and  safe to attempt a manual go-around. Two alti- 
tudes - -  decision altitude (DA) and  critical' altitude (CA) - - were 
then  defined which aidedinthe subsequent crew procedure definition. 
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The pilot decision strategy was then developed  to  correspond 
t o  the flight path envelope constraints, determined by the  fault 
detection and recovery analysis. Three different variations of 
this strategy for Category  I1  and IIIA weather, are summarized in 
Table 35. 
Two different display concepts were  developed to provide neces- 
sary  monitoring  and guidance information to the crew to allow mech- 
anization of the  ILM concepts developed  in this study. Crew pro- 
cedures are defined for using  both  displays. One display  system 
consists of a set of panel warning  lights  shown. in Figure 31, 
which would indicate which subsystem has failed, and what action  is 
recommended  to  the  crew.  For  this system, guidance  would be provid- 
ed  by other cockpit instruments. The other display  system  proposed 
consists of a CRT-type display  presented in Figure 32, showing  the 
aircraft's attitude and position with respect to the nominal trajec- 
tory. A closing ellipse on the  display  indicates  the  boundaries of 
the  safety envelope developed by the  fault detection and recovery 
analysis.  .Additional features incorporated  into  the  display  include 
numeric data on the difference between  the current altitude  and  the 
decision and critical altitudes (i.e., ADA, ACA) ,  respectively; 
the  corresponding  time to reach  these  altitude is also  displayed 
(i.e., TDA, TCA). These features  enable thepilot/crew to  be ap- 
praised of the  recovery decision options that are open  (i.e., go- 
around, manual landing with ILM, manual landing under visual guid- 
ance, emergency  landing) at any given  time. This display  would 
have enough additional information to allow complete manual  guidance 
for go-around or continuation of the  landing  sequence. 
In summary, the.main emphasis  of  this  study was to establish a 
fundamental methodology for the  analysis  of  landing  systems  (auto- 
matic or manual). The principal benefit of this  analytical proced- 
ure is in generating design guidelines for implementing airborne 
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TABLE 35.-EXAMPLE  POST  FAULT DETECTION PILOT DECISION STRATEGY 
WEATHER 
CATEGORY 
I1 
( V i s i b l e  
Below DA) 
. 
IIIA 
IIIA 
FAULT 
DETECTION 
ALTITUDE 
h > DA 
CA < 'h < 'DA 
h <  'CA 
h > CA 
h < ' C A  
h > DA 
PILOT/CREW  ACTION 
~ ~~~~ 
P r o c e e d  t o  DA Under 
M a n u a l / I n s t r u m e n t s  
Go -Around 
Emergency  Landing 
Go -Around 
L a n d ;   P r e p a r e  For 
Emergency 
Manual  Takeover And 
Land  With ILM 
Guidance 
Go -Around 
Emergency Landing 
- 
COMMENTS 
I L M  S e r v e s  A s  
Go -Around 
P rompte r  
I L M  S e r v e s . A s  
Go -Around 
P rompte r  
ILM P r o v i d e s  
P o s s i b l e  G u i d -  
a n c e  C a p a b i l -  
i t y  To Touch- 
down In C a t e g o r y  
IIIA 
C r i t i c a l  A l t i t u d e  (CA) - A l t i t u d e   b e l o w   w h i c h   n o   f a u l t   c a n   b e  - 
r e c o v e r e d  f r o m  w i t h i n  r e q u i r e d  l e v e l s  
o f  s a f e t y ,  f o r  a g o - a r o u n d   o r  a l a n d -  
i n g   d e c i s i o n .  , 
- 
D e c i s i o n   A l t i t u d e  (DA) - A l t i t u d e   b e l o w   w h i c h   n o   f a u l t   c a n   b e  - 
r e c o v e r e d  f r o m  w i t h i n  r e q u i r e d  l e v e l s  
o f  s a f e t y ,  f o r  a l a n d i n g   d e c i s i o n .  
1 2 0  
I 
CAUTION AUTOPILOT I LM MLS  WIND ABORT 
* 
FIGURE  31.-STATUS-MONITOR  PANEL  IN  ILM  DISPLAY  OPTION 
ILM Message Flag 
Speed 
ILM Derived /*----- 
""- 
\ Vector 
ILM Derived 
Smoothed  Heading 
FIGURE  32.-CANDIDATE  LANDING  DISPLAY  FORMAT  FOR  ILM 
SYSTEM  (AUTOLAND  NORMAL) 
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systems that  would  be  too dangerous and costly to  be obtained from 
flight test  directly. Moreover, it provides a basis for formulating 
simulator  experiments  in a cost-conscious manner. Specific analyti- 
cal results, of operational value, that can be obtained by  applying 
this  methodology  include numerical values for landing minima and 
flight path deviation  envelopes  for a given aircraft/avionics con- 
figuration, ground-based navigation aid, and weather/visibility 
conditions. Furthermore, optimum (in a probabilistic sense) emer- 
gency  recovery procedures can be  derived  as a useful byproduct  of 
this  methodology. 
The analytical approach developed was used to  evaluate infor- 
mation and  display requirements for an ILM. It is  emphasized again 
that  many  simplifying assumptions were used in  this  study  for quan- 
tifying  both  the  aircraft  and  pilot  behavior  and for determining 
the ILM performance  requirements. These assumptions were necessary 
so that the methodology  could be demonstrated and  because  detailed 
models  (with numerical values) of the  Boeing 7 3 7  TCV system were 
unavailable. Consequently, more anlaytical results should be ob- 
tained to get sensitivity measures of key parameters to  the informa- 
tion  and  display requirements. 
Recommendations 
Much additional  work  is required to reach a point where an 
ILM system  based on the concepts of this  study can be  developed for 
flight  testing. Seven specific study areas which require further 
work to enable  designing  and  testing  an ILM that  meets  broad usage 
requirements are: 
1. Pilot Reaction Time---The timing requirements and  manual 
landing/go-around decision logic are  based  on  models for 
the  pilot as a controller and decision maker.  In  this 
1 2 2  
effort, pilot models were based on limited previous data. 
An analytical/experimental effort is required to  develop 
and validate more accurate mo-dels of the  pilot response 
in stabilizing the aircraft and  recovering from a fault 
condition. Model parameters must be determined  that  are 
consistent with the dynamics of the 7 3 7  aircraft in ap- 
proach, landing, ground roll, and go-around. This model- 
ing study would require extensive use of a cockpit simu- 
lator. 
2. Ground Phase Analysis - -  The current effort was mainly con- 
cerned with the landing phase (500  feet to  touchdown) of 
flight. The ILM can also provide both 1ateral.and longitu- 
dinal guidance during rollout and takeoff. Further analy- 
tical work is required to develop more detailed  purformance 
requirements Of the  system  during  this  ground phase to 
supplement those developed in  this  study  for the land- 
ing. phase. Y 
3 .  Approach and Go-Around Phase Analysis - -  The ILM can be 
used during the approach phase as a ground proximity warn- 
ing system and  to  detect  general variations from the flight 
. path.  It  can also be used as a backup guidance system dur- 
ing go-around. Similar to the  ground phase, more analyti- 
cal work is.required to  specify performance requirements 
for these  phases. 
4 .  Fault Detection - -  The current  effort  defined methods which 
.can be used to detect faults of the MLS, autoland, or  ILM 
systems. The effort was based upon assumed measurement 
system models. Additional effort  is required to obtain more 
exact models of sensor and  signal inputs, their  errors 
and noise characteristics, and  the resultant effect on 
the performance of the  fault detection logic. These more 
detailed results are  required for specifying sensor accur- 
acy requirements so that  fault detection timing require- 
ments can be met. Also, more specific software require- 
ments must be determined. 
5 .  Display Format Experiments - -  Both  headup  and headown dis- 
plays are being considered for the  ILM. Further details 
as  to the type  and quantity of info.rmation  displayed must 
be  answered. A simulator experiment  must  be conducted to 
determine what the preferred format  is with respect to 
pilot workload, pilot acceptability, and pilot performance 
in making decisions and controlling the aircraft. The 
required accuracy of the  displayed elements must also  be 
determined on  an experimental basis. The fundamental ques- 
tion of whether the ILM can be  used as a display for manual 
landing in Category I11  weather must be answered. 
J 
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6 .  Timing Requirements - -  The current effort required the 
assumption of preliminary pilot models and a linearized 
model of the 737.  It also was assumed that the detection 
logic functions  in a given time period. The completion 
of the effort described in Tasks (1)-(5) above would pro- 
vide more exact information on the overall requirements of 
the  ILM. In addition, more exact nonlinear models Of the 
737 aircraft  are  under  development. More elaborate num- 
erical methods exist which can be used to determine the 
statistical distribution of aircraft  path perturbations 
due  to  faults. These elements  should be combined  in a de- 
tailed simulation to obtain more precise timing require- 
ments  for  the ILM to  detect  faults in order to provide a 
specified  level o f  safety. 
7. Integration of Sensor, Computer, and Display Requirements - -  
The sensor, system software, and display requirements will 
dictate what type of computer is required to  implement the 
ILM.  Before proceeding to  build a prototype of the sys- . 
tem, a design study  must be conducted to integrate  the com- 
ponents  and to provide the  final design specification. 
These seven tasks represent an integrated procedure which must 
be  followed  for  development o f  an ILM  that meets the wide range 
of potential  users'  requirements. These tasks are based on the 
systematic  procedure  developed  in  this  study  and other parallel 
work  that  has  been accomplished. These steps serve to obtain more 
exact  answers  and to obtain quantitative and qualitative data that 
can only be produced by man-in-the-loop simulator studies. 
The ILM has a great  potential for reducing aircraft operating 
costs by allowing  increased operation in low visibility conditions. 
However, to realize this  potential requires a vigorous research 
and  development  program with a full committment on the  part of the 
government to obtaining required technical  and operational infor- 
mation. Specifically, a systematic simulator validation program 
must be conducted to verify  the  various assumptions made  during  the 
course of this study. It is  recommended  that such action be taken 
based on the  steps outlined above. 
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APPENDIX A 
SAFETY BUDGET ANALYSIS 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
I n  C h a p t e r  I11 t h e  s y s t e m  s a f e t y  a s s e s s m e n t  was p r e s e n t e d  
us ing   an   event   ou tcome t r e e .  T h i s   t r e e  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F i g u r e  
3 3 .  The  purpose   o f   th i s   appendix  i s  t o  d e f i n e  i n  more  methemati- 
c a l  d e t a i l  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  t y p e s  o f  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
which a re  i n c l u d e d  a n d  r e l a t e  t h e s e  t o  t h e  e x p o s i t i o n  i n  C h a p t e r  
111. T h e s e   d e f i n i t i o n s  are r e l a t e d   t o   s a f e t y   r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  
ILM monitor  system. 
The  outcome t r e e  r e l a t e s  o n l y  t o  t h e  f i n a l  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
l and ing   approach .  I t  i s  a s sumed   t ha t  a c r i t i c a l   a l t i t u d e  h* 
e x i s t s   i n   t h e   m o n i t o r   l o g i c .  Above h* ,   t he   chances   o f  a s u c -  
ces fu l  go -a round  maneuver  fo l lowing  a f a u l t  a r e  g r e a t e r  t h a n  
the   chances   o f  a s u c c e s s f u l   a n d i n g .   T h u s ,  i f  t h e   f a u l t  i s  
de tec t ed   above   h* ,  a go-around  maneuver i s  always commanded 
(and  assumed t o  b e  o b e y e d ) ;  t h i s  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F i g u r e  3 4 ,  
as p i l o t   d e c i s i o n   S t r a t e g y  A .  A n o t h e r   s t r a t e g y   a l t e r n a t i v e ,  
d e s i g n a t e d  a s  d e c i s i o n  S t r a t e g y  B ,  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F i g u r e  35. 
This  i s  a v i a b l e  s t r a t e g y  p r o v i d e d  t h e  w e a t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s  p e r m i t  
a d e q u a t e  v i s u a l  c o n t a c t  t o  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  w i t h  t h e  r u n w a y  p r i o r  
t o  r e a c h i n g  a l t i t u d e  h;. 
The n e x t  s e c t i o n  d e f i n e s  t h e  v a r i o u s  p r o b a b i l i t y  terms. 
Then e q u a t i o n s   t o   c o m p u t e   t h e  terms d e f i n e d  a re  p r e s e n t e d .  The 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  l a n d i n g  m o n i t o r  ( I L M ) ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  
t o   t h e   e x i s t i n g   p r i m a r y   a u t o l a n d   m o n i t o r s ,  i s  d i scussed .   Add i -  
t i o n a l  d e f i n i t i o n s  a n d  e q u a t i o n s  a re  a l s o  p r e s e n t e d .  
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(Exclude Monitor) (Exclude Monitor) 
(Fau l t   F ree )  
F a i l u r e  
I I  
F a i l u r e  
Detec ted  
F a i l u r e  
F1-1 P r i o r  
Performance Disconnect 
“l;fl 
Atter 
=]E] VJj.:.:,,.] GIEl Go-Around Go-Around Landing Landing 
FIGURE 3 3 . -  EVENT OUTCOME TREE  FOR  MONITOR  OPERATION  DURING 
AUTOMATIC  LANDING  USING  STRATEGY A .  
FIGURE 34.- POST  FAULT  DETECTION  PILOT  DECISION 
STRATEGY (A) 
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Probability Definitions 
To understand the  equations in this appendix, -the following 
definitions are needed: 
hI = altitude indicated by monitor sensors 
h* = critical altitude 
hD = altitude where fault is detected 
h = altitude where jth fault occurs 
AhI = hI - hD; error in indicated altitude 
pfj  (hfj) = probability  density function that  jth fault 
fj 
occurs  at altitude hf 
j 
p~~ (hfj - hDlhfh) = conditional probability density function 
that detection of jth  fault  is detected 
at  altitude hD given that the  jth fault 
occurs at altitude hfj 
pI(AhI > h - hD) = probability that error AhI is greater 
* 
* 
than h - hD 
pI(AhI) = probability  density function of altitude error AhI 
pDk(hD) = probability density  function  that  the kth fault is 
incorrectly  identified  at altitude hD 
pDk(hDlhfk) = conditional probability  density function that 
the kth fault is identified at altitude hD 
given  that  this fault did not occur  at altitude 
hf k 
P(f,n)  (d,u)  (p,a,v)  (g,l) j  k (til hD) = failure probability 
density  function 
f = fault  present in equipment 
n = no fault present in equipment 
d = primary monitor detected fault 
1 2 8  
u = primary monitor undetected fault 
p = piloted control (displays) 
a = automatic control 
v = piloted control (visual) 
g = go-around decision 
1 = landing decision 
j = index on 
k = index on 
i = index  on 
Pfdpgj (‘i IhD) 
Pfdplj (‘i IhD) 
type  of fault (N total) 
type  of  false fault (N total) 
type of  catastrophe (M total) 
= conditional probability density  function 
that the ith catastrophe will occur  during 
go-around due  to the jth  fault being 
detected at hD 
= conditional probability density function 
that  the  ith catastrophe will occur  during 
landing due to  the jth fault  being  detected 
at hD 
= conditional probability  density function 
that  the  ith catastrophe will  occur  during 
landing due to  the j th fault occuring at 
h f j  and not being subsequently detected 
= conditional probability density function 
that  the  ith catastrophe will occur during 
go-around due to the kth fault being in- 
correctly identified  at altitude hD 
= conditional probability density function 
that the ith catastrophe will occur  during 
manual landing due to the kth fault being 
incorrectly identified at  altitude  hD 
Pnu a 1 = probability of  fault-free performance catastrophe 
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Pfual = probability of undetected fault causing automatic 
landing catastrophe 
Pfdpl 
pndp 1 
pndvl 
pf dvl 
hO 
P~~~ 
'EF 
'MAE 
'D 
tl 
t2 
"1 
"2 
"3 
probability of detected fault causing manual go- 
around catastrophe 
probability of detected fault causing manual 
landing catastrophe 
probability of false fault causing manual go-around 
catastrophe 
probability o f  false fault causing manual landing 
catastrophe 
probability of  false fault causing manual visual 
landing catastrophe 
probability o f  detected fault causing manual  visual 
landing catastrophe 
altitude at which monitor becomes functional 
probability of catastrophic accident  (total  system) 
probability of false primary monitor alarm 
probability of equipment  (airborne/ground)  fault 
probability of missed monitor alarm due to .primary 
monitor failure (PMF) 
probability of fault detection 
nominal flight duration from h to touchdown (TD) 
nominal flight duration from ho to h (critical 
altitude) 
* 
* 
landing decision exposure factor (Strategy A, B) 
go-around decision exposure factor (Strategy A, B) 
visual  landing exposure factor (Strategy B only) 
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Mathemat i ca l  Def in i t i ons  
Dete 'cted  Fault   Causing  Manual  Go-Around  Catastrophe 
To c o m p u t e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s u c c e s s f u l  g o - a r o u n d y  r e p l a c e  
Note t h a t  i n  E q .  (A. l )  
* 
* - J -ho 
P I  cAhI ' - hD> - P I  (AhI) dhl 
hO 
Detec ted  Fau l t  Caus ing  Manual  Landing  Catastrophe 
To c o m p u t e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  a s u c c e s s f u l  l a n d i n g ,  r e p l a c e  
P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a F a u l t  
N 0 
Undetec ted   Faul t   Caus ing  L'an'd'ing .C a t a s t r o p h e  . ' ' ' ' ' . ' 
To compute t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a s u c c e s s f u l  l a n  
M r M 
d i n g ,   r e p l a c e  
P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a Missed  Alarm 
= PE - PD (15) 
P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  D e t e c t i n g  a F a u l t  
Nuisance  Disconnect  Causing  Go-Around  Failure 
Here,  
1 3 2  
r D  h 
To c o m p u t e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a s u c c e s s f u l  g o - a r o u n d ,  r e p l a c e  
M M 
i=l Pndpgk ( c i  lhD) by [ 1 -  i=l P ndpgk ('i I hD)  1 
Nuisance  Disconnect  Caus ing  Landing  Fa i lure  
To c o m p u t e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a s u c c e s s f u l  l a n d i n g ,  r e p l a c e  
P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a Fa lse  Moni tor  A l a r m  
ComDutation  of C r i t i c a l  A l t i t u d e  (h 1 
* 
When h ? h , A - 
1 3 3  
Thus, when h > h , t h e   c o r r e c t   d e c i s i o n  i s  t o   g o - a r o u n d   a n d   f o r  
h < ha  i t  i s  t o   l a n d   m a n u a l l y .  
* 
- 
E x p o s u r e  F a c t o r s  f o r  S t r a t e g y  A 
T, 
- ( T1 + T2) 
- I 
- T2 
a 2  - (T1 + Tz) 
E x p o s u r e  F a c t o r s  f o r  S t r a t e g y  B 
= T2/(T1 + T2 + T3> 
a3 = T3/ IT1 + TZ + T3> 
P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  C a t a s t r o p h i c  A c c i d e n t s  f o r  D e s i g n  S t r a t e g y  A 
'A - {' - 'EF"'nua1 + 'FAE("1 'ndpl 
- + a  2 P ndpg) '  
. 'EF{'MAE . ' fual  + ( l  - 'MAE) (al 'fdp1 + "2 'fdpg) 
( 2 4 )  
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Probab i l i t y  o f  Ca ta s t roph i ' c .  Acc i .den t  ' f o r  De ' c ' i s . i on  S t r a t egy  B 
Independent  Landing  Monitor ( I L M ) .  The i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  
t h e  ILM i n t o  a n  a v i o n i c s  s y s t e m  w i t h  a p r imary  au to l and  capa -  
b i l i t y ,  i n t r o d u c e s  a d d i t i o n a l  terms i n t o   t h e   e q u a t i o n s ,   p r e s e n -  
t e d   i n   t h e   p r e v i o u s   s e c t i o n s .  The D r i n c i p a l   s o u r c e   o f   t h e s e  
terms i s  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  making  pro- 
cess r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  i n i t i a t i n g  a p i l o t  t a k e o v e r .  
The f o u r  o p t i o n s  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  T a b l e  34 a r i s e  d u e  t o  t h e  p o -  
t e n t i a l l y  c o n f l i c t i n g  o u t p u t s  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  ( i . e , ,  a u t o l a n d )  
a n d  s e c o n d a r y  ( i .  e .  , ILM) m o n i t o r s ,  
__ 
The e q u a t i o n s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  p r o v i d e  a r i g o r o u s  
b a s i s   f o r   ( a )   j u s t i f y i n g   t h e   i n c o r p o r a t i o n   o f   a n  I L M ,  (b)  d e t e r -  
m i n i n g   t h e   b e s t   t a k e o v e r   c r i t e r i o n ,   a n d   ( c )   g e n e r a t i n g   p e r f o r m a n c e  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  s y s t e m .  
Tab le  36.-POST FAULT DETECTION PILOT TAKEOVER CRITERION 
OPTIONS 
OPTION TAKEOVER I N I T I A T I O N  CRITERION 
1 
ILM - and  pr imary   moni tors  4 
ILM o n l y  ( i . e .  i g n o r e  p r i m a r y  m o n i t o r s )  3 
ILM - o r   p r i m a r y   m o n i t o r s  2 
Pr imary   mon i to r s   on ly  ( i . e .  no ILM) 
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Probability Definitions' 
Additional probability terms, introduced by the incorporation 
of a  secondary/ILM monitor are defined in this section. 
'FAI = probability of false ILM alarm 
Pms = probability of missed  ILM  alarm due to  ILM failure 
(PILM> or inherent missed alarm rate (P - MAI) ; 
- pMAI + P~~~ 
'ELE 
'GAE 
= probability of emergency landing catastrophe with 
primary monitors 
= probability of go-around catastrophe with primary 
monitors 
'MLE 
'EL I 
'GAI 
'MLE 
'SAE 
'SAI 
'SBE 
'SBI 
= probability of manual visual landing catastrophe with 
primary monitors 
= probability of emergency  landing catastrophe with ILM 
= probability of go-around catastrophe with ILM 
= probability of manual  landing catastrophe with ILM 
= probability of catastrophe using Strategy A with 
primary monitors 
= probability of catastrophe using  Strategy A with ILM 
= probability o f  catastrophe using  Strategy B with 
primary monitors 
= probability of catastrophe using Strategy B with ILM 
Mathematical Defintions 
Catastrophe  Using  Strategy A and Primary Monitors 
136 
’GAE = max ( P  P I ndpg’  fdpg 
we g e t  ’SAE = “1 ’ELE + “2 ‘GAE 
Ca ta s t rophe  ~ .. - -. - . U s i n g   S t r a t e g y  B an‘d .Pr imary  Monitors  
Def in ing  P~~~ = max. Pndvl Y ‘fdv1 I ( 2 9 )  
w e  g e t  P~~~ - “1 PELE + “2 P~~~ + “3 ’MLE 
N - 
(30) 
”~ Catas t rophe  ~~ Using   S t r a t egy  A and ILM 
Def in ing  - ’EL I - max {‘ndpl’  ‘f  I I (31) 
’GAI 
N 
= max { P  ndpg’ P fdpg’I ( 3 2 )  
we g e t  ’SAI - “1 P~~~ + “ 2  P~~~ (33) 
- - 
w h e r e   t h e   s u b s c r i p t  I denotes   usage   o f   an  TLM. N o t e   t h a t   h e  
pe r fo rmance  o f  t he  sys t em can  po ten t i a l ly  be  improved  du r ing  
emergency  landing (EL) and  go-around (GA) by us ing   gu idance  
commands s u p p l i e d  by t h e  I L M .  
Ca ta s t rophe  ~~ Using   S t r a t egy  B and I L M  
Define - ’ML I - max {‘ndvl’  ’fdvl’1 
w h e r e   s u b s c r i p t  I denotes   usage   o f   an  I L M .  N o t e   t h a t   i n   t h i s  
case t h e  ILM s e n s o r   m u s t   p r o v i d e   v i s i b i l i t y   e n h a n c e m e n t .   T h i s  
g i v e s  t h e  r e s u l t  
- 
’SBI - ’ELI + “2 ’GAI + “3 ’MLI 
(34) 
( 3 5 )  
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APPEVJDIX B 
COVARIANCE PROPAGATION ANALYSIS 
The assessment of post fault recovery performance is made by 
conducting a covariance propagation analysis, The objective of this 
appendix  is to (1) describe the mathematical models used for.  the 
aircraft/display/pilot system, (2 )  present the covariance propagation 
equation, and ( 3 )  relate the time sequence of covariance matrices 
to the catastrophic failure probabilities defined in Appendix A. 
The closed loop pilot display  aircraft  block diagram is shown 
in Figure 36; the  blocks  in  this figure are  described in the f o 1 l . o ~ -  
ing . 
Linearized Aircraft Model ( B - 7 3 7 )  
Linearized longitudinal and lateral axis Todels o f  the Termin- 
ally  Configured  Vehicle ( 3 - 7 3 7 )  were developed to conduct the co- 
variance propagation analysis. The linearized aircraft equations 
are  described by the  vector  differential equation, 
where x is the state vector, u is the control input vector, and 
wd is the  disturbance  vector. It is  assumed  that Wd is a zero  mean 
white noise source with 
The longitudinal  and lateral decoupled perturbation equations are 
numerically specified  in Figures 37 and 3 8 ,  respectively, for  the 
flight condition. 
139 
I 
W 
d E x t e r n a l  
D i s t u r b a n c e  vm - - - - - - - - - - - - - "1 Measurement Noise ( e . g . ,  MLS, ILM) I I 
u C o n t r o l  
I 
I I 
I 
. * A c t u a t o r  
A i r c r a f t  Model L _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _  J 
-+ A i r c r a f t  
b D i s p l a y  
r""""""""""" -1 
I I 
I 
I 
I 
A 
Cont ro l l e1 -4  E s t i m a t o r  x 
I 
I wm 
I 
I Motor Noise P i l o t  Model 
v I 
D i s p l a y /  I 
Percept ior l  
d 
L"""""""""" Noise  I 
FIGURE 36 .-MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM BLOCK D I A G R A M  
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0 = pitch 
u = normalized  velocity 
I 01 = angle-of-attack 
~ q = pitch  ra e 
h = altitude 
Rs=  slant  range 
6, = elevator 
C;T = thrust 
ug = gust component (longitudinal) 
ag = gust component (angle-of- 
attack) 
P 
P 
P 
FIGURE 37.-LONGITUDINAL PERTURBATION  EQUATIONS 
9 = r o l l  a n g l e  
JI = yaw a n g l e  
B = s i d e s l i p  a n g l e  
p = r o l l  r a t e  
r = yaw r a t e  
L = Lateral  Displacement 
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0 
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-0.0678 
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6a = a i l e r o n  = g u s t  cornponenet ( s i d e s l i p )  
6r = rudder  
FIGURE38.-LATERAL  PERTURBATION  EQUATIONS 
A1 ti tude = .30'5m -(100.0.  ft) 
Airspeed = 120 kts 
Weight = 31,800 kg (70,000  lb)
Thrust = 38,440  Nt  (8654 lb) 
Angle-of-Attack = 4.37O 
Flight Path Angle = -3' 
.For the longitudinal axis, the go-around maneuver was simulatd 
by open loop commands for  the  elevator  and thrust inputs  given  by: 
where 
'eel. 6emax = (maximum  elevator  angle) 
6 emax 
= maximum elevator rate 
6eo = elevator  command  at t t to 
and 
'Th(t) = 'Th max + ['Tho - 'Th max 1 e (39) 
-t/T 
where 
'Th max = 62,150 Nt  (14,000 lb) 
T = 1 s  
6 
= thrust command at t = to 
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a ( t >  5 amax 
where amax = 18' 
Display  (Measurement)   Equat ion 
The d i s p l a y  s y s t e m  i n  F i g u r e  3 6  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  e q u a t i o n ,  
z = H x  + V  (41) 
where the measurement  matr ix  H i s  d e f i n e d  i n  F i g u r e  3 9 f o r  t h e  
l o n g i t u d i n a l   a n d   l a t e r a l   a x i s .  The n o i s e  V ,  made up  of   measure-  
r ien t  no ise  vm a n d  d i s p l a y  n o i s e  V d ,  i s  de f ined  by  
I t  i s  assumed t h a t  v i s  a zero   mean,   whi te   no ise   source   wi th  
P i l o t  Model 
A number of  math  models  have  been  proposed  to  charac te r ize  the  
p i l o t  i n  t h e  g l i d e s l o p e  a n d  l o c a l i z e r  t r a c k i n g  p h a s e  o f  t h e  m a n u a l  
l and ing   t a sk .   These   mode l s   r ange   f rom  the   f r equency   domain   t r ans -  
f e r  f u n c t i o n  t o  t h e  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  m o d e l s .  
144 
LONGITUDINAL: 
em 
0. m 
hm 
Rs 
LATERAL : 
0 .  
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I -  1 0  0 1  
FIGURE  39.-DISPLAY  (MEASUREMENT)  EQUATION 
An isomorphic form for the optimal control model was proposed 
by Kleiiman [ 3 3 ] ,  as shown in Figure 40. This model attempts  to 
retain a one-to-one correspondance with hypothesized pilot acti- 
vity, in terms of an observation phase, information processing 
phase and a motor phase. From an input-output point of view, this 
model  can  be  simplified  to  that  in Figure 41. Although neither 
o f  these models has been  fully validated, analysis to date  indicates 
that  the latter model, consisting o f  a Kalman estimator followed 
by an optimal controller is  an adequate representation for current- 
l y  available pilot data. 
To incorporate the motor noise term  into  the  aircraft equations 
as  in Figure 36, define 
u(t) = u opt + wm 
The aircraft equation is augmented so that 
+ Gu OP t 
where 
w 
+ rw 
(44) 
(47)  
and 
Q = E { w w  1 T 
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Motor Noise 
Equalization 
Observation 
Noise 
FIGURE  40.-OPTIMAL  CONTROL  MODEL OF PILOT  RESPONSE 
u ( t )  
l c r  - 1  9;- Filter 
Ka 1 man 1 ) i s p l a y  
Command 
Motor Noise 
W m ( t )  
D i s p l a y / P e r c e l ) t i o n  
E r r o r  (Obscrvc l t  ion 
noise) 
FIGURE 41.-SIMPLIFIED  PILOT  MODEL 
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R e f e r r i n g  t o  F i g u r e  36, t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h e  p i l o t ,  d u r i n g  t h e  
t r a c k i n g  t a s k  i s  t o  k e e p  d e v i a t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  n o m i n a l  p a t h  a s  small 
as p o s s i b l e ,   u s i n g   t h e   f e e d b a c k   c o n t r o l   u ( t ) .   N o t e   t h a t   t h e   e q u a -  
t i o n s  (36)  a n d   ( 4 5 )   a r e   l i n e a r i z e d   p e r t u r b a t i o n   e q u a t i o n s   a n d  do 
n o t   i n c l u d e   t h e   n o m i n a l   t r a j e c t o r y .   S i m i l a r l y   t h e   c o n t r o l   i n p u t   u ( t ) ,  
o n l y  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  c o r r e c t i v e  p a r t  o f  t'he c o n t r o l  a c t i o n  a n d  i n c l u d -  
es   the   open   loop   nominal  commands. 
T h u s ,  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h e  p i l o t ,  a s  a n  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l l e r  i s  
to  min imize  a q u a d r a t i c  i n d e x  o f  t h e  f o r m .  
F o r  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  e f f i c i e n c y ,  i f  t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e  a s s u m p t i o n  i s  
made ( i . e . ,  T -f m ) ,  t h e n  t h e  f i l t e r  a n d  c o n t r o l l e r  g a i n s  a r e  t i m e  
i n v a r i e n t .  But t h e   f i l t e r   r e p r e s e n t i n g   t h e   p i l o t  i s  no l o n g e r  
o p t i m a l .   M o r e o v e r   t h e   s t a t e   e s t i m a t e   a n d   s t a t e   e s t i m a t i o n   e r r o r s  
a r e   c o r r e l a t e d .  A s  a consequence   t he   cova r i ance   p ropaga t ion   ana ly -  
s i s ,  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n ,  m u s t  b e  p e r f o r m e d  w i t h  t h e  
a u g m e n t e d   s t a t e   v e c t o r  x GIT , where i s  t h e   s t a t e   s t i m a t e   o f  
t h e  " i n f i n i t e  t i m e "  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  Kalman e s t i m a t o r .  
The numer i ca l  va lues  o f  t h e  w e i g h t i n g  m a t r i c e s  A and B ,  and 
the  process  and  measurement  noise  te rms  Q and R ,  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  
F igu re  42 
Covar iance  Propagat ion  
B a s e d  o n  t h e  p i l o t - a i r c r a f t - d i s p l a y  m o d e l  d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e ,  t h e  
o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  e q u a t i o n s  u s e d  t o  a s s e s s  
p o s t  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  r e c o v e r y  p e r f o r m a n c e .  
The i n i t i a l   s t a t e   c o v a r i a n c e   m a t r i x  Pf:(0) r e p r e s e n t s   t h e  
e n v e l o p e   o f   d i s p e r . s i o n s   o f   t h e   a i r c r a f t   s t a t e  x a t  t h e  p o i n t  
o f  f a u l t   d e t e c t i o n .  The c o v a r i a n c e   p r o p a g a t i o n   t e c h n i q u e  
1 4 8  
LONGITUDINAL: 
A = diag [33, 100, 33, 0, 0.01, 0.001] 
B = diag [130, 0.251 
Q = diag [0.01, 0.0025] 
R = diag [0.0003, 0.000068, 0.0003, 1, 251 
LATERAL : 
A = diag  [33, 33, 33, 0, 0, 
B = diag  [13, 331 
Q = lo-' 
R = diag  [0.00015, 0.00015, 0.00015, 12.51 
FIGURE 42.-NUMERICAL VALUES FOR PILOT MODEL AND PROCESS-MEASUREMENT 
NOISE COVARIANCES 
is used to determine  the  manner  in which the covariance matrix P* 
evolves  from P * ( O ) .  This matrix  finally reaches the  steady  state 
nominal  value  (due t o  external disturbances only). 
To perform covariance propagation, define 
vector  differential  equation of dimension 2n, 
[f] = [" I - 
KH I F-GX-KH 
an  augmen%ed  system 
(50 
Define 
and F I - G h  
I - - - - -  
KH I K-Gh-KH 
" 1 (52 1 
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Then the vector differential equation to propagate the initial 
covariance is, 
r 1 
The initial 
detection, is 
L 
covariance matrix P*(O), at  the  point of fault 
Thus, to evaluate  fault  recovery performance, Equation ( 5 3 )  is 
numerically integrated for the longitudinal and lateral represent- 
ations of the system. To determine whether the  resulting  time 
sequence of covariance matrices represent a "successful" post 
fault  detection recovery, it  is necessary to relate the covari- 
ance matrix  to  the  probability of catastrophe, during a landing 
or go-around maneuver  defined in Appendix A ;  this is  discussed 
in  the  next section. 
Computation of Catastrophe Probability From The Covariance  Matrix 
The system fault recovery performance is  evaluated  by start- 
ing with an  initial  covariance  matrix  (representing  the state o f  
the aircraft at  fault detection, in a statistical sense). Then, 
by performing covariance propagation, the time sequence by which 
this initial covariance transitions t o  the nominal covariance 
matrix, (by the stable pilot/display/aircraft  feedback control 
system) is obtained. This is graphically depicted for the land- 
ing/go-around task, for  one of the  system states (altitude), in 
Figures 4.3a and 43b, respectively. The following discussion relates 
the  probability of catastrophe resulting from a go-around (PGaE/ 
1 5 0  
Acceptable  Deviation r Envelope 
ovariance 
Nominal G1 ide- 
Flare  Point 
S,tate Manifold 
At Fault  Detection 
FIGURE  43a.-MANUAL  LANDING TASK FAULT  RECOVERY 
- Covariance 
Y Minimum  Height > 
Obstacle  Clearance 
Limit 
FIGURE  43b.-MANUAL  GO-AROUND  TASK  FAULT  RECOVERY 
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PGAI)  and  landing (PMLE/PMLI), de5Fined In Appendix A and  used in 
Chapter 111, to the covariance propagation computations. 
Let x be the random n-vector representing the system state 
whose  component.^ can take on a continuous set of values with the 
probability density function 
P(X) = 1 exp [ -1/2 (x-X) P (x-X) ] 
T -1 
C2dn/Z I p I 1/ 2 (55)  
where 
E(x) = X = mean value of state vector ( 5 6 )  
and 
E{(x-x) (x-x) I =  P = covariance matrix o f  vector T ( 5 7 )  
It is o f  interest to determine the constant such that 
the  probability that x lies outside the hyperellipsoid. 
(x-x)TP-l  (x-X) = R 2 (58)  
is less  than  the go-around (PGAE/PGAI) or landing  (PMLE/pMLI) 
catastrophe probability requirement. Then, an approximate method 
of ensuring  that  the hyperellipsoid defined by Equation (58) does 
not  violate  any o f  the state constraints (e.g., angle-of-attack, 
obstacle clearance, etc.)’,  is  to check  whether  inequalities of the 
form, 
where xi max is  the  maximum allowable deviation in state i and 
ai is  the ith diagonal element of the covariance matrix. 
A more accurate method of ensuring constraint satisfaction is 
to define  the constraint boundaries as another hyperellipsoid o f  
the form, 
1 5 2  
(x-$  C(x-X) < m T 2 - 
Then it can  be shown t h a t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  a n d  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  
f o r  c o n s t r a i n t  s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  t h e  m a t r i x ,  
i . e . ,  t h e  m a t r i x  d e f i n e d  by Eq.  (61) i s  p o s i t i v e  s e m i d e f i n i t e .  F o r  
t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y ,  i n e q u a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  form  of 
Eq.   (59)   were  checked.   The  valuat ion  of   catastrophe  probabi l i ty  
a s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  n and R was performed  and i s  t a b u l a t e d  i n  T a b l e  3 7 .  
I t  c a n  b e  s e e n  t h a t  f o r  a s i x t h  o r d e r  s y s t e m  t o  a c h i e v e  a p r o b a b i l -  
i t y   o f   c a t a s t r o p h i c   a c c i d e n t   o f   a b o u t   ( e . g .  , r e q u i r e d   f o r   g o -  
around  and  landing  in   Appendix A ) ,  t h e   f o u r   s i g m a  (40 )  c o v a r i a n c e  
d i s p e r s i o n   b o u n d a r y   m u s t   b e   c h e c k e d   f o r   c o n s t r a i n t   v i o l a t i o n .  The 
assumed a i r c r a f t  r e c o v e r y  limits a n d  t h e  f l a r e  p o i n t  window a r e  
p r e s e n t e d   i n   T a b l e  3 6 .  The r ecove ry  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  to be   " success -  
f u l "  i f  t h e  r e c o v e r y  limits a r e  n o t  i n c l u d e d  a n d  t h e  " t i m e - t o - c o r -  
r e c t "  i s  t h a t  r e q u i r e d  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  f l a r e  p o i n t  window c o n s t r a i n t s  
of  Table  36.  
Extens ion  of  the  Covar iance  Propagat ion  Technique  
The p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n s  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  m a n n e r  i n  w h i c h  t h e  c o v a . r i -  
a n c e  p r o p a g a t i o n  t e c h n i q u e ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  c e r t a i n  p r o b a b i l i t y  i n t e -  
g r a l s ,  a l l o w  o n e  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  s y s t e m  f a u l t  r e c o v e r y  p e r f o r m a n c e .  
This  methodology was a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  n u m e r i c a l  e x a m p l e  d o c u -  
men ted  in  F igu res  37and  38 , f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  c o n d i t i o n  n o t e d  i n  t h e  
a p p e n d i x .   e a r l i e r .  To p e r f o r m   t h e   a n a l y s i s  more t h o r o u g h l y ,  it is  
e s s e n t i a l   t h a t   t h e   e n t i r e   f l i g h t   t r a j e c t o r y   b e   c o n s i d e r e d .  The con- 
ceptual  f ramework by which t h i s  i s  accomplished i s  now d i s c u s s e d .  
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Consider  a t y p i c a l  t e r m i n a l  area t r a j e c t o r y  d e p i c t e d  i n  F ig -  
u r e  44 ( a l s o   d e s c r i b e d   i n   C h a p t e r  11). The d i f f e r e n t   f l i g h t   p h a s e s  
d u r i n g  t h e  t r a v e r s a l  o f  t h i s  t r a j e c t o r y  a r e  p a r t i t i o n e d  i n  t h e  
f i g u r e   a n d  are l a b e l e d  a ,  b y  c y  d ,   a n d   e .  When t h e  a i r c r a f t  i s  
f l y i n g  a l o n g  t h i s  t r a j e c t o r y ,  u s i n g  t h e  p r i m a r y  a u t o l a n d  s y s t e m ,  
e a c h  o f  t h e s e  p h a s e s  c a n  b e  m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a l i n e a r  
p e r t u r b a t i o n   e q u a t i o n   s u c h  as Eq .   (36 ) ,   w i th   t he   f eedback   l oop  
shown i n   F i g u r e  36 b e i n g   c l o s e d  by t h e   a u t o l a n d   s y s t e m .   T a b l e  39 
shows the  sequence  o f  s y s t e m  m a t r i c e s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d -  
i n g   a u t o l a n d   e s t i m a t o r ,   c o n t r o l l e r   a n d   c o s t   f u n c t i o n .   S i m i l a r l y ,  
Table  4 0  d e p i c t s  t h e  same sequence  of  mat . r ices  when t h e  s y s t e m  i s  
under  manual  cont ro l .  
TABLE 37-CATASTROPHE PROBABILITIES AS A FUNCTION 
OF SYSTEM DIMENSIONALITY(n) AND MULTIPLE 
( a )  OF STANDARD DEVIATION(o) 
8 I 4 . 2  
5 - 6  7 8 
(x  l o + )  (x l o + )  ( X T 7 - q "  .~ (x  l o - ?  ~ . .~ 
0 . 5  0 . 3  
L O . 0 6  1 0 . 0 0 1  
1 . 4  1 . 0  0 . 2 2  0 . 0 1  
~. ~ .- ,. . -. " . .
3.4  2.8  0 .75 0 . 1  I 
~ ~~~~~ ~~ - .. - 
7 . 6  7 . 3  2 . 2 7  0 . 2  
1 5 . 6  1 7 . 6  6 . 3 6  0.8 
S 
1 5 4  
TABLE  38.-ASSUMED  AIRCRAFT  RECOVERY  LIMITS  AND  FLARE 
POINT 'WINDOW 
- 
RECOVERY 
AX1 S WINDOW MIN MAX STATE 
FLARE PO I NT LIMITS 
8 ,  O 
- + 1 . 5 ( +  - 5) - 30.5(-100) 305(100) h ,  m ( f t )  
- + 0.05 - 3  3 9, O / S  
- + 0 . 5  - 1 0  + 2 2  01, O 
- + 0 . 0 2  - 0.15 0.15 u ,  - 
L o n g i t u d i n a l  - + 0 . 5  - 1 2  1 2  
Rs ,m( f t )  
& e ,  O 
- + 3.05   (+ lo)  - -610  ( -2000)  915 (3000)  
1 0  - + 1  - 5  
& t h  - + 100 - 500 5000 
4 ,  O 
1 5  $ 9  O 
- + 1  - 1 5  1 5  
- 1 5  
6, O 5 
- + 0.5 - 5  5 I?, O / S  
- + 1 . 5  - 5  
T, O / S  5 - 5  - + 0 . 5  
L ,m( f t )  152  (500) - + 6.1(+20) - -152  (-500) 
La tera l  
+ 1 . 5  - 
1 
1 5'5 
IrIISSED APPROACH 
I 
INTERMEDIATE 
"- 
RADIAL e 
$ 2  
P L  
f 
FIGURE  44.-TYPICAL  TERMINAL  AREA  TRAJECTORY 
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TABLE 39.  "ATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION OF NOElINAL AUTOLAND (PRIMARY SYSTEW) 
FLIGHT PHASES 
PHASE 
a 
b 
C 
d 
e 
AUTOLAND MODEL AIJTOLAND SYSTEM COST 
MATRICES COBINENTS FUNCTION CONTROLLER ESTIMATOR 
Kaa x a a  *aa > 'aa A p p r o a c h   f l a p s   g e a r  down, l o o s e   t r a c k i n g  
Fab  Gab Curved,   descending Aab  Bab 'ab Kab 
ac GS = S o ,  l a n d i n g  f l a p s ,  d e c e l e r a t i n g  
Fad Gad GS = 2.8', t i g h t  t r ack -  Aad Bad 'ad Kad 
i n g  
9 G a e   F l a r e  *ae  $Bae 'ae  Kae - 
! 
i 
j 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
! 
~ 
Nomenclature:  A (a lmlF)  (a  . . . e )  
F i r s t  S u b s c r i p t   ( a l m l F ) :   A u t o m a t i c l N a n u a l   F a u l t  
Second  Subscr ip t  (a . . . e ) :   F l i g h t   P h a s e s  
i 
TABLE 40.-MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION OF NOMINAL MANUAL CONTROL (BACKUP  SYSTEM) 
FLIGHT PHASES 
PHASE 
SYSTEM 
MATRICES 
Fma ' Gma 
Frnb Gmb 
Fmc 9 Gmc 
Fmd  Gmd 
Fme* me G 
r , PILOT 
ESTIMATOR 
Kma 
;ODEL - 
CONTROLLER 
ma 
mb 
mc 
md 
me 
FUNCTION 
Amb ' Bmb 
3 Bmc 
Amd , Bmd 
9 Bme 
COMMENTS 
Approach   f laps . ,  gear 
down, l o o s e  tracking 
Curved ,   descend ing  
GS = 5 " ,  l a n d i n g  f l a p s ,  
d e c e l e r a t i n g  
GS = 2 . 8 " '  t i g h t  track- 
i n g  
Flare  
Thus, to thoroughly evaluate the overall system performance, 
linear perturbation models must  be constructed for each of these 
phases, and the covariance propagation program must  be  exercised 
to sequence through the  entire  trajectory. 
Two flight phases are singled out for further comment, namely, 
flake. and go-around. During the flare phase, the system model is 
essentially nonlinear due to the flare control law and the ground 
effect on aerodynamic coefficients. Consequently, a sequence of 
models rather than a single model is needed to represent this  phase. 
and again, a sequence of models is necessary  to describe accurately 
the transition from  small  signal perturbations to a  limiting  control 
si  tuat  ion. 
For go-around, the aircraft controls are at their  limiting values, 
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APPENDIX C 
STATISTICAL TESTS 
Depe ndin g on the hypothesis being tested, a numb er of statis- 
tical  tests can be used [ 2 2 - 2 5 1 .  The  applicable tests, to detect 
changes in the mean and variance, are  presented in Table 41. This 
table categorizes the statistical tests according to  the hypothesis 
and whether  the sample is unipariate or multivariate.  Let {xili=l 
n 
be a sample from a normal distribution with constant mean po and 
variance a . To test whether a given sample {xi) satisfies the 
null  hypothesis (02 = oo) or  the alternate (a # ao) one can per- 
form either a likelihood ratio test [ 2 2 ]  or a chi square (x ) test. 
Even under the assumption of normality  and  independent sample 
assumption, the likelihood ratio test  is a complex function of the 
sample variance. Analytical or  empirical results on the distribu- 
tion of the likelihood ratio tests, necessary to compute  test 
thresholds, are not available in literature. Therefore, in prac- 
tice, a chi square (x ) test  from  the null hypothesis  (denoted  by 
H : u = uo) is used. This  test is also used here, for detecting 
univariate variance changes as documented in  Table 4 1 .  
2 
0 2 2 2 
2 
-2 
2 
The statistic for the x 2  test is 
(n-1) s 2 x2 = 2
aO 
which under Ho has a x* distribution with v = n-1 
freedom. 
and 
whe re 
The usual central region is  thus made up of 
( 6 2 )  
degrees of 
1 6 1  
HYPOTHESES 
MEAN -
Ho: u = uo 
H1: IJ f uo 
VARIANCE 
2 2  Ho: u =a 
H1: u #ao 2 2  
2 2  
0 
u >uo 
TABLE 41.-APPLICABLE  PARAMETRIC  STATISTICAL  TESTS 
U N I V A R I A T E  
u KXOWN u USKNOWN 
2 T E S T :  1 t T E S T :  
r :  CORRELATION ROBUST TO  NOR- 
C O E F F I C I E N T  1 MALITY A S S U N P -  
( B I - V A R I A T E )   T I O N  
- 1  x = -  c x  
n i=l i 
M A X I N J P I   L I K E L I f I O O D   T E S T  
LARGE  SAMPLE  APPROXIMATION:  x 2  
N O T   R O B U S T   T O   N O W A L I T Y  
ASSU3IPTION 
MULTIVARIATE  (O .XE-SIDED NOT A P P L I C A B L E )  
u KNOWN 
x 2  T E S T  
(VECTOR 
C A S E )  
u U X n i O l i ' N  
S = COVARIANCE  MATRIX 
x, = CONFIDENCE LEVEL SETTING 
MAXIMUW L I K E L I H O O D   T E S T  
LARGE  SAYPLE  APPROXIMATION:  T2 
u KNO;VS/UNXNOWN 
2 1 n 
i=l 
s = (x) (Xi - x)  - 2  sample variance ( 6 5 )  
sample mean 
and rl = false alarm rate. 
For one sided tests with the alternate hypothesis u > o 0 ,  the 
central region is 
2 2 
A lOO(1-rl) % confidence interval for u2 is 
The probability, P, depends on the  alternate  hypothesis.  For 
example, if the alternate hypothesis is CH1: u > uol  then, 2 
However real sample data (xi)  are usually correlated. Since the 
x2 test assumes random samples, the  test results will be  degraded. 
In other words, probability of false alarm ,-, will in  general be 
larger  than the value assumed in the calculations preceding  this 
test. An empirical study needs  to  be conducted to evaluate  the 
effects of departures from the underlying assumptions. 
Another source of error includes deviations from the assump- 
tion of n.ormality. The chi-square test  is not robust with respect 
to the normality assumption, Sensitivity of the test to deviations 
from normality cac be studied empirically.' 
To test the hypothesis that the mean p is  equal  to some 
constant po (denoted  by Ho: p = vo), the t test  is  used when 
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(J i s  unknown.  The t t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  i s  [24]  L 
(X - Po)  - 
to - S Jii 
which  under Ho has  a s t u d e n t ' s  t d i s t r i b u t i o n   w i t h  v = n - 1  
degrees  o f  freedom. As  i n   t h e  x 2  t e s t ,  t h e  P va lue   depends  
on t h e   a l t e r n a t e   h y p o t h e s i s .  When t h e   a l t e r n a t e   h y p o t h e s i s  i s  
IH1: u # u o l ,  t h e n  
An i n t e r v a l  estimate f o r  1-1 i s  g i v e n   b y   t h e   1 0 0 ( 1 - n ) %   c o n f i d e n c e  
i n t e r v a l  
where t l -  (n,2)  ( n -1 )  i s  t h e  1 0 0  [ l -   ( n / 2 ) ] t h   p e r c e n t i l e   o f   t h e  
s t u d e n t ' s  t d i s t r i b u t i o n   w i t h  v = n - 1   d e g r e e s   o f   r e e d o m .   T h i s  
i n t e r v a l  i s  u s e d   t o   t e s t  IHo: u = pol a g a i n s t  {H1: u # v o 3 .  
Ho i s  r e j e c t e d   a t   l e v e l  rl i f  1-1 f a l l s   o u t s i d e   t h i s   c o n f i d e n c e  0 
i n t e r v a l .   U n l i k e   t h e  x 2  t e s t ,   t h e  t t e s t  i s  known t o   b e   r o b u s t ,  
t h a t  i s ,  i n s e n s i t i v e   t o   m o d e r a t e   d e v i a t i o n s   f r o m   t h e   a s s u m p t i o n  
o f  n o r m a l i t y ,  when the  sample  i s  random. 
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